The concept of constitution in the history of political thought by Górnisiewicz, Arkadiusz & Szlachta, Bogdan
Arkadiusz Górnisiewicz and Bogdan Szlachta (Eds.)
The Concept of Constitution in the History of Political Thought

Arkadiusz Górnisiewicz and Bogdan Szlachta (Eds.)
The Concept of 
Constitution in the 
History of Political 
Thought 
Managing Editor: Katarzyna Michalak
Associate Editor: Arkadiusz Górnisiewicz
Language Editor: Mark C. Anderson
ISBN 978-3-11-058191-1
e-ISBN 978-3-11-058192-8 
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License. 
For details go to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/.
© 2017 Arkadiusz Górnisiewicz, Bogdan Szlachta and chapter`s contributors.
Published by De Gruyter Open Ltd, Warsaw/Berlin
Part of Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
The book is published with open access at www.degruyter.com.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress.
Managing Editor: Katarzyna Michalak
Associate Editor: Arkadiusz Górnisiewicz
Language Editor: Mark C. Anderson
www.degruyteropen.com
Cover illustration: © 2017 4FR, gettyimages
Complimentary copy, not for sale.
Contents
Editors’ Note and Acknowledgments     IX
Bogdan Szlachta
1 The Ambiguity of Constitutionalism    1
 Bibliography     12
Paweł Kaczorowski
2 Epistemology of Constitution     14
2.1 Part One     14
2.2 Part Two     19
2.3 Conclusion     28
 Bibliography     29
Alvydas Jokubaitis
3 Can the Constitution Do Away with Nation State?     32
3.1 The Phenomenon of Central and Eastern Europe     33
3.2 The Nature of the Nation State     36
3.3 The Conflict between Nation and Constitution     39
 Bibliography     44
Waldemar A. Skrobacki
4 Remarks on the Legal and the Practical:  
The Rechtsstaat in Europe’s Development of the Rule of Law      45
 Bibliography     60
Dorota Pietrzyk-Reeves
5 Magna Carta and the Rise of Anglo-American Constitutionalism     63
5.1 The Great Charter     63
5.2 Magna Carta as a Model in Medieval and Early-Modern Europe     66
5.3 Magna Carta in America     71
5.4 Conclusion     72
 Bibliography     73
Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski
6 The Case of France: Vitality of the Republican Legal Tradition     75
6.1 Idea of the Sovereignty of the Nation and Its Ramifications     76
6.2 Statism and Centralism     80
6.3 Opposition to the Rule of Judges     82
6.4 The Fifth Republic – Institutional Revolution within the Framework of 
Republican Tradition     84
6.5 Conclusions     85
 Bibliography      86
Ferenc Hörcher
7 Is the Historical Constitution of Hungary Still a Living Tradition? A Proposal 
for Reinterpretation     89
7.1 The Historical Constitution of Hungary: A Diffuse Concept     89
7.2 Political Thought, Constitutional Culture and the “Philosophy” of the 
Constitution     91
7.3 Historical Layers of Constitutional Life in Hungary     93
7.4 Founding the Historical Constitution? The Golden Bull     93
7.5 Stephen Werbőczy     94
7.6 Stephen Bocskai     96
7.7 Transforming and Reflecting Upon the Historical Constitution:  
The Eighteenth Century     97
7.8 The Golden Age of Historical Constitutionalism: The Nineteenth Century  
  99
7.9 Anachronistic Afterlife, Death and Revival (?) of the Historical 
Constitution: The Twentieth Century     101
7.10 The Achievements and the Failures of the Historical Constitution  
  105
7.11 How to Reinterpret the Tradition of the Historical Constitution?     108
 Bibliography     110
Arkady Rzegocki
8 Polish Constitutional Traditions     113
 Bibliography     121
Igor D. Osipov and Leonid V. Smorgunov
9 Russian Constitutionalism     123
9.1 Philosophy of Law and Constitutional Ideas in the 19th and Early 20th 
Centuries     125
9.2 Ideas of Soviet Constitutionalism     130
9.3 Constitutional Ideas of the Human Rights Movement in the USSR  
  134
9.4 Constitutionalism in Today’s Russia      139
 Bibliography     141
Bogdan Szlachta
10 Theoretical Problems in the Preamble to the 1997 Polish Constitution in the 
Perspective of History of Political Thought     144
Index     154

   IX
Editors’ Note and Acknowledgments
The aim of the present volume is to discuss the notion of constitution from the per-
spectives of history of political thought. Its scholarly intention is to go beyond the 
approach concentrating on the formal understanding of constitution and bring 
forward more complex historical and philosophic-political interpretations. Our point 
of departure was the need to revive the somehow neglected distinction between the 
idea of constitution as an act of conscious law-giving activity and the notion of consti-
tution conceived as the set of fundamental political rules derived from the very nature 
of political regime and its historical development. 
We are fully aware that a multi-authored volume cannot retain the coherency and 
methodological unity offered by a single-authored monograph. Nevertheless, the het-
erogeneous character of this volume is mitigated by the effort of the authors to engage 
the problems of constitutionalism in historical-political perspective. 
We would like to express our thanks to Dr Kálmán Pócza from Pázmány Péter 
Catholic University in Budapest for helpful remarks and suggestions. We also thank 
all the authors for their contributions. Finally, we would like to thank Katarzyna 
Michalak from De Gruyter Open for her assistance and advice. 
Dr. Arkadiusz Górnisiewicz and Prof. Bogdan Szlachta
Faculty of International and Political Studies
The Jagiellonian University in Kraków

Bogdan Szlachta1
1  The Ambiguity of Constitutionalism
Presently, in literature on the subject, the term “constitutionalism” (from the Latin 
constitutio – “polity,” “constitution”) is usually associated with the rule of law, a 
political system in which government actions are taken on the basis of and within the 
limits set by law. By such an association, the constitution is seen as a normative act 
of the highest order, from which the highest public authorities (forming and applying 
the law) draw their authoritative competences. Constitutionalism, therefore, would 
refer to the most important element of reflection about the “legal state” (Rechtsstaat), 
in which every act of authority is based on and remains (or should be based on and 
should remain) within the framework defined by law. Without going into divagations 
about the legal state, carried out since the second half of the nineteenth century 
and usually in connection with the popularization of legal positivism, or about the 
criticism of the supporters of normativism conscious that positivism, contrary to its 
essence, does not justify the existence of standards from which the legislature derives 
its right of fixing normative acts, since it is to be the authority setting the provisions 
of constitutional status, it should be noted that historians of political thought speak 
carefully about the dominant association of constitutionalism with the concept of 
providing for the existence of a written basic law. Even if they join in a debate led 
by lawyers or political scientists engaged in the study of constitutionalism, they still 
claim that the concepts justifying the restriction of the will of legislators by some nor-
mative requirements appeared already in antiquity, not finding them in the written 
“basic law,” but in the standards of customary, fundamental rights, the standards 
of God’s or natural law as well as the law of nations, hence in the standards of a 
“higher law” preceding and limiting the will of the legislator.2 According to histori-
ans of political thought, the term “constitutionalism” describes concepts that justify 
1  The Jagiellonian University in Kraków.
2  See i.e.: Elkin and Soltan (1993); Elster (1988). However, while the rules binding the will of the 
authorities, and perhaps also setting the grounds for the system in which they work, need not be 
included in the written act, they should have a normative and not merely nominal value, since oth-
erwise even the written constitution is not honoured by the authorities (although a respect for it is 
required from the governed). For example, until the late 1980s, in the name of achieving the objectives 
set by the communist ideology the authorities in the so-called “people’s democracies” frequently 
violated regulations of the nominal constitutions, did not honour any solid legal principles, following 
the rules determined arbitrarily or they were guided by the terms of the current effectiveness of the ac-
tions; despite the fact that these constitutions granted the citizens of these states (here I am avoiding 
the problem whether or not they were states) individual rights, for example, to freedom of expression 
or assembly. The authorities involved in formal constitutional regulations sometimes applied other 
rules (of an extra-constitutional or even non-legal character), challenging the rights formally held by 
citizens.
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opposition to despotism/tyranny (in which the will of the ruler is not limited by a 
“higher law,” but is treated as the only source of law), and today also against authori-
tarianism, referring sometimes to a written constitution, but to some extent allowing 
actions against the rights and freedoms of individuals. The dominant approach today, 
binding both constitutionalism and the rule of law with the context of the rights and 
freedoms of individuals leads, however, in a different direction than the constitution-
alism which, for the purposes of this text, can be called “classical.” Such an approach 
exposed the existence of a “higher law” as a kind of a “normative constitution” of 
a community with a material value (defined by natural, fundamental or customary 
law); in the attitude prevailing today more attention is given to the need to ensure the 
rights and fundamental freedoms of individuals in the written law, and to identify a 
number of operational procedures of public authorities, in which they should exer-
cise their competences, indicated also in the written law.3 
In a contemporary sense, constitutionalism was to be born as a result of the denial 
of absolute monarchy in the 17th-20th centuries, and the introduction of a constitutional 
monarchy in which the king, remaining the highest public authority, was to operate 
on the basis of and within the framework specified in a written act (even if he were to 
impose it by himself). It is worth noting that this approach was formulated at the end 
of an evolutionary process spanning many centuries, during which there were also 
other options considered by historians of political thought as constitutionalist,4 refer-
ring to the “higher standards” associated not with the non-existent (as of yet) written 
constitution, but with the rules limiting the will of the legislature or the assessment 
criteria of its decisions.
In antiquity, these standards were associated with natural law, understood in 
various ways, and requirements of the common good. Recognizing that the normative 
order should allow for the fulfilment of the requirements of human nature, think-
ers of this period – such as Aristotle and Cicero – limited the will of the legislature 
indicating the material norms, and at the same time set the safeguards for the rule 
of law in a system that would protect against arbitrary actions of the members of the 
ruling class. The term politeja used by Aristotle referred not only to a certain type of 
good regime or form of government contrasted with the evil forms of rule (such as 
3  Although constitutionalism is usually associated today with the existence of a written constitution 
(a benchmark for decisions taken by constitutional courts or courts of law, independent from the leg-
islative bodies), historians of political thought emphasize that even in some modern political systems 
there are rules (considered constitutional) binding the will of authorities and having for example 
customary value. That is why the modern state, even if lacking a constitution in the written form, can 
meet the requirements of constitutionalism,”being ruled by an unwritten “constitution” (i.e., rule of 
law).
4  For example, see Church (1941), Franklin (1969), and also a work by the author of these words, 
Konstytucjonalizm czy absolutyzm? Szkice z francuskiej myśli politycznej XVI wieku [Constitutionalism 
or Absolutism? Sketches from the 16th Century French Political Thought] (Szlachta, 2005).
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despotism, oligarchy and democracy, which were to be directed towards the imple-
mentation of the interests of the ruling), but also to one of the regimes or forms of 
government recognized as good because they allowed for the pursuit of the common 
good.5 The criterion for distinguishing the good system or “form” from the bad one 
would usually be the right to achieve the common good, which Plato thought was 
accessible to the wise through intellectual cognition while in Aristotle’s thinking it 
was for interacting groups of citizens who recognized the experience of political com-
munities. The Romans, on the other hand, granted this right both to patricians and 
plebeians who searched for the sources of power and stability of their own state. Poly-
bius, Cicero, and the Roman legists who were influenced by their reflection, sought 
guarantees for the rule of law that would stabilize and strengthen the state as a politi-
cal community led by the authorities, and would not, as the followers of the modern 
constitutionalism claimed, protect the rights of individuals forming a kind of political 
association. In Roman political thought the distinction between public and private 
law, significant also for the later constitutionalism, was particularly important, as 
5  Already in the work of the Stagirite there are therefore two elements whose existence must be kept 
in mind: the element of binding with a higher law and the institutional component, associated by 
him with the participation of community members in setting norms; it is still worth reflecting whether 
participation is binding, or rather an advisory. With this feature also the problem of the ambiguity of 
the term “res publica” is related, which once can be associated with “rzeczpospolita” or a republic 
as another name for the state,”and other times also with a certain form or system of government, as 
well as yet another the issue, still crucial for many scholars, referring to the subjective side, to the 
one who co-creates a republic as a state and not as a form of government. A Polish lawyer, Stanisław 
Kutrzeba, while interpreting the regulations of the Nihil novi constitution from 1505, writes: “the king 
is not allowed to constitute anything new that would alter the ius commune and publicam libertatem 
and would bring damage and harm to everyone to cause violation and strain to reipublicae. There-
fore, according to this grammatical interpretation, it is just stated here that the king by the changes 
will not violate these rights which to the individuals – [...] only those of the nobility – were ensured 
by the common law (at that time it mainly means ius commune), or the law based on the privileges 
(libertas publica), because it would be considered as an oppression of the reipublicae.” Moreover, 
the same author notes, that the Nihil novi constitution does not introduce anything new in this re-
gard: “The king, the same as before it, if it was about changing these subjective rights, had to refer 
to the eligible. Only them, each one of them, has to agree to such a change in his entitlements for the 
change to come into effect” (Kutrzeba, 1906, pp. 17-18). Everyone, except for nobility, was not included 
among the people or, in other words, the nobility constituted the people. Shedding further burdens on 
the townspeople, peasants and other (necessary, according to many political writers of the sixteenth 
century) “members of Rzeczpospolita,” a nobleman, “not having any non-free obligation on him,” 
as Stanisław Orzechowski wrote in the sixteenth century, “does not owe anything to the king or the 
suzerain lord, but only: the title on the lawsuit, two pennies of the fief to the common war, and for a 
Pole there is no fourth thing in the kingdom” (Quincunx, cit. after: Orzechowski 1919, p.231). In spite 
of its name, the then Rzeczpospolita was not “a single body of a living creature, all the members of 
which are animated by one spirit all the actions of which flow from a single source” (cit. after: Koranyi 
1955, p.477), instead, it was limited to Polish knightly and the crown council, the nobility and the 
clergy (Quincunx, p.246).
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was the thesis that even though the people are not the permanent owner of legisla-
tive authority, they are the original ones who cede it to rulers. Although the Romans, 
perceiving at times a higher law in the norms that were formulated over an extended 
period of time, took advantage of these norms to limit a ruler who derived legitimacy 
from the assignment of the power carried by the people, there are certain norms in 
the codification of the mid-sixth century CE, set by the order of Emperor Justinian the 
Great, in which the ruler-legislator is sometimes recognized as the sole source of law, 
or even as the “living right.” Both threads present in the Roman juridical tradition, 
which in large measure would later be drawn from by medieval legists, would appear, 
and sometimes even in a pivotal role, in such diverse currents of political reflection, 
as the absolutist and the constitutionalist. 
Classical constitutionalism was known already in the Middle Ages. This is proven 
not only by the remarks of St. Augustine on “reliable justice” as the basis of a real 
state, and by St. Ambrose on “good faith” uniting all the members of a political com-
munity and obliging also its rulers to appropriate action, but also by the attempts of 
the church hierarchy to determine a space independent for the secular power. The 
announcement of the demarcation of the spiritual and secular spheres, combined 
in the pre-Christian ancient tradition, and their subjection to separate authorities in 
order for man to fulfil his true goal (achieving salvation), present for instance in the 
dualistic conception of St. Gelasius I at the end of the 5th century CE, was gradually 
linked more clearly with the postulate to limit the powers of secular rulers, by depriv-
ing them, among other prerogatives, of the power to regulate the truths of faith and to 
allocate the posts in the church (one of the reasons for the dispute over investiture in 
the 11th-12th centuries). 
Also on the subject of lawmaking, the church gained increasing importance during 
this time, both in setting the standards in some areas of public law (e.g. family law) 
and in controlling the standards determined by the rulers and the activities under-
taken by them (as, for instance, in the case of the early medieval concepts justifying 
the need to obtain the consent of his subjects by the secular ruler for any action taken, 
according to the regulations of the synod held in Toledo in 636). The notable develop-
ment of the concept of natural law, whose purpose was to designate the negative limit 
of legislative freedom and provide a criterion for assessing the actions of rulers, was 
accompanied by reflection on the effect of the promises made by the rulers in the cor-
onation oath, related in particular to ensuring the subjects’ safety and the protection 
of the church. The fulfilment of duties by the ruler (and not his moral values) was the 
main theme of reflection for the thinkers of the late Middle Ages who associated the 
thesis of “the orienting power of the standards of higher order” with the thesis about 
the possibility of obtaining support from the pope or the community for the “binding 
force,” a permanent law binding the will of rulers, including the use of the sanction of 
dethroning in case of its persistent violation (a problem present mainly in the dispute 
between the supporters of the “divine right of resistance,” called “monarchomachs,” 
and the creators of the doctrine of the “divine right of kings”). 
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The belief that a Christian ruler, as a Roman patrician, should effectively protect 
the rights of the subjects and respect the freedom of the church, or else, being useless 
to the community, expose himself to the risk of deposition similar to that which struck 
Childeric dates back to the mid-eighteenth century at the latest. The new criteria, con-
sidered more important than the hereditary title of the king, were included in the 
juridical formulas after the statement by Gregory VII, who delegated the power to 
judge whether the ruler is just, or whether he is a vicious and sinful tyrant, not to the 
people and the clergy, but to the Bishop of Rome. In this way, the pope of the second 
half of the nineteenth century, contrary to the tradition that insisted on treating a 
tyrannical ruler as God’s punishment, refused to grant the legitimacy to rule Christian 
subjects to anyone who did not respect the requirements of justice. 
In developing this idea, already in the twelfth century, John of Salisbury, whose 
name is associated with the concept of tyrannicide, and the canonist Rufinus, rec-
ognized the fair establishment and implementation of justice as the criteria that dis-
tinguish a Christian king from a tyrant, combining the standards of justice not so 
much with the natural law, but rather with the content of the customary laws of the 
kingdom and the commitments made by the ruler in the coronation oath. This direc-
tion was taken by the canonists, the supporters of papalism and hierocracy, and also 
individual popes, like Innocent IV, who in 1245 dethroned the Portuguese king Sancho 
II (without depriving him of royal dignity) and bestowed the right to rule on his 
brother, Alfonso III, as a more useful pretender. He also spoke out against the emperor 
Frederick II, accusing him of tyranny, violations of the rights of the church and the 
coronation oath. Over time, the feudal lords also began to proceed in the same direc-
tion, demanding respect for the privileges conferred on them. Consequently, next to 
natural law (associated mostly with the divine) and the independence of the church 
as a community enterprise provided with its own sphere of activity, the privileges 
of secular and clerical feudal lords gradually gained more importance, thus becom-
ing specific subjective rights, which were also to establish the limitations of political 
power and even co-create the content of what was eventually collectively considered 
the fundamental rights of the kingdom. 
The conflicts of the universal or local church superiors with the rulers of the 
laity (the emperor, kings) and the disputes of the latter with the feudal landlords or 
other bodies representing the community, also led to the establishment of institu-
tional guarantees of such rights and the application of sanctions in case of their vio-
lation. Magna Carta Libertatum of 1215, many times confirmed by the later rulers of 
England and used by, among others, Edward Coke in polemics with Stuart King James 
I seeking to consolidate monarchical absolutism, announced a condition in which 
the contract and not just the one-sided coronation oath, was to bind the ruler. But 
before the dissemination of such a solution, usually requiring a written act, it was the 
customary right, the consent of the representatives of the people to constituted law 
and the subjects’ right of resistance in case of a violation of the law by the ruler, which 
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were the main features of constitutionalism.6 The seemingly paradoxical thesis of the 
concurrent primacy and subordination of the will of the king to the law was under-
stood at that time and preached by many authors of the late Middle Ages, including 
St. Thomas Aquinas. Also, for example, Henry de Bracton proclaimed that “higher 
law,” equal to the natural law or customary law of the kingdom, should “guide” the 
actions of the ruler, who is entitled to change it only in exceptional conditions.7 
Attempts to subject Christian lawmakers to the pope’s judgment, which would 
have the authority of release from obedience to a maleficent ruler, sometimes regarded 
as a factor reinforcing the development of late medieval constitutionalism, aroused 
opposition especially after the emergence of the so-called national monarchies, 
ruled by kings as emperors in their own kingdoms. The problem was, however, that a 
monarch recognized in such a way sometimes set the norms for the actions of his sub-
jects at the expense of their privileges and without the participation of representative 
bodies, not honouring the interference of his superiors with universalist pretensions 
(the emperor and the pope, which would become the subject of reflections of John of 
Paris and will almost universally be echoed by the thinkers of the sixteenth century, 
being linked, to some extent, with the development of Gallicanism). Polemics con-
ducted by the legists (e.g. Azo and Lothair) with regard to this issue were concerned 
with similar problems to those considered by the supporters of papalism and con-
ciliarism, when it comes to the system of the church. The problem of the source and 
scope of the political leader’s power again became the center of reflection: advocates 
of constitutionalism still preached the primacy of the common good over the arbitrary 
will of the ruler, stressed the corporate nature of the kingdom, defended the privileges 
and demanded taking into account the will of the representatives of the community 
in lawmaking. 
Also, by using the jurisdictio (legislation) and gubernaculum (state management) 
distinction introduced by Bracton, they granted absolute power to the monarch only 
in the second sub-field. A French lawyer, Philippe de Beaumanoir, formulated the 
concept, characteristic of this period, of a ruler enforcing a common customary law, 
and introduced the problem of the relationship between the written law and the cus-
tomary local law (so important for the Germanic tradition), significant in this regard 
(Wilks, 1963, pp.206-207). While Irnerius, at the end of the eleventh century, pro-
claimed that customs should be honoured only so far as to not contradict the demands 
6  More on the subject, see Kern (1939).
7  The issues that are today usually associated with the constitution or the system concerning, for 
example, the division of powers, were regarded therefore as secondary, because more attention was 
paid to the presentation of a model ruler, conscious of limitations, and to bending his will in a suit-
able direction, than to building institutional governance models and determining the relationships 
between various authorities. For the ruler, representing God on earth, established the law not so much 
as its author, but as a judge pronouncing what is right and just, that is, consistent with the fundamen-
tal laws of the kingdom, including customary laws.
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of reason or the law established by a wise ruler, seeking thereby to strengthen the 
role of the written law. Azo, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, claimed that 
customs should be treated as a measure of written rules, shaped in a long process. 
The position of Azo was also close to the one of Beaumanoir and of the English-
man Henry Bracton. However, Irnerius’s approach gained more and more importance. 
Thus, by separating the content of legal norms from rationality and customs, and by 
making such jurisdiction dependent on the will of the ruler, jurists began to consider 
all legislative judgments of a ruler as legal standards established in the course of the 
procedure prescribed by law, even those which were irrational or contrary to exist-
ing customs. By removing the value of rationality or dependence on the customs, 
essential for the gradually rejected juridical tradition dominant for several centuries, 
outside the discussion on the essence of law, legists of the late Middle Ages reached 
for the category of the common good, essential for classical constitutionalism, but 
acknowledged that it would need to be linked with the utility of the community norms 
determined by the legislator. The criteria for correctness of the will of the legislator, 
reduced in this way, failed to protect the existing legal system against changes; on 
the contrary, because of these criteria, the ruler, adjudicating on the content of the 
common good, could impose new norms honouring the requirements of the legis-
lative procedures, without respecting the legally binding power of customs without 
exception (Pennington 1991, pp.424-429). 
It appears that the double defence undertaken by Beaumanoir and Braxton 
(against the consequences of separating the rationality and law, and against the pro-
ceduralization of law) was more effective than the return to the old approach, fol-
lowed, among others, by St. Thomas Aquinas. The appeal to the rational order of 
creation proved to be less legitimate than the appeal to the spontaneously emerging 
custom, while a sense of the existence of the universal normative order, enhanced by 
the particularization of the universal Christian community and atomization within 
political communities, fundamentally weakened in the following centuries. An 
attempt to combine both positions, also undertaken numerous times in the political 
thought of the sixteenth century, would prove successful as far in terms of referring to 
the customs’ antiquity; the custom was to have a foundation that would reach ratio-
nality but, after all, in some of the approaches it would determine the substantive 
content of the ruler’s will, shaped in the appropriate way.8
8  A.J. Carlyle (1941, p.14) states that the position of Beaumanoir differed significantly from that which 
is sometimes considered the announcement of the absolutist trend in sixteenth-century French po-
litical thought, and which involves the work of a thinker of the turn of the fourteenth century, Jean 
de Terre Vermeille (Terrevermeille or – as stated more and more frequently in the literature – Jean 
de Terre Rouge or Johannes de Terra Rubei), who in his Contra rebelles suorum regum employed the 
category of dominium to demonstrate the centralized nature of the hereditary French monarchy, un-
derstood as one political body subject to one ruler-owner, who acted to maintain justice and peace in 
the political entity ruled by him. (Burns, 1985, p.797). See also Dunbabin (1988).
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Discussions about the relationship between customary norms and the rationality 
of the legislator determined the context for the changes leading to the disorder of feu-
dalism, particularly to the replacement of relationships based on private legal rela-
tions by the norms of public law, to approaching the law less in terms of individual or 
group privileges justified by tradition and more as a set of general fundamental norms 
(determining even the order of succession of the crown and prohibiting the divest-
ment of goods belonging to the domain of the crown), the respecting of which by the 
ruler, understood more as an administrator than a legislator, was to be guarded either 
by a body composed of representatives of the states (according to Francois Hotman) 
or an office (e.g. the ephors, according to the other followers of Calvinism), or a part 
of the kingdom (e.g. the provinces, according to Johannes Althusius).
The Renaissance advocates of constitutionalism not only opposed the absolutist 
tendencies, but also built the foundations of modern republicanism. Reaching for the 
legacy of the Romans, they recalled the classic concepts of mixed government pro-
posed by Polybius and Cicero (e.g. Coluccio Salutati, Leonardo Bruni), to some extent 
using the findings of Marsilio of Padua, who justified the supremacy of the people, but 
also the arguments of John Fortescue, who in the fifteenth century made a distinction 
between dominium regale and dominium regale et politicum in a manner reminiscent 
of Aristotle’s analysis of politeia as a good system. In a similar direction, in the fif-
teenth and sixteenth centuries, proceeded Thomas Starkey and the representatives of 
the school of Salamanca, Guy Coquille, John Mair and Jacques Almain. They believed 
that the people, ceding the originally held power on the representatives embodying 
the mystical body of the community, had authorized them to legislate together with 
the king, leaving in his hands all current administration of the state. Accepting such 
arguments, in his polemic with the Concilliarists, by Cardinal Gaetanus (Tommaso’ de 
Vio) who did not agree with the concept of the power of the people, neither in the form 
of the current administration of the state exercised by the people or their representa-
tives, nor in the form of bestowing the administration on the king, who would act 
following the norms set by the people or their representatives (regimen medium), the 
aforementioned thinkers had already distinguished the power of the community (as a 
collective superior) and the power of the monarch who was to draw jurisdictional and 
administrative authority from the community; the community no longer understood 
as a corporate unity personified by its head, but rather as a collection of individuals 
equally responsible for the common good.9 
At that time, the constitutionalists tried to work towards a slightly different posi-
tion by discussing the problem of the independence of courts and representative 
bodies in the process of establishing constitutional rules.10 The sixteenth-century 
9  For more, see Kern (1939), Dicey (1947); Wormuth (1949), Friedrich (1957),  Pennock (1979), and 
especially Tierney (1982).
10  Ibid.
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French thinker Claude de Seyssel, who imposed some curbs on the ruler (including 
the verification of his decisions by the judges of the royal courts, and periodical meet-
ings of the nobility and clergy), and the English author Richard Hooker, almost his 
contemporary, defended fundamental rights equally against the supporters of vari-
ously justified absolutism, who identified the will of the king with the law, and the 
followers of new ideas, inclined to associate the legitimacy to rule with a direct divine 
intervention and, in the name of Revelation, to challenge the existing customary 
rights (e.g. the Puritans). 
The discussions about the independence of the courts and the role of representa-
tive bodies in shaping the legal order played a special role with regard to this issue. 
Fortescue and Coke in England underscored the importance of both factors, stressed 
the need of the sovereign to honour the law that was shaped over a long period of time 
and was not deliberately designed by anyone (i.e. the common law). Therefore, they 
did not agree to recognize the will of the ruler as the only source of law; at the same 
time, they claimed that the king, acting together with the representatives of the upper 
and the lower strata (bicameral parliament), should only supplement the applicable 
law, but not alter its essential clauses, even in the name of God’s mission, with ref-
erence to the authority allegedly bestowed on him by God, or even by invoking the 
dictate of the right reason. 
Already in the sixteenth century, Thomas Smith proclaimed that the parliament 
exercises the supreme and absolute authority, that ultimately both the legislative and 
the judiciary power are placed in its hands, and only the parliament is entitled to dero-
gate the old laws and introduce the new, and to exercise judgment in disputes between 
private individuals. Not only the English, but also the French absolutists proceeded in 
a different direction in order to justify the full power of the king, not the parliament. 
In the first half of the sixteenth century de Seyssel stated that judges of parliaments 
exercise independent permanent power, and that the monarch cannot deprive them 
of their functions. The legists of the second half of this century (especially Charles 
Dumoulin), on the other hand, though they noticed a distinction between the private 
and the mystical side of the monarch, began to treat all the organs of the state, includ-
ing the royal council and the parliament, as parts of the mystical body of the one who 
gives life to the law. Taking into account the consequences of the debates waged in 
the sixteenth century between the followers of constitutionalism, who defended the 
fundamental rights, and the supporters of absolutism, who refined their scope to the 
rules that determine the order of succession of the crown and the restriction on the 
disposition of the domain, it should be pointed out that they led to the formulation 
of the fundamental reasons for the independence of the judiciary, the determination 
of the rules for dividing the realm of legislation (settlement of issues concerning the 
body of the kingdom) from the sphere of the judiciary (settlement of specific cases), 
and thus made it possible to distinguish between the spheres of private and public, of 
which the first was subject to the king and/or representative bodies, and the second 
to independent courts.
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The dispute over the body of the highest commanding authority dominated the 
political reflection of the subsequent centuries and pushed the issue of fundamental 
rights into the background. Although constitutionalism sometimes combined with 
the doctrine of ancient constitution and the approach to the political community as 
a kind of a corporation remained alive in England (e.g. Henry St. John Bolingbroke, 
Edmund Burke), with time it began to encounter resistance both from the absolutists 
and the supporters of individualistic approaches. Still recalled against absolutism, 
among others by Francois Fenelon, constitutionalism increasingly lost its takings in 
favour of the positions based on the concepts of inherent powers of the individual, the 
division of power, and the social contract. These positions not only assumed the need 
to consider the different function of a mixed government (protection of individual 
rights, not of fundamental rights), but also accentuated the importance of a conscious 
act constituting the foundations of the system, which was over time associated with 
the postulate of drafting written constitutions. 
Modern constitutionalism, usually called liberal-democratic, mainly due to the 
doctrines elaborated by, among others, John Locke, is based on the thesis that the 
freedoms and rights of the individual are properly protected, as long as the order 
designed in the constitution honours the restriction on the mutual violation of such 
rights and freedoms; in a broader sense, however, it leads to demands for the decon-
centration of the central government and decentralization of power to local govern-
ment authorities, to ensuring judicial control of the constitutionality of normative acts 
and the legality of administrative acts, to multi-instance independent courts of law, 
to controlling the actions of authority by the political opposition and to respecting 
the powers of the various minorities by the dominant majority. Two forms of modern 
constitutionalism are typically mentioned in this context: the continental (European) 
and the British, differing not only in terms of the lack of basic law in the form of one 
written act in the latter, since Albert Venn Dicey argued that an important feature of 
the British constitutional system is not that the law is binding to all citizens, including 
those in power, but that “every man, whatever be his rank, shall be subject to the ordi-
nary law of the king and is responsible before an ordinary tribunal” (Dicey, 1945, pp. 
193); whereas the continental constitutionalism normally exempts the public admin-
istration authorities from the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts, thus differentiating 
their legal position and the position of citizens. For instance, Immanuel Kant, while 
demanding that the king and subordinate executive bodies refrain from interfering 
in the administration of justice, declared that they cannot be held accountable by 
the citizens, and that the latter should put up with the unfortunate decisions of the 
administration in the hope that the administration itself will correct them.
Some authors argue that one of the reasons for the dissimilarity of the continental 
constitutionalism is the legacy of Roman law (especially the so-called right of inter-
cession, which allows an official to suspend the decision of his equal; for example, 
a consul could suspend the decision of another consul or might question a decision 
made by an official of lower rank, as in a praetor’s decision could be questioned by a 
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consul). For Lon L. Fuller, intercession was a prefiguration of the division and balance 
of power, through the prism of which Montesquieu marvelled at the solutions intro-
duced by British constitutionalism. Its dissimilarity is also a result of the different 
evolution of the English and continental legal systems: the role was played by the 
decisions of judges in the former of these systems was not exposed by Montesquieu, 
who also stated that British judges are only the mouth pronouncing the words of the 
law, which weakened their role. 
Meanwhile, it seems that the key component of the British constitutionalism is 
the decoupling of the sphere of citizens’ freedom from the decisions of the parliament 
and combining it with precedential judgments which eventually gained legal value 
(for this reason the British constitution is sometimes considered to have been created 
by judges: a judge-made constitution), despite a different interpretation dominant 
among the Whig theorists of constitutionalism (e.g. Walter Bagehot). On the conti-
nent, however, not only under the influence of absolutist doctrines and actions of the 
kings, but also of the rationalist or utilitarian-minded liberals, both individual rights 
and the law as a set of legal norms or rules guaranteeing them, were deprived of their 
historical roots. Such constitutionalism could have given rise to a tendency to regard 
entitlement as an arbitrary gift of, understood in one way or another, a constituent 
assembly or king-legislator; a tendency to treat written constitution as the source of 
freedom of individuals and intermediary bodies, contrary to English tradition, accord-
ing to which freedom is the foundation of constitutional order rather than its result.11
Although the dispute between the advocates of constitutionalism, preferring the 
reflection on law which is independent of the will of the legislator, and the followers 
of constitutionalism, emphasizing the institutional dimension and proclaiming the 
primacy of individual rights (also recognized as supreme to the will of the legisla-
tor) continues to this day, it seems that the influence of both legal positivism and 
normativism increasingly reinforces the conviction that only a written constitution is 
able to determine the principle of the rule of law and ensure the aforementioned solu-
tions. Difficulties in terms of changing the regulations of the constitution imposed 
on the legislator, however, today seem to direct the attention firstly to the procedural 
norms, while largely turning away from reflection on the basics of the material order, 
which is most often subjected to the general criteria of utility, set by the consensus 
between competing political groups, or by mechanical voting (either in parliaments 
11  While some of the radicals decoupled the reason of a legislator from the traditional foundations 
and pointed to the utility as the sole directive binding the will of a legislator, the British Wigh-con-
servative, Burke, praised prejudice as a link in ensuring the historical and constitutional continu-
ity, an effective inhibition for legislative authorities and, above all, a source of knowledge about the 
limits of the freedom of the legislator. Continuing the traditions of Bractona, Fortescue and Hooker, 
he repeated arguments put forward by Coke against the pretensions of James I, attributing to himself 
the supreme power of judges, and by Francis Bacon who preached the apology of natural reason of a 
legislator as the sole source of law, akin to continental thinkers, his contemporaries.
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or in referendums). In this way, and the announcement of the contemporary approach 
can be found in the work of the inter-war period (including that of Carl Schmitt), the 
constitution is associated with an act of a conscious decision on the content of the 
system, or with the expression of the will of the sovereign authority, even if the act, as 
in the case of Hans Kelsen, refers to the basic norm (Grundnorm). 
Recognition of the precedence of the will of the authority against any higher 
law, which would by definition restrict it, poses a serious challenge for contempo-
rary constitutionalism, targeting almost exclusively in the opinion of many scholars, 
out of necessity against the erosion of the common good, the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of individuals and the rule of law which embodies the standards and 
defines the characteristic virtues of the legal system as such, safeguarded by the con-
stitutional judiciary as a specific guarantor of the legal state.
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Paweł Kaczorowski1
2  Epistemology of Constitution
2.1  Part One
In his work The Laws, Plato stated that it is necessary for man to establish law and to 
obey it, as otherwise he could become similar to a savage animal, and not a human 
being.
This truth was taken to heart in the 18th century by the bourgeoisie of the Western 
world and by the end of the Enlightenment it had become the centre of attention 
among the politically engaged public and also the public opinion at large. This led 
to the emergence of a modern idea of constitution qua fundamental law. As Ducancel 
wrote in 1814, the Romance-speaking countries started the constitution fever which 
later spread all over Europe (Schmale, 1988). The notion of constitution became one 
of the main subjects of the political controversy all through the 19th century, which is 
not only considered the century of steam and electricity, but also the century of con-
stitution, law and legislature. 
From that perspective it can be said that just as after the Reformation, and the 
religious wars that it had caused, between the then feuding sides there emerged the 
so-called third one (the sovereign) who, due to the power he had, built a state which 
ensured peace, law and order, and security (Forsthoff, 1971), so after the Revolution, 
in France for example, the sides of the conflict, without the participation of the third 
one and after the long period of exhausting wars, eventually had to, on their own, 
come to an agreement which was put down in writing as a document in the form of a 
constitution. 
Neither of the parties could acquire absolute superiority. On the other hand, abso-
lute power was no longer their main goal and it did not constitute the solution to the 
problem, as was prompted by the just acquired historical experience. Values such as 
freedom or law and order, which were advocated by both sides, were also no longer 
treated as mutually exclusive alternatives. The constitution became the remedy for 
the problem of political competition which earlier would have been found by having 
a sovereign, supposedly above the fray of day to day politics. 
The constitution became the thing which two opposing parties, the movement 
for change party and the party opposing that movement, could accept as something 
neutral, superordinate, and objective. It also meant that even though the parties 
accepted it, neither of them felt as the defeated party. That said, the passing of a 
1  Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University, Warsaw.
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constitution also served peace, which in the 19th century was repeatedly proving to be 
a temporary, fragile state, constantly endangered by any of the sides involved should 
the smallest opportunity arise (Schieder, 1950).
From a great variety of ways of understanding the idea of modern constitution, 
two, according to Hasso Hofmann (1986), deserve our particular attention. The first 
is the idea of constitution that restricts power and thus proclaims the freedom of an 
individual and also promotes the idea of emancipation. What Hofmann (1986) under-
stands by this is the guarantee of values such as life, liberty, property, the introduc-
tion of the idea of representation, and of the separation of powers. Secondly, the 
concept of a constituting constitution needs to be mentioned. This kind of constitu-
tion establishes a plan of methodical building up of the state, fashioing a rational 
structure, a tool, a mechanism. Hofmann (1986) reminds us that this concept had 
also appeared before. It was advocated by a Swiss lawyer and philosopher Emmerich 
Vattel, who claimed that the constitution is the “nation’s plan to acquire happiness” 
(Vattel, 1959, p.29). 
Apart from these two main concepts it is worth reminding ourselves of the typical 
characteristics of a constitution. According to Heun (2006), these include a written 
document that is a proclamation at its inauguration, but with a possibility of chang-
ing it in the future; has superiority over other laws; enjoys juridical protection regard-
ing its enforcement (this only existed in the USA from the beginning); aims at a total 
encompassing of the political order and of power. It also possesses universality, 
democratic representation, the separation of powers, and the rights of individuals as 
factors restraining power. 
As for the basic content of constitutional norms, they include notions of social 
institutions such as elections, basic rights, the administrative system, the judicial 
system, the armed forces, churches and religion, education and upbringing, finances 
of the state, the economy and social support networks and charitable institutions 
(compare: Brandt et al., 2006).
The constitution which came into existence in the 18th/19th century was unique in 
that it was written, legally binding, and determined the state’s institutional, politi-
cal and social order. It was a constitution which was already modern, a constitution 
which monopolized the understanding of the notion of constitution. It needs to be 
remembered that constitution (Verfassung) is a notion that has been known for a very 
long time and thus it has had not one but several essential meanings throughout its 
history (Mohnhaupt and Grimm, 2002). Its history dates back to antiquity, and then it 
obviously meant something different comparing to modern times. Back then it meant 
a political system, a city-state system (Greek polis), and later another political entity, 
civitas. The political system was something tangible, which in fact was an existing 
community, an ordered society – an order (Greek nomos) which consisted of religion, 
customs (German Sittlichkeit) and also laws. It was, from today’s perspective, a special 
entity because it was not determined by the division into state and society, nor into 
state and church. This reality, factual and symbolically spiritual at the same time, a 
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system that constituted, as it were, the soul of polis (see Aristotle) was not a reflection 
of any matrix of set legal norms. It was something that was lived, and it was at the 
same time the essence of the social consciousness which determined this particular 
society and constituted the common identity. This essence was effectively alive, it was 
a part of the general image of the world that fitted into the society’s religious image 
of reality. Thus, today, this kind of system or this kind of constitution may be and is 
called the ontological constitution (Marcic, 1963, 1965). 
The modern constitution, that is, as written down and legally binding, was pre-
ceded by the ontological one in many epochs. The constitution of the feudal Middle 
Ages needs to be mentioned as one of the important predecessors. Firstly, it was then 
understood metaphysically as a Christian Ordo, that is the natural order where there 
is place for res politicae (Matz, 1975). Secondly, it functioned as a way of enacting and 
regulating of social life by the authority which granted freedom and privileges, as a 
form of official action by sovereign power. This type is closer to the modern times but 
not exactly the same.
The constitution that preceded the legal written constitution was the one known 
in modern absolutism, that is, as the real constitution. It was understood as a rational, 
factual state of things, res politicea, somewhat artificial as it was introduced and con-
stituted by the sovereign authorities. Estate, status – hence: State, lo stato, der Staat. 
This state of affairs consisted of real relations between authorities, social institutions, 
common law, fixed forms of common life, traditional offices, royal ordinances and 
fundamental rights.
Following these different types arrangements there came the modern form: a 
written constitution which is enacted or imposed by a monarch. It started to appear in 
many West European countries at the beginning of the 19th century (Grimm).
It needs to be mentioned that apart from the aforementioned two concepts of 
a modern constitution, some others had already existed at the turn of the 18th and 
19th centuries. They could be divided into two categories. Firstly, the ideological and 
abstract ones, which are based on theoretical reasoning, and those which consti-
tuted the so called real-politik (Stolleis, 2001), which means they were the outcome 
of attempts to adapt the idea of constitution to the realities of political life, especially 
those realities which none were at the time prepared to challenge.
The first category included the concept of constitution as a social agreement, a 
social contract (see Rousseau, 1762), the concept of an abbot from Chartres, Emman-
uel Sieyès, in which constitution was the result of the constituting power, pouvoir con-
stitutionelle/pouvoir constituent; then also ideas of François Guizot, who perceived 
constitution as a collection of rational and thus common sense and indisputable rules 
(compare the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen); and also ideas of 
constitution that is the result of the self-consciousness of a nation in which it is an act 
of self-enactment as a political entity.
The second category includes, above all, the type of constitution imposed by a 
monarch as an act of grace; constitution as an expression of a straight compromise 
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between politically opposed sides; and also a constitution which has a somewhat 
technical nature, that is, a set of bills which regulate the most important matters 
concerning the relations of authority. This was not always called a constitution (see 
French Constitutional Laws of 1875). All these types, whether ideal or real, have been 
thoroughly described, analyzed and assessed, both apologetically and critically. 
All the theoretically described and justified constitutions, which are in them-
selves intellectual propositions, and even more so the concepts of constitutions which 
originated from pragmatic considerations, under the pressure of circumstances and 
conditions related to the real-politik of the day, appeared as a result of historic con-
flicts which determined the politics of each country, particularly in the course of the 
19th century (Schulze, 1998; Winkler, 2009; Langewiesche, 2007).
Generally speaking, it was a conflict between Revolution and the remnants of the 
Ancien Régime, between the Revolution and Restoration. The stages of the conflict 
constituted the stages of transformation and development of the political order in 
the Europe of the 19th century. In this context, even the theoretically ingrained ideas, 
or ideals, related to constitution-making, began to function differently to what their 
creators anticipated. This happened not only because they had an own substantive 
value, rightness and authenticity, but also since they functioned the way they did 
because they were treated or read as camouflages of ideological positions, as ideas 
which were engaged, or even militant, polemics hostile to monarchical power, or built 
for its support and used for its defense. 
Looking at the historical context all the constitutions, whether they were pro-
claimed, discussed, or forcibly imposed, obtained political significance because they 
all became a tool of politics, weapons in the struggle for power – power which, once 
obtained, gave further opportunities to act in one’s interest. They were promoted by 
political entities as an expression of their aspirations; their vision of the appropri-
ate mode of life in common; and as representations of their political aims. Behind 
them there were particular dealings and the will of a particular group or groups; they 
functioned as supporting or opposing something. In the context of this antagonism, 
as a tool of politics, every constitution acquired a new meaning. This meaning was 
expressed by Bismarck in his well-known aphorism: “Keine Verfassung kann ohne 
Kompromiβ existieren” (No supreme basic law can exist without a compromise). 
Since the outbreak of the Revolution, and especially in the times of Restoration, 
the constitutions in Western Europe followed the rules of a historical compromise 
between two opposing sides. This was because the two sides, unlike in the 16th century 
when the sides were two religious groups which could not agree on a consensus, 
were, in this case, socio-political groups that had their own aims and interests. The 
third one, an institution which had hitherto been supreme, that is, in which the state 
became a party to the conflict, which in turn caused the situation where there was no 
longer an external arbitrator who could be an independent political power and thus 
a power broker. The only way to prevent the conflict between the state and society 
was to create some sort of agreement, a compromise. Every constitution in the 19th 
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century was a kind of compromise, not explicit but implied, often messy and partial 
and not particularly sincere, and therefore merely tactical. But it was a compromise to 
the extent that it took into consideration the interests, expectations or needs of both 
sides. The new constitutional law became the means to do so. The law is considered 
to be an ideal tool to regulate relations between two entities as it is a synonym for 
justice. Thus, it could be treated as neutral, impersonal, supreme and thus unbiased. 
It can be used as a means to achieve compromise because it constitutes an autono-
mous, objective and sovereign sphere. 
It can be said that constitutions had the merit of being a relatively neutral legal 
institution. They created the possibility that the introduction of a constitution would 
lead to at least partial de-politicization of the social situation and its stabilization. 
However, due to the same reason, that is, taking place in a radically politicized public 
sphere, the very imposing of constitutional solutions had a political character. In this 
situation, the aforementioned solution could only be used when the constitution was 
a compromise. 
There were many ways in which a constitution could be a compromise. Even the 
constitution imposed by a monarch was an expression of the monarchs’ recognition 
of some rights of their subjects. It was the recognition of their freedom, of their right 
to be treated justly, of their will to co-exercise authority, and also their right to knowl-
edge about the state and how it functioned. 
The constitution to be seen in the law-governed state (Rechtsstaat) also had some 
characteristics of a compromise. In this way it did not have a limiting character. It was 
a law which was adjusted to the state. However, it was a law which, when respected, 
provided the state with the sense of being legitimate in the eyes of the public opinion. 
When the differences in beliefs were too grave, or the politicians persistent or 
unwilling to reach a consensus, then the only way was to restrict the number of bills 
to the essential ones, and regarding them as constitutional, as they were important 
to the orderly exercise of power. Therefore, the solution here was to limit the compro-
mise to the minimum. A case in point is the constitution in the French Third Republic.
Eventually, also in liberal democracies, which are constitutional entities, as von 
Beyme (2004) wrote: “Verfassungen sind Kompromisse im streit von Parteien and 
Gruppen” (Constitutions are compromises in the dispute between parties and groups) 
(Beyme, 2004, p.33).
Apart from many ideas and concepts underlying constitution-making in the 
19th century there appeared many political systems which could all be classified as 
Rechtsstaat (Schmidt-Assman, 1987; Böckenförde, 1991) – a law-governed state. In 
these systems the constitution played a significant role. This tradition, so different 
from the rule of law, Etat de Droit or Etat legal, is a product of the German culture and 
science, and has a long history. 
The idea of Rechtsstaat diversified over the years (approximately since the 
1840’s), and this lead to the emergence of two basic, divergent strains. These were 
the aforementioned formal law-governed states and the material law-governed states 
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(Preuss, 1994). Without going into the nuances of these concepts it could be said, as 
Kelsen (1925) pointed out, that a formal law-governed state is a state that is legitimate 
and where the law is a neutral medium; it consists of content created by the state. On 
the other hand, the material law-governed state demands that certain institutions and 
mechanisms such as the separation of powers or the state’s compensatory function 
must be accepted. What is more, the acceptance of axiological rules such as democ-
racy, liberalism, pluralism and the respect of personal dignity are also crucial.
This essay does not aim to focus on a detailed description of political views but 
it needs to be mentioned that every form of law-governed state (Rechtsstaat) – and 
especially the material law-governed state – consists of a certain requirement for 
power and its structure to be constitutional. It postulates the superiority of the consti-
tution in building the order of the state and law, and also provides conditions which 
once fulfilled guarantee that the constitution will be meaningful in the light of law 
(Starck, 1995; Di Fabio, 2001).
2.2  Part Two
This section will focus on other than the so far mentioned forms of understanding 
constitutions and related issues. So far this chapter looked at idealistic projects: ideo-
logical, ideal, and realistic concepts of constitutions, and also views which empha-
sized the importance of a constitution, and the ones which presented and implied the 
state to be a law-governed state. All of them to an extent functioned as ideological 
weapons for political subjects. These products of thought that became political instru-
ments, once accepted and passed, unambiguously determined the political, social 
and economic conditions of Western European countries. In this particular form of 
the existing law-governed state which determined its order and power in terms of his-
torical reality, the constitutions together with what they created, became the subjects 
of analyses and cognitive investigations of two parallel scholarly disciplines, which 
emerged and developed dynamically since the first decades of the 19th century. These 
are the theory of law and the theory of constitution.
While talking about the specific constitutional epistemology, that is, the constitu-
tion, ideas, concepts and investigations which were multidimensional and interdisci-
plinary, some notions need to be mentioned. These include:
 – ideological and political drafts of constitution;
 – realistic and pragmatic constitutional models;
 – theories of the ‘law-governed state’ incorporating a constitution;
 – theories of law, including constitutional law;
 – theories of constitution including theories of the state. 
This part will be devoted to the most important problems connected with constitu-
tions in the light of theories of law and constitution. 
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A constitution to function needs to be something more than just a declaration, 
an announcement or a political program. It needs to be an act of normative character 
with a force of law. The constitution is a fundamental law. This way, it becomes, as 
a significant part of public law, a subject of the theory of law. Its problems are then 
looked at from a specific perspective of this discipline whose development since the 
19th century in France and Germany was connected with the development of legisla-
tion and its significance with the emergence of codification and the general tendency 
towards it, and with the emergence of new branches of law, that is, specialization and 
autonomisation of the legal order (Stolleis, 1992; Lutz, 2000). However, placing con-
stitutional law in the system of law is already controversial, similarly to the notion of 
the specificity of private law and its role in the legal system. The specific character of 
constitutional law can be seen not only in its close relationship with politics, but also 
in the enigmatic relationship between this law and power. Unlike in other spheres of 
law what is different is the notion of the crucial importance of that law, that is, the 
fundamental law and the relationship between the constitution and its object. The 
specific character of constitution can also be seen in the fact that it is a law that is 
constituted and which also associated with a particular phenomenon and sense of 
alienation. 
This essay does not focus on the detailed description of the constitutional issues 
that are present in the theory of law, however, some issues need to be at least signaled:
a) As opposed to other rights and types of law, a constitution is not constituted by 
an institution of public law, nor is it a law of higher order;
b) It can be said that the constitution is constituted by a kind of power, but this 
power is special, it is a constituting power (pouvoir constitutionelle, verfassungsge-
bende Gewalt). However, the question remains whether after the passing of the con-
stitution the power in question should disappear, or exist in concealment and be 
constantly ready to take action. Another question regards the nature of that power; 
whether it is a state or pre-state power, and when it is justified for it to take action;
c) Constitutional law is richly creative in its own way. While other branches of 
law find their object, the constitution creates it and refers to it. At the same time, 
a constitution as a product of human action undergoes a characteristic alienation, 
alienation totale (Rousseau, 1762). It is a law that is a product of a subject, an expres-
sion of its will, and after its enactment it becomes a collection of opposing, supreme 
and limiting norms. It becomes an alienated letter of the law. Fuller (1968) talks about 
this duality in his Anatomy of Law and so does von Laum (1935) in his classic work 
Recht und Sittlichkeit.
From the perspective of epistemology of constitution and its problems, among many 
theories of law, special attention should be paid to the theory of legal positivism. It 
has a long tradition, especially in Germany, that dates back to the mid-19th century. 
There are many varieties and views within legal positivism. This doctrine had many 
supporters as well as many opponents.
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The fundamental thesis of legal positivism states that law has a specific nature; 
its norms have characteristics that no other norms have, whether they are moral or 
religious. The nature of legal norms is their specific law-related duty: normativity. 
They constitute their own kind, they are sui generis norms. This is the reason why they 
create an autonomous, separate sphere or a separate dimension of reality, especially 
when they constitute a closed system, whose crowning is the constitution. The con-
stitution closes the system. 
It might be said that the fact that legal norms are conditioned in various ways is 
obvious. These norms contain ethical, religious and philosophical contents. They are 
projects forced through by political parties, various subjects and groups of people 
holding power. Constitutional norms express various common interests and consti-
tute the result of compromises. They are written on the basis of various ideological 
credos. They arise based on particular circumstances, and political and social situ-
ations. They have a specified background of historic continuities. The question is 
whether all these are meaningless for the legal norms and their interpretation. A legal 
positivist would say that they do not matter beacuse it is true that these various cir-
cumstances exist and it is an unquestionable fact, nevertheless, that they do not hold 
any legal meaning, that is, meaning for the law. The legal character of concepts does 
not exist before and beyond the law. The contextual circumstances can and should 
be investigated, described and evaluated, but they cannot have any influence on the 
interpretation of legal norms. Such contextual circumstances and the law have dif-
ferent natures. Therefore, it is impossible for them to influence the content of legal 
norms. Through intellectual operations, legal norms can be, and should be, taken 
out of their socio-historical and political causation, they should be separated. The 
text should be distinguished from the context. It is not an unprecedented action, or 
an action that is undertaken only when it comes to law. On the contrary, this is done 
in other spheres of life. For example, while analyzing a work of art, a piece of litera-
ture or a scientific work, the focus is not on the author or his biography, intentions, 
events happening around him which for sure had influence on him and his creation. 
Similarly, it happens that whenever someone wants to assign some logical value to 
an utterance, thesis or a judgment. It is treated as an object that conforms to the rules 
of logic and methodology, and not psychology or sociology. The act of separating the 
law from facts is not an exception. Besides, the law, the legal norms that a positivist 
works on are already separated from the context as they had already been abstracted 
and defined by the relevant institutional actors. Thus, the law for a positivist does not 
have a subjective, mental, or conscious dimension. It is simply a legal act. 
Since the norms need to be separated from events or situations, and especially 
from political actors, the authorities that helped them to come into being and enacted 
them, a question arises whether this means that the law is something that is found, 
that comes from nowhere, is it simply given? A legal positivist would undoubtedly 
say no. Firstly, what is acknowledged is the internal meaning and achievements of 
historical and political entities and the act of legislating, but not their meaning for 
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law. Secondly, law is constituted but it is constituted by the state, by the authorities of 
the state. The state, however, is not a socio-historical reality, something separate from 
the law. It is the subject of law, a legal person who defines itself within the law that in 
turn is an act of will of the state. 
A question may arise, where in all of this is the constitution? Firstly, in terms of a 
positivist theory, a constitution is not anything special, significant, or something that 
could significantly be regarded as separate within a given state. Even though it is an 
act, it is a fundamental law. It is a part of the complete legal order, a part of the state’s 
law and not something mythical or remarkable because it was constituted by verfas-
sungsgebende Gewalt (order-instituting power). A constitution is not a compromise. 
If it were, as Laband (1876-1882) claimed, it would not be able to bind people. It is not 
shaped according to a political or ideological blueprint as it does not have any legal 
meaning, any meaning for the law. Secondly, there is no such thing as constitution, 
because there is only a collection of norms, which altogether may be called a consti-
tution. But in fact, it is only a collection of norms and nothing more; the collection 
does not constitute a separate entity. Moreover, this collection of norms does not have 
any pre-determined common content. It is distinguished due to the fact that it is very 
difficult to change it. There is also no fixed set of ways as to how to interpret the 
constitution. Investigating it is based on logical analyses of norms, showing relation-
ships between them, constructing legal institutions, building a systematic whole of 
the legal order. All this happens as if the law were a positivist subject. A model for a 
positivist to investigate a constitution is based on private law. 
The best known works by legal positivists are the investigations by von Gerber 
(1876-1882) and Laband (2014), the main representatives of the study of law in Impe-
rial Germany. Thoma, Anschutz and Preuss, the creators of the Weimar Constitution, 
are also worth mentioning. 
To some extent a person who continued the legal positivism was Kelsen, the 
author of Pure Theory of Law. He further stressed the meaning and the autonomy 
of the state. A state was no longer a legal person that expressed its will through 
the authorities. For Kelsen the state was self-limited. Apart from the law there was 
nothing else. Kelsen’s anti-metaphysical stance was very radical. A state did not make 
the law, it did not bind it. A state was the law. In all this the position of the constitu-
tion changed dramatically; it became meaningful. As the law is a hierarchy of norms 
where all the norms are related to each other and which explains its importance 
in relating lower order norms to higher norms, a constitution becomes the norm of 
norms, norma normans. However, its importance needs to be acknowledged by relat-
ing it to the basic norm which is hypothetical and presupposed by the theory. The 
basic norm is necessary as all the lower norms in a legal system are derived from it. 
It is an idealistic notion and thus quite extraordinary in this anti-metaphysical theory.
Turning to the problems of constitutions in the light of the theory of constitution 
it needs to be stated that the problems presented here are only a few of the impor-
tant ones (Winterhofer, 2007). They may be mentioned and not described. They have 
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appeared expost in the theory of constitution, or they appeared during the constitu-
tional debate, which started with the emergence of the idea of a modern constitu-
tion and is an ongoing process (see Grimm, 1991). The theory of constitution that this 
article examines is not a discipline which rests on formulating empirical generaliza-
tions, but a discipline which has insight into the essence of constitution, and thus has 
a quasi-philosophical character. 
It needs to be remembered that even at the end of the 18th century in France 
(Morabito, 2014) and Germany there were two meanings of constitution in common 
use. They were: descriptive or prescriptive; empirical or normative; constitution was 
considered as an ordered and hierarchical entity or constitution as law. In other 
words: constitution as a status quo or constitution as a written document. 
The basic endeavor of constitutionalism was to introduce a written constitution 
that would take the place of the status quo ante, the factual state of affairs. However, 
the status quo ante was not considered to have a constitution at all by many, and it 
was rather thought by the same people that this state could no longer be tolerated. 
It was a state of lawlessness and disorder. On the other hand the introduction of a 
constitution could be considered as hubris, an extreme attempt to revolutionize the 
world. 
The introduction of a written constitution nullified the old order, which meant 
negating the previous order that was defined by institutions, customs, hierarchies, 
conventions or beliefs. That order was real, experienced, enriched by tradition in 
which an individual was rooted. Instead of this historic society (Burke, 1756), there 
was a plan to replace it with, as it were, a jigsaw puzzle, where one piece could be 
replaced with another one, that is to introduce a new and artificial state, a collection 
of general, abstract, non-historical rules written on a piece of paper. The justifica-
tion for this radical change could only be the revolutionary fever, a state of anxious-
ness and tension, a need for a breakthrough: creating new foundations for a life in 
common. 
It is interesting that the two meanings of constitution were not always treated 
as alternatives. Since it was acknowledged, even if it was intuitive, that every com-
munity or a political entity is a determined order in itself (but not every entity has it 
as something that has been constituted consciously), then enacting a constitution 
– which appeared necessary during the economic and industrial revolution – was 
not just an act of enactment, but also moving from a status quo ante constitution 
towards the modern one, which is supreme law. And so, it is a real change. A ques-
tion may arise about the conditions of such a change. Who in fact has the right to do 
so, or whether a change like this can be understood as an arbitrary act, which was 
exactly what the absolutist monarchs were accused of. Another issue is on whose 
behalf a person may claim that they have the right to do this, what it is going to lead 
to, and who will pay the highest price for these changes. Another issue is what kind of 
changes these would be. If they were to happen, would these changes be only allowed 
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when the rules are straightforward and fully rational as well as commonly known and 
having everybody’s support?
The constitution as law also required a special form and content. When it comes to 
the content, it introduced two rules – the rights of man and the separation of powers – 
which were thought to be necessary by many authors and political groups. As for the 
form, what was required was that it had to be written and officially proclaimed. There 
were problems with these requirements and they were discussed publicly.
The view that a constitution is a fundamental law and its form is composed of 
certain rules is in opposition to the legal-natural idea of a social contract. This agree-
ment, a synonym for freedom, is restricted and the fundamental truths are beyond it. 
The importance of the content does not come from the fact that it was created jointly 
and approved by the multitude, but that it is considered to be the truth in itself. On 
the other hand, it can be asked whether a matter of such importance as the constitu-
tion and its significance, which is the very ground of freedom, can actually be left to 
chance, that is left to the speculative and hypothetical notion of the ‘social contract’. 
What may also be considered controversial is the requirement of giving constitu-
tion a written form. On the one hand, giving the constitutional norms a character of 
an official public document is an efficient way of making the content publicly estab-
lished, precise and officially binding. It also makes it part of the current content of 
civic consciousness and a warning for those in power and a reminder of the restric-
tions to power which must not be forgotten. On the other hand, it can be suspected 
that questions of this kind only concern something that in itself is unseen despite 
its declared legal-natural character, and it is all somewhat uncertain and unclear, 
and possibly unnecessary, since it requires all these efforts. It is also not much of a 
necessary presence since it remained absent from most of history. The transition from 
the sphere of belief to the sphere of something that constitutes public content – all 
the more juridical content of a legal document – is far-reaching and implies serious 
consequences. It can be said that together with this transition, a community loses 
its civic subjectivity. In this way the centre of gravity, the grounds for a public order, 
changes its place. It is not the natural or subjective beliefs but something external, the 
law. Therefore, the act of proclaiming a normative text is now the ground for political 
rules, and not their subjective importance. Taking this into consideration, the view 
that only the recording of positive law is a guarantee of natural entitlements can be 
insufficient and somewhat contrary. 
Another problem concerns the identity of a written constitution or the notion of 
a constitution. A question may arise whether the word constitution means a kind of 
thing or whether it is a specific name. Or whether multiplicity of historical constitu-
tions is multiplicity of different documents under the same name, which in fact is 
the only thing they have in common. This multiplicity can be investigated as one can 
investigate objects, facts or phenomena. Based on these empirical generalizations 
one can determine their common characteristics. However, would this be all? There is 
the question whether behind this multiplicity there is unity, unity of a subject, unity 
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of an entity which the constitutional order is, an entity that has different substantia-
tion. Finally, it can be asked whether modern constitutions, which have been so often 
proclaimed since the end of the 18th century, are volitional acts, so special and specific 
for a group which has the will or gets the will of being through the constitution. Or 
perhaps these are intellectual projects that at the deeper level are joined by objec-
tive substance and subjective unity. There are many theories of law that analyze the 
constitutional law which silently acknowledge this unity, as the matter of proper law 
remains one of the biggest unknowns of the social sciences (Engel and Schoen, 2007). 
A more philosophical theory of constitution tries to justify this, tries to show what the 
essence of the constitution is. A constitution is not a notion that is natural, innate, but 
it is also not a word chosen accidentally, a word that is meaningless. Though defend-
ing the hypothesis of the unique kind of identity that supposedly is constitution, it 
can nevertheless be claimed that despite the fact that there are so many constitutions, 
they are not empirically equal as there are some which are considered to be models. 
This distinguishing character is in principle accepted, and even acknowledged by 
the history of constitution. Moreover, almost every constitution has its substantial 
content as well as the additional secondary content that can be changed more easily. 
The former may imply the existence of the essential content of a constitution. There 
are also the aforementioned concepts of constitution that may contribute an abstract 
model and in this way they can serve as a joining element between fundamental laws. 
The notion of the underlying unity of constitutions, its identity, has been debated 
during the talks on the common European Union constitution. 
The legally natural and rational concept of a constitution that was emerging over-
night and consciously prepared and instituted in one act was already criticized by 
Hegel. His critique was on the notion of the state of the constitution as the status 
quo. He appreciated the constancy of this system and the definiteness of the reality 
of it. Absurd in his eyes was the claim to consider it as null and void. However, he 
also claimed that a constitution needs to be considered within a socio-historic and 
political reality, which is not something accidental, but is a product of the spirit of 
an age. It has gradually shaped the contemporary being of a national community. 
The common reality and imponderables must be included in the constitution because 
they are the constitution. The agreement as such, whether real or presumed, of all the 
subjects that work together merely constitutes Verstandesstaat but not the Vernunft-
staat. It is the organization, and not the state, that constitutes an ethical entity. An 
ethical state is stable (Böckenförde, 1978) and its existence is deeply rooted. It is also 
a complex and multidimensional state, which enables a being’s self-realization, self-
development and freedom. Meanwhile, Verstandesstaat is something created by acci-
dent, incidental unanimity of independent entities, the result of individual decisions. 
A constitution as a state has a meaning. When this state is pondered and believed to 
be persistent and stable, and when it is described as a state that consists of laws and 
institutions, only then will this constitutional system exist as reality and a state of 
consciousness of the members of the national community. 
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Hegel’s view on constitution does not only hold historical meaning. Many con-
temporary authors such as Böckenförde, Isensee, or Hennis point to the fact that post-
war 20th century’s liberal democracy is a fully functioning Verstandesstaat that lacks 
ethical-spiritual substance. This substance is important and necessary not only in 
itself and its significance for man, but it is also necessary for keeping liberal democ-
racy as a working system, and, what is even more important, in order to defend it 
against the enemies of freedom and democracy. 
Apart from Hegel and others, the difference and the existing tension within con-
stitutions – between what, in the constitutional sphere, is the expression of momen-
tary will and is thus explicitly voted in, and what is to be an underlying reality of 
enduring significance – was pointed out as a problem by Lasalle (1993). He stressed 
the meaning of constitution and confirmed it is a magical word. However, the real 
constitution – after the revolutions of 1848 and their suppression in German states – 
was for him the then balance of social forces and the actual relations of power. The 
written constitution, the document, is a synonym for legality but its real importance 
comes with the actual degree to which it reflects that real constitution. 
The status quo and the descriptive constitution, the relation between empirical 
and normative constitutions, the importance of real social forces, historical origins 
of the constitution, are some of the problems pointed out by not only Hegel, Stein, 
and Lasalle, but also by Huber, Brunner, Schindler, and Hennis in his excellent work. 
These and the problems that will be mentioned in this chapter can be regarded as 
being within the range of a broader problem, which the theory of constitution strives 
to show and analyze. It is a problem of a particular tension that exists between consti-
tution and reality. It is called the constitutional reality. In constitutionalism, especially 
in Germany, as Hennis (1968) states, the assumption that the constitution is supposed 
to include everything that is somewhat relevant politically is tacitly accepted. On the 
other hand, it is obvious that there is always a bigger or smaller difference between 
norms and real phenomena, which is not necessarily the legislator’s fault and the 
imperfection of legislatures in general, nor can it be dismissed as lawlessness or dis-
respect for constitution. These constant problems of the system’s incongruence and, 
in this case, the difference between the constitution and the political reality, induces 
reflection as to whether it should be expected that the constitution will fully and in 
great detail describe all the relevant relationships. Is it not a false idealism – not 
false because it is practically unattainable but because it is in principle ill-conceived? 
Another question is whether socio-political reality is in fact significantly amorphous, 
if it is not formed by norms. Is it not the case, as the idea of constitutionalism pre-
sumably presupposes, that socio-political reality, before it is subject to a constitution-
making exercise, constitutes, as a living reality, a subject matter of primary impor-
tance for the potential law-maker? It has its constituted, though pre-constitutional, 
state and it has its logic, its rationale, and maybe it should therefore be considered as 
an ungeschriebenes Verfassungsrecht (Smend, 1928) – ‘an unwritten lawful and cus-
tomary order’ – and perhaps it should be an element taken into account when trying 
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to interpret and match the written laws to it, and that includes the constitution itself. 
Is it really enough to make a deal, determine and agree to give these constitutional 
records effective meaning, or maybe the constitutional law needs to be found, discov-
ered and not legislated? As Kaufmann (1911) argued, maybe it should be discovered in 
the particular, understood sphere of common life, which in turn needs to be described 
through norms so that constitutional law can come into existence. It will then acquire 
the value of objectivity, adequateness, and constancy. 
The problems regarding constitutional reality arise when, as Hennis (1968) states, 
one notices issues that do not allow for an acknowledgement, often automatically 
made in scientific procedures, of two important reflections. First, that a constitution 
is intended to comprehensively cover and incorporate the whole of social and politi-
cal reality. Secondly, law is a different kind of activity to that which is social or histori-
cal, and that the latter has no significance for the law and is in fact meaningless to it. 
Another issue raised in the theory of constitution is the relation between the con-
stitution (Konstitution) to the system (Verfassung). As Hesse (1993) writes, the consti-
tutional law can only be understood by understanding its object, that is, the constitu-
tional system. This leads to the question whether written constitution construes only 
a part of the order of the system, which, according to Huber’s thesis and Haberle’s 
opinion, is everything that is characteristic for a particular group of people, that is, 
the reality of social, economic, cultural and political life. In his seven-volume master-
piece Verfassungsgeschichte, Huber (1981) states that the constitution is a collection 
of spiritual and cultural contents, social tendencies, elements of political order, the 
essence of ideas or interests, and institutions which together belong to the reality of 
a particular epoch.
Many constitutional theorists also see the problem in the relationship between 
the state and the constitution. The essence of this is as to which notion is the original 
or which includes the other. There is no problem when it comes to the constitution 
imposed by a monarch as there the sovereign state authority, the monarch’s authority, 
is an entity beyond the constitution, in which case the latter is a voluntary, gracious, 
self-restricting act for the benefit of society by the constitution-making power. There-
fore, it is within the sphere of an existing state that the constitution regulating par-
ticular spheres of life appears. In some cases the matter becomes less obvious, that 
is when the constitution allows for change, but it cannot be undertaken by the sov-
ereign; it can only happen within the limits of the protocol stated in the constitution.
The more the range of norms in the constitution is extended, the more exten-
sive it becomes. It becomes a collection of all elements from which the state’s order 
is composed. The more the state as a specific reality is pushed aside, the more it 
becomes invisible or even negated as a separate entity. In the debates on constitu-
tional law the question is raised whether the constitution should be seen against a 
background of a state that is more than the legal order; or a state should be seen as 
an entity that is constituted through the constitution. For legal positivists in Imperial 
Germany the state was the creator of law, but at the same time it was a legal entity. 
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On the other hand, Jellinek (1900) claimed that the state is not just the law. It has 
two sides, sociological and legal (Zweiseitentheorie). Also, the authors of the Weimar 
theory of the state, Schmitt, Smend, Heller, Triepel, and also in a way Kaufmann, 
opposed reducing the state to mere law and order. For Schmitt, Heller and Triepel the 
element that existed beyond the legal and constitutional system was the sovereign. 
However, Isensee (1987) claims that however impossible it is for the constitution to 
exist without the state which it structures, organizes, and within which it obtains 
meaning, there also cannot exist a state without a constitution because a particular 
state is always somewhat constituted. Isensee is trying to build a theory that presents 
a dialectical unity between the state and the constitution.
Much in the theory of constitution has been devoted to the complicated tensions 
that exist between the constitution and politics. Constitutional law has sometimes 
been called political law, that is, a law whose essence is politics; the life of politics 
that should be legally regulated. A question may arise whether working on constitu-
tion should be preceded by investigating what politics is, or regardless of what it is, 
whether constitutional law should prescribe politics with how it should function. 
It is generally acknowledged that the spheres of constitution and politics are not 
exactly the same, which cedes the ground for political sciences to exist. Constitu-
tional records may be interpreted in many different ways, and often they are very 
general and allow diverse interpretations and, thus, implementations. Many para-
graphs exist only on paper and are not employed or respected. Many political actions 
are not sanctioned by the constitution. Not everything is regulated in such a docu-
ment and the rules of the constitution are often bent when need be. It is, after all, the 
product of politics. All these facts show that the discrepancy between the constitution 
and politics presents a real problem. 
However, what kind of conclusions can be reached from this; how can the reasons 
for this discrepancy be understood and what kind of counter-measures could be used, 
which in turn invites further questions. To answer them, as Preuss (1994) says, three 
models of relations may be presented: it can be assumed that politics is an irrational 
activity whose rational state is achieved only thanks to formulating it through con-
stitutional law; or the constitution must take into account what is political, as ignor-
ing the nature of politics leads to political crises or catastrophes; or the constitution 
can release creative powers and potential that exist within politics and create social 
harmony.
2.3  Conclusion
Many problems such as sovereignty of constitution or mechanisms for changing it, or 
the relation of constitution to constitutional tribunal, still remain to be debated. The 
scientific, multithreaded constitutional debate continues. Theoretical issues continue 
to engender curiosity and interest. Its multiplicity and complexity may mean that the 
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understandable desire to introduce a constitution in a given country may not be an 
easy task, but it also does not make the state, or thinking about the state, a problem 
that is now fully systematized or theorized. New problems, it seems, simply appear 
elsewhere and continue to complicate matters. Even though the debate regarding the 
constitution and its dilemmas, paradoxes and priorities continues to develop, the 
times of constitutionalism seem to be all gone. European societies, even the ones that 
have just had their new old states restored to them, are no longer concerned with 
this issue. Writing and passing a constitution is not perceived as a task of primary 
importance. Loewenstein (2000) paid attention to this fact earlier, when in the 1960’s 
he wrote about devaluation of constitution in constitutional democracies. He pointed 
to specific indications such as lack of respect for it among the people in authority, the 
very ones who should obey its rules. There is also an indifference shown to constitu-
tion by the masses, combined with ignorance of it and a low turnout when it comes 
to voting. 
Schmitt (1928) may have been right that in the 20th century in a mass society 
there is no division into society and state, which was exactly the 19th century social 
infrastructure that made a constitution a necessity. Or perhaps, as Forsthoff (1971) 
claimed, Sozialstaat ousts Rechtsstaat, or, as Grimm (1991) points out, the problem of 
constitution, once so oriented to the state, is complicating its growing functions and 
involvements. Taking this into consideration it can be said that von Stein’s prognosis 
from 1850 was essentially correct, when he foresaw that in a democracy the focus on 
Verfassung will turn to Verwaltung which takes care of more current matters, espe-
cially social ones. And this may be the reason why the administration (Verwaltung)
(Dreier, 1991) is becoming so important and theoretically interesting now.
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Alvydas Jokubaitis1
3  Can the Constitution Do Away with Nation State?
Constitution today is seen as a tool in the attempt to do away with the nation state 
and nationalism in Europe. Modern constitutions historically came into being as a 
tool to safeguard the political form of the nation state. According to the contempo-
rary widespread belief, national patriotism has to give way to constitutional patrio-
tism. The historical experience of the states of Central and Eastern Europe reveals 
that the adherents of constitutional patriotism have an erroneous conception of the 
nation state. The nation state is more than just a political form or a legal system. 
National states are inseparable from their unique national cultures. In Central and 
Eastern Europe states were established by various nations primarily to safeguard the 
existence of a concrete nation. The most important political task was understood as 
being the preservation of the nation. The preservation of the nation and the establish-
ment of a sound political order are two closely interrelated tasks, however, there is an 
important difference. Even when the nation state loses its statehood it is capable of 
preserving its own cultural identity. The advocates of constitutional patriotism do not 
notice that their understanding of constitution is foreign to the experience of Central 
and Eastern European nations. The cultural constitution in the region is seen as being 
more important than the political constitution. This reminds us that political tradi-
tions and experiences continue to shape the understanding of the essence and func-
tion of the constitution. The aim of this essay is to prove that the nation state is more 
than just a political form which can be replaced by a new political form based on the 
ideas of constitutional patriotism. The traditions of constitutionalism in Central and 
Eastern Europe reveal that constitution in the region is seen as being subordinated to 
the nation and not vice versa. 
Constitutional law is understood as a discipline that has its own method of creat-
ing norms. Jurists are proud that they can deduce norms from other norms by taking 
the stance of a disinterested observer, one who does not need to pay any attention 
to concretely existing social circumstances. The belief that the law can be perfectly 
understood without considering historical factors today is shared by many jurists. 
This stance is based on the belief that the constitution can escape from culture. Cul-
tural and historical differences are declared to be of no matter and the most important 
things are the rules of correct deduction of norms. As an old saying has it, lex becomes 
rex. Constitutional law becomes detached from the culture and history of the nation, 
which had produced it in the first place. This process goes against the fundamental 
modern constitutional principle of national sovereignty. Constitution detaches itself 
from the will of the people who are the source and basis of its legitimacy and by this 
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detachment arrives at its own logic. This separation of law and cultural circumstances 
thus becomes a source of the conflict between nation and constitution. 
The contemporary experience of the member states of the European Union shows 
that constitutional jurists in their discourses try to evade the problem of nation as 
much as possible. National particularities are declared to be of concern only on the 
private level. Constitution not only becomes detached from the nation, the necessary 
consequence of this is that it becomes detached from politics. Society and its history 
seem to be of no importance among the contemporary constitutional problems. Politi-
cal history disappears from the field of vision of professional constitutional jurists. 
Today, at least formally, nation still remains sovereign, but this idea is foreign to many 
contemporary experts of constitutional law. One gets the impression that the state is 
governed not by the people but by nomos basileus. European specialists of constitu-
tional law attempt to construct a new constitution, which would find its basis and 
final point of legitimacy not in the nation, but in some kind of principle that would be 
more universal than the necessarily particularistic nation. The fundamental principle 
of nation states that came into existence two centuries ago was to protect the rights 
of their citizens. Today nations face the challenge of constitutional projects that see 
them as an anachronism that needs to be overcome. This was not the case during the 
formation stage of the modern nation states. Nation was understood as something 
that chronologically existed before the constitution. 
3.1  The Phenomenon of Central and Eastern Europe
The American philosopher of law and politics Paul Kahn argues for a broader per-
spective on the problems of constitutionalism. His aim is to broaden the horizon of 
inquiries concerning constitutional law by exploring the political, cultural, and moral 
aspects of the phenomenon. Kahn writes that constitutional jurists tend to forget the 
history of the sovereign nations. Their investigations thus are limited solely to the 
problems of the relationship between legal norms. This perspective proves incapable 
of grasping the political circumstances under which the nations came into being. By 
remaining focused only on legal norms, constitutionalists forget that the nation is 
not a product of a deduction of legal norms, but that it emerged from a revolutionary 
rupture of society. Modern nations were formed in their struggle for cultural and polit-
ical identity. Experts of constitutional law do not understand the importance of the 
struggle that took place two centuries ago. Their methodological presuppositions lead 
them to neglect the problems of political, cultural and moral philosophy. In the words 
of Kahn, “Constitutional governance in the United States is less about justice than it is 
about maintaining this belief in popular sovereignty: if the belief falls constitutional-
ism can easily become governance by the dead hand of the past” (Kahn, 2011, p.143).
Contemporary experience of the member states of the European Union shows 
that constitutional law has become detached from the nation. This problem is of 
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concern not only to the experts of constitutional law. Political philosophers talk about 
the gradual disappearance of nation state as a modern form of political organization. 
Kahn does not pay enough attention to this problem. However, the explanation of 
the problem is put forward in the works of Pierre Manent. By comparing the ideas of 
these two thinkers we can gain a better understanding of the relationship between 
constitution and nation, constitutionalism and nationalism. By detaching themselves 
from politics and history, constitutionalists are not able to understand the nation 
as a political form. They are even less capable of understanding the importance of 
the nation as a cultural form. The cultural dimension is especially relevant to the 
nations of Central and Eastern Europe. The tradition of political thought in Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and other states is unimagina-
ble without the fundamental question of cultural identity. According to a stereotype, 
which is very popular among researchers, nationalism in this region of Europe is very 
different from its Western European counterpart. This popular thinking holds that 
the political development in Western Europe has to be seen as a movement from state 
towards nation, while in Central and Eastern Europe the nations had to go through a 
period of cultural rebirth before they were able to attain their statehood (Kohn, 1967). 
This important historical circumstance sharpens the problem of cultural identity.
Kahn focuses his research on the importance of politics and morality. He pays 
little attention to the importance of national culture. According to him, the emergence 
of modern constitutions is inseparable from self-sacrifice, loyalty, faith, solidarity 
and other virtues. These factors almost never come into consideration in the works of 
contemporary experts of constitutional law. They work only with the established legal 
norms and do not take into consideration the moral factors that were necessary for 
sovereign nations to come into being. This purely normative perspective is very foreign 
to the experience of Central and Eastern Europe. The political thinkers of this region 
were the creators of what could be described as national existentialism. The history of 
political thought in the region is deeply influenced by the discussions about cultural 
survival. The historical experience of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe allows 
us to recognize that the modern nation state is a fundamentally twofold phenomenon. 
This form of political organization requires some kind of culture, which since the 19th 
century has been called by the name of national culture. In the region it is customary 
to discuss cultural problems when one is engaged in a discussion about the political 
problems. Central and Eastern European political discussions almost always tend to 
involve a cultural dimension. This important circumstance sharpens the problem of 
cultural identity in the region. This is the reason why Central and Eastern European 
nations react more sensitively to changes in sovereignty.
Kahn is engaged in polemics with the positivist position. He aims to show that it is 
wrong to try to trace the beginnings of the modern nation state to the law. He attempts 
to find their source in politics and morality. Kahn’s investigations are a good starting 
point, but we have to add that in Central and Eastern Europe national states emerged 
through the struggle for cultural identity. Before reaching the stage of constitution, 
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the nations of the region had to grasp their own cultural identity. Kahn is right that 
modern nations emerged from revolutionary political struggles. However, in Central 
and Eastern Europe the struggle for cultural identity preceded the political struggle. 
The first task of the nations in the region was cultural revolution. Only on the basis of 
success in this revolution could they aim to emerge victorious in political revolution. 
Kahn is interested in the political history of the United Stated of America and France 
and on the basis of these historical cases he explores the link between constitutional-
ism and political revolutions. To correctly understand the politics and constitution-
alism in Central and Eastern Europe, we need to add to his research the analysis of 
the revolutions of national identity. The nations of the region became sovereign not 
as a consequence of political revolutions. Prior to staging them, these nations were 
doomed to undergo a long process of cultural revolutions. 
The nations of Central and Eastern Europe were born from cultural revolution. 
Though the historians of these nations do not talk about revolution, we can only 
understand the emergence of new nations as a revolutionary event. The unique road of 
the nations of Central and Eastern Europe towards political independence began with 
the development of cultural self-consciousness. Universal enlightenment, education 
and access to the high culture were promised to the members of the lowest strata of 
society. The nation state in the region emerged not only as political form. Its roots are 
to be found in the struggle for national identity. The leaders of national movements 
who wanted to establish the unique cultural identity of their homelands promised a 
revolution, which in some of its intentions reminds us of the cultural revolutions of 
Mao Zedong or Ayatollah Khomeini. The national revolutions were not as radical as 
those of the Maoists or Islamists, but they upheld a promise of a new culture. Georg 
Hegel’s idea of the objectification of spirit is helpful in our attempt to understand the 
national movements of Central and Eastern Europe. Before reaching independence, 
the peoples of the region had to become self-conscious of their cultures. 
In our attempt to understand the political experience of Central and Eastern 
Europe we should turn to Kahn’s investigations of the relationship between revolu-
tion and constitution. We have to add the analysis of cultural revolutions. According 
to Kahn, “Revolution and constitutional construction mark the assertion of a power 
of the popular sovereign to destroy order by withdrawing the sovereign will and to 
create order by speaking it into existence” (Kahn, 2005, p.90). The constitutions of 
the United States and France came into being as a result of a revolutionary struggle 
for a new state. This pattern is foreign to the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, 
which did not directly engage in political revolutions but had to fight for their cultural 
identity. This struggle for cultural identity in the region was the necessary precondi-
tion for the appearance of the new states. The struggle for cultural identity carried by 
the national movements in Central and Eastern Europe from its very inception had 
been what Carl von Clausewitz described as doing politics by other means. Politi-
cal aspirations always existed behind the demands for cultural identity. The national 
movements in the region had to go through the process of cultural revolution before 
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they could become a political subject. These cultural revolutions were as demanding 
as political revolutions. 
Kahn argues that in the concept of nation state the element of “state” is more 
important than that of the “nation.” In his words, “The idea was that a nation could 
be created out of a state, not that state must track the preexistent nation” (Kahn, 2005, 
p.260). This thesis proves to be wrong if we consider the political experience of the 
states in Central and Eastern Europe. When the people in the region are discussing 
national matters, nation is understood as being a concept that belongs not only to 
the sphere of politics. Even when citizens of the region are engaged in discussions 
about political nation, they cannot avoid thinking in terms of culture. The French 
and American nations were born from political revolutions. In Central and Eastern 
Europe the nations had to prove their cultural maturity and only then could they go 
to the process of state building. The people in the region know that a nation can exist 
even when the political independence is lost. This viewpoint is accurately expressed 
by the Lithuanian philosopher Stasys Šalkauskis: “The revision of the territory of the 
state eventually is possible. The cultural strength of the nation and its relevance can 
become one of the deciding factors” (Šalkauskis, 1995, p.465). The cultural strength of 
the nation is understood as more important than state. 
Manent thinks that at the time of its emergence, a nation state was the best 
tool for the creation of democratic politics. However, today the nation state is seen 
as being an obstacle to the processes of democratization. According to Manent, the 
dialectics by which a useful tool becomes an obstacle is unavoidable to all forms of 
political organization: “What allows us to reach an objective is also what prevents us 
from pursuing further the attainment of this same objective and even directs us in an 
opposite direction” (Manent, 2006, p.198). Manent wants to defend the nation state, 
but he misunderstands the very essence of this political form. Similarly to Kahn, he 
does not see the cultural side of the state. He thinks that the nation state is elimi-
nated for political reasons. This is not a substantiated claim. The reason behind these 
changes can be found in the changes of the understanding of culture. The dialectics 
of a useful tool becoming an obstacle is also at work in the case of modern constitu-
tionalism. The modern nation state is unthinkable without a constitution. However, 
contemporary constitutionalism is one of the most important driving forces in the 
struggle against the nation state. A number of attempts to create a constitution for the 
European Union are the most obvious example of this. 
3.2  The Nature of the Nation State
The process that in France and the United States evolved into a change of forms of 
government in Central and Eastern Europe began as a struggle for cultural identity. 
The term national rebirth in this region has the meaning of cultural revolution. The 
goal of the national movements in the region was to create a new cultural subject that 
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could later become a political sovereign. Only after the people who shared the same 
culture had been consolidated as a unique community could one begin to think of an 
independent state. When the names of nations capable of defending their own cul-
tural identities became known, the names of the claimants for political sovereignty 
also became apparent. Many critics of nationalism are wrong to think that the epoch 
of national rebirth was a time when propaganda about the uniqueness of nations was 
being spread. These developments were also marked by important elements of cosmo-
politanism. The more the nations of Central and Eastern Europe wanted to enjoy the 
fruits of the high culture, the more they became independent from parochial national-
ism. The latter is usually understood as a conservative phenomenon. This interpreta-
tion does not reveal the whole truth. In its most important intentions nationalism 
is a revolutionary ideology. The contemporary detachment of constitution from the 
nation is one of the best proofs of this thesis. Constitution not only creates but also 
destroys the nation state.
National movements are being destroyed by the mode of thought that they gen-
erated. To be more precise, the fundamental premises of national movements today 
are working against nation states. The forces that created the cultural revolutions are 
the forces that today are working against the achievements of that revolution. Once 
again, the revolution is devouring its own children. The premises of the nation state 
become a weapon in the struggle against the nation state. There are at least three 
causes behind this self-destruction. Firstly, the phenomenon of multiculturalism is a 
consistent development of the political ideas of nationalism and this offspring under-
mines the power of nationalism. National movements begin with a demand to recog-
nize their cultural uniqueness. Once they gain success and the statehood is achieved, 
it becomes clear that nation is not the ultimate indivisible element of cultural identity. 
The final point of this process of division is the individual. Just as nations demanded 
to be recognized, today recognition is demanded by feminists, sexual minorities, and 
other cultural groups. Secondly, national movements cannot withstand the corrosive 
effects of historicism. When everything is thought to be historical, the nation must 
be interpreted as something that undergoes permanent changes. Because of histori-
cism the political metaphysics of nation today has lost its power. Thirdly, national 
movements are being destroyed by the passion that they themselves had unleashed – 
the passion to modernize. The aim of modernization transforms itself into an aimless 
quest of novelty for novelty’s sake. The unceasing search for novelty leads to the situ-
ation when people no longer see their nation as the basis of political life. This devel-
opment necessarily leaves its mark on constitutionalism. Constitutionalists pay little 
attention to the political history. Their views are focused on the future. 
During the first stage of their formations the democracies needed a demos and 
nation was chosen as the new demos. Nation building in Central and Eastern Europe 
was seen as being more important than the creation of constitution. Nations had to 
identify their own cultural constitution and only then could they create political con-
stitutions. We can only understand the traditions of constitutionalism in Central and 
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Eastern Europe only after we have understood the historical process by which the 
nations of the region became sovereign. This is why we have to pay serious atten-
tion to the political and cultural history of the region. The thesis that nation became 
sovereign says too little. We must know how specific nations formed their cultural 
identity. The road to constitutionalism in Central and Eastern Europe is very differ-
ent from that which was taken by the Western nations. For the newly formed nation 
states in the region the establishment of constitution was only one task among many 
others in their attempts to create a new political order. This problem was usually 
solved by taking the principles and norms from the constitutions of Western liberal 
democracies. 
The nations of Central and Eastern Europe, especially the small ones, live by 
the faith that even if they lose political independence, they can continue to exist by 
protecting their cultural identity. The historical experience of this region does not 
allow one to fully grasp the politics of the region without taking into account the cul-
tural dimension. Any discussion about politics here must involve discussions about 
culture. For two centuries the understanding of the nation state in Central and Eastern 
Europe has been firmly coalesced with the notion of national culture. The idea of the 
nation state in the region demands that political and cultural questions go hand in 
hand. If there were no cultural differences between the citizens from various states in 
the region, the understanding of the significance of political independence would not 
exist. Nation state in the region is seen as a twofold phenomenon wherein universal 
principles of constitution must be harmonized with the national culture, which by its 
very essence is particularistic.
Because of the historical experience of aggressive nationalistic regimes, the dis-
cussions about the nation state in Central and Eastern Europe has become an uncom-
fortable topic. The twofold nature of the nation state makes moderation very diffi-
cult. There is always a danger of a drift toward radical politics. When people begin to 
put too much importance on their national culture, universal legal principles can be 
thrown overboard. When too much emphasis is put on universal principles, the task 
of upholding the national culture is forgotten. The twofold nature of the nation state 
means that statesmen and citizens must find a delicate balance between their unique 
culture and constitutionalism. One could not deny that universal principles of law 
are a crucial element of political life. However, according to the traditional under-
standing of the nation state in Central and Eastern Europe, these principles have to 
be harmonized with the task of upholding the unique cultural identity. When the 
importance of the cultural dimension of the nation state is forgotten and all empha-
sis is placed on the universal principles of constitution, democracy or social welfare, 
the very idea of the nation state loses its function and meaning. Even when taking a 
critical stance towards nationalism, we have to admit that the states in Central and 
Eastern Europe are unimaginable without the element of a nation. When the impor-
tance of the nation is forgotten, the meaning of political responsibility disappears. 
National identity in the region is traditionally seen as a necessary element of politics. 
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This is why any attempt to grasp the peculiarities of constitutionalism in the region 
cannot allow itself to lose sight of the importance of cultural matters. 
The kind of liberalism espoused by John Rawls, which demands a clear sepa-
ration of culture and politics, is completely unsuitable to the traditions and reali-
ties of Central and Eastern Europe (Rawls, 1996). The people of the region do not 
ask whether a sovereign and independent state is a meaningful political form. Most 
of them do not doubt this. The most important point of the problem is whether the 
contemporary culture can justify the struggles of previous generations for political 
independence. This question is not about the freedom of the individual but about 
the meaning of the existence of political and cultural community. Many philosophers 
designate this problem by the name of positive liberty. No one could seriously doubt 
that constitutional principles are a key part of politics in Central and Eastern Europe. 
However, because of the understanding of the nation state in the region, they have to 
be harmonized with the goals of upholding national culture. 
3.3  The Conflict between Nation and Constitution
The conflict between the two main elements of the nation state, culture and poli-
tics, remains a permanent threat. It is not easy to say what role constitutionalism 
plays in this conflict. It can be attributed to both politics and culture. The answer to 
the question depends on the convictions held by the person. If we highlight only the 
political dimension of constitution we will fail to understand that it can be used not 
only as a tool to express the will of the nation but also as a tool to suppress it. Con-
stitutional law cannot evade the conflict that is to be found in the very nature of the 
nation state, the conflict between culture and politics. Even though the sovereign in 
Central and Eastern Europe emerged from the historical changes in cultural matters 
at a certain time the functioning of the constitution becomes independent from the 
national culture. The reason behind this development is that liberal democracies tend 
to operate with the notion that the law is sovereign. The conflict between these two 
understandings of sovereignty becomes inevitable. Carl Schmitt has shown that the 
liberal idea of the “sovereignty of law” is by its very nature opposed to the demo-
cratic idea of the “sovereignty of nation.” In his words, “A logically consistent and 
complete Rechtsstaat aspires to suppress the political concept of law, in order to set 
a “sovereignty of the law” in the place of a concrete existing sovereignty” (Schmitt, 
2008, p.187). From the very beginnings, the concept of nation state has contained an 
element that is hostile towards the nation. The experience of the European Union 
shows that it is possible to create a constitution without a nation. 
The idea of constitutional patriotism proposed by Jürgen Habermas and other phi-
losophers is the best example how constitution is capable of transcending the nation 
and nationalism. According to the advocates of constitutional patriotism, loyalty 
to the constitution can overcome loyalty to the nation. In the words of Habermas, 
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“The political culture of a country crystallizes around its constitution. Each national 
culture develops a distinctive interpretation of these constitutional principles that are 
equally embodied in other republican constitutions – such as a popular sovereignty 
and human rights – in the light of its own national history” (Habermas, 1998, p.118). 
Nation is understood as being of less importance than constitution. Nation and its 
cultural particularities disappear from the political and legal thought. The advocates 
of constitutional patriotism operate solely with the concept of political nation. The 
jurists of a political nation recognize the universal norms of the constitution and their 
ethnicity is of no relevance. This line of thought sees constitution as a tool for neutral-
izing the political importance of national cultures. The aim is to make citizens patriots 
of constitution. Patriotism remains, but it becomes completely foreign to the patrio-
tism from the times of national rebirth. Identification with nation is seen as being a 
purely private choice. Constitutional identity and political notion of the individual 
become the basis of political life.
Once the independence had been established, the nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe embraced the universal constitutional principles. However, nation as a politi-
cal sovereign has its own unique culture and history. A tension between universal-
ism and particularism has to necessarily exist in a nation state. Particular cultural 
identity of nation comes into conflict with universal cosmopolitan legal norms. When 
Central and Eastern European nations became members of the European Union, uni-
versal legal norms became more important than national sovereignty. Viewed histori-
cally, the nations of the region first had to become self-conscious of their uniqueness 
and only then could they hope to reach statehood. Today we see a movement from the 
sovereignty of the nation to the sovereignty of law. This means that a nation state is 
incapable of fulfilling its cultural promise. Cosmopolitan legal principles and norms 
are in direct opposition with the old cultural promises of national movements. Con-
stitution becomes detached from the sovereign who had created it in the first place. 
At the end of the 19th century and during the first part of the 20th century modern 
nations of Central and Eastern Europe wanted to become constitutional republics. 
Today constitutionalism has become opposed to the very force that made it possible.
The idea of constitutional patriotism allows us to see the modern nation state in 
a new light. It becomes clear that this state cannot fulfil its cultural promises. Cul-
tural education has been pushed out to the sphere of private choice. Advocates of 
constitutional patriotism think that jurisprudence has its own method for deduction 
of norms. There is no place for cultural matters in this method. Moral and cultural 
disagreements between citizens are seen as a source of political disagreements and 
this is the reason why they are driven out to the realm of private sphere. Citizens of 
liberal societies who cannot agree on questions of morality and culture have to agree 
at least on their constitution. Culture is said to belong to Lebenswelt and legal norms 
to the sphere of Rechtsstaat. Liberalism comes into conflict with the historical expe-
rience of the nation states. Constitutions in Central and Eastern Europe were born 
from cultural struggles. According to the understanding of state that was dominant 
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in the political thought of the region, the goal of political independence is not only 
to protect human rights but also to protect cultural identity. The concept of a nation 
state can disappear from the political vocabulary only when the understanding of 
uniqueness of the culture is forgotten or seen as being politically irrelevant. 
The nation state stands or falls by what Alexis de Tocqueville described as the 
method of democracy. Scholars tend to miss the crucial importance of the chapter 
“Of the Philosophical Method of the Americans” in his Democracy in America. Here 
Tocqueville claims that even though Americans do not read Descartes, they think 
according to his method (Tocqueville 2010, pp.698-709). This observation allows us 
to gain a better understanding of the nation state. This state came into being as a 
democratic form of political life but it remains a hostage of the Cartesian method. If 
we follow the philosophy of Descartes we cannot prove the necessity of the nation 
state. National movements brought about the permanent aspirations for more and 
more liberty and these aspirations have become hostile to the ideals of national move-
ments. The proponents of the Cartesian method have no feelings of loyalty to any 
culture. For them self-evident cultural identities do not exist. When national move-
ments began, the Cartesian method was seen as a useful tool. Today it has become 
hostile to the very ideals put forward by those movements. A nation state is a product 
of modern democratic thought and for this reason it is destined to fail. Those states 
cannot be protected from the corrosive influence of the method, which once helped to 
form them in the very first place. As a result, there is no reason to think that constitu-
tionalism can be protected from this method.
Citizens of Central and Eastern Europe are proud of their democratic constitutions. 
However, at a certain point these constitutions begin to take away the sovereignty from 
the nation. The nations of the region understand the importance of constitutionalism, 
but they do not share the American and French experience of establishing constitu-
tions. In their history cultural identity is of more importance than constitutionalism. 
For the citizens in the region, constitution is only one of many documents that estab-
lish the statehood. Kahn’s explanation is somewhat Aristotelian. For him, political 
revolution is the moving cause, constitution – the formal, whereas citizens’ identifi-
cation with the constitution is regarded as the material cause. This Aristotelian line of 
thought must be modified to explain the politics of Central and Eastern Europe. Here 
the moving cause was not a political revolution but cultural identity. Constitutional 
experts do not pay enough attention to this difference. Kahn’s thesis that “final cause 
of the nation state is nothing more than the perpetuation of the state‘s own existence” 
(Kahn, 2005, p.276) is foreign to the realities of Central and Eastern Europe. The initial 
goals of the nations were connected by culture. We cannot agree with Kahn’s idea that 
nation states had only political aims. Central and Eastern European states came into 
being with the promise of a new culture.
Two different revolutions took place in Central and Eastern Europe – cultural and 
political. The first one had to do with the building of new nations, the second with 
the building of states. Today we are witnessing a third revolution, which can even 
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be called a counter-revolution, the nation state is being pushed away from political 
life. These three revolutions are the effects of what Tocqueville called the “method of 
democracy”. The philosophical presuppositions of the nation state make its failure 
inevitable. It is incapable of withstanding radical cultural changes. The method that 
played such an important role in the creation of a nation state today has become its 
executioner. Democracy is destroying its own creations. The same process occurs 
during the rise and fall of a nation state. From its very beginning a nation state was 
based on presuppositions that do not allow its citizens to achieve their goals. One 
democratic revolution follows another democratic revolution. We have no reason 
to think that constitutional patriotism can be more durable and stronger than the 
national one.
Citizens of nation states like to think that the rule of law is possible. Constitu-
tion and law are seen as something that can supersede politics. The attempt to do 
away with the nation state goes hand in hand with the attempt to do away with poli-
tics or at least to reduce it to law, economy or humanitarian morality. According to 
Schmitt, the driving force behind this belief is the political philosophy of liberalism: 
“The principles of the modern, bourgeois-Rechtsstaat constitution correspond to the 
constitutional ideal of bourgeois individualism so much, indeed, that these prin-
ciples are often equated with the constitution as such and “constitutional state” is 
given the same meaning as the “bourgeois Rechtsstaat” (Schmitt, 2008, p.169). Yet 
this explanation is incomplete. Liberals could never overcome the nation state on 
their own. The changes in Western culture make the achievement of this aim much 
easier. The changes in moral self-consciousness of the citizens are important factors 
that promote the indifference towards the nation state. The individual is understood 
as being superior to community, personal good is more important than the common 
good, universality triumphs over locality. The nation state had a firm moral basis that 
today is becoming less and less significant.
The political freedom of a nation is superseded by liberty from the nation. Manent 
is right when he states that “today common European opinion indeed considers 
humanity as the only available resource and reference point now that the nations are 
exhausted” (Manent, 2013, p.326). However, the causes behind this development are 
not the ones that he proffers. Manent is mistaken when he claims that nation state is 
only a political form. Nation states in Central and Eastern Europe are unimaginable 
without a struggle for cultural identity. This fact makes this form of political organi-
zation extremely vulnerable to the changes in cultural attitudes. Important cultural 
developments produce significant changes in the understanding of the nation state. 
The less the nation understands its own cultural uniqueness, the less significant the 
independence of the nation state becomes. Without the appreciation of cultural dif-
ferences the discussions about nation state lose their meaning. According to Kahn, 
“legal rules do not come from nowhere. We read in every legal regulation a narrative 
of the state’s self – creation” (Kahn, 2005, p.271). A constitutional system can hardly 
 Can the Constitution Do Away with Nation State?   43
be created on the basis of universal principles. The recognition of local culture is of 
paramount importance. 
Schmitt specifies three different types of juristic thought – normativism, decision-
ism and concrete-order. “Every jurist who consciously bases his work on the concept 
of Recht, concieves of this Recht either as a rule or as a decision, or as a concrete 
order and formation (Gestaltung)” (Schmitt 2004, p.45). This classification helps us 
understand the relationship between nation state and constitutionalism. During the 
formation of nation states it was thought that the most important thing is the political 
decision of the nation. This type of juristic thought is being displaced by pure norma-
tivism. Cultural order is being superseded by the order of legal norms. And there is a 
conflict between these two lines of thought. Normativists think that law is just a col-
lection of norms and can be understood without any reference to history and culture. 
This mode of thinking is of great importance when discussing the traditions of legal 
thought in Central and Eastern Europe. The states in the region began from a certain 
cultural order, but today they seem to have no need for it. National patriotism, as 
noted, gives way to constitutional patriotism. The fundamental presuppositions of the 
European Union are opposed to the presuppositions that allowed the nation states of 
Central and Eastern Europe to emerge. Constitution is seen as a more important thing 
than the sovereign that created it. As a result the interpreters of constitutions today 
tend not to pay attention to the cultural differences and the different roads by which 
nations reached their independence. Experts of constitutional law from Central and 
Eastern Europe discuss with their colleagues from the West and in these discussions 
there is no place for differences of culture. Kahn is right to point out that experts 
of constitutional law tend to forget the revolutions, from which these constitutions 
emerged. Constitutional experts from various member states of the European Union 
meet in the space of pure juristic normativism.
The rule of law in the European Union has become more important than the 
nation, which is the source of legal order. Schmitt had described similar process as 
a conflict between bourgeois Rechtsstaat and national sovereignty: “The aspiration 
of the bourgeois Rechtsstaat, however, is to repress the political to limit all expres-
sions of state life through a series of normative frameworks, and to transform all state 
activity into competencies, which are jurisdictions that are precisely defined and, in 
principle, limited” (Schmitt, 2008, p.93). Advocates of Rechtsstaat think that the rule 
of law can become sovereign. During the last two centuries, the nation state was pro-
tector of human rights. Today we see how the human rights can be protected without 
the nation state. During the times of national rebirth democracy needed the nation 
as a subject that would defend the human rights. Today citizens of democratic soci-
eties and experts of constitutional law think that the nation has no role left to play 
in politics. This marks the emancipation of democracy form the nation and points 
towards the creation of a cosmopolitan empire of law. It is the rule of law without the 
nation: “The sovereign law replaces the sovereign who determines the law” (Manent, 
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2006, p.174). Constitution is understood as being more important than politics, self-
government and cultural identity. 
The historical experience of Central and Eastern Europe shows that a nation state 
is a contradictory phenomenon. It comes into being and seems to be destroyed by the 
same method, which Tocqueville had described as the “method of democracy.” The 
cultural identity in which nation states emerged is sharply different from the con-
temporary one. Tocqueville wrote that “a great democratic revolution is taking place 
among us” (Tocqueville, 2010, p.80). We can add that a nation state is a central com-
ponent of this revolution. One of the most important characteristics of the democratic 
revolution is the permanent reevaluation of its own achievements. Nation states began 
with the struggle for cultural identity. Today we see how this struggle has transformed 
itself into attempts to eliminate national culture. Many believe and even try to prove 
that constitution can take over the title of sovereignty from the nation. Viewed from 
the perspective of Central and Eastern Europe this looks like a highly unconvincing 
undertaking. When we discuss constitutional matters in this region we have to pay 
attention to the cultural self-consciuosness of the people who represent the source of 
the constitution. From what has been said it does not follow that a constitution can 
be established only by an ethnic nation. However, it is impossible to have a constitu-
tion without a political subject. This is why the enthusiasm of constitutionalists to do 
away with the nation state raises doubts.
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Waldemar A. Skrobacki1
4  Remarks on the Legal and the Practical:  
The Rechtsstaat in Europe’s Development of the Rule 
of Law 
Rechtsstaat, l’État de droit, Pravovoe Gosudarstvo, from Germany to France to Russia, 
these are terms that refer to the role of law, its nature and political utility in the 
process of governance. The theoretical interest in the concepts that stand behind the 
terms, such as accountable government, has an intellectually rich tradition. Because 
they originated in Europe and because of the continent’s impact on the world, they 
have been also geographically universalized from Indonesia to Burundi, for example 
(Bossuyt et al. 2013; Qamar, 2013).
Although the interest in law and its role has a long history, it was re-energized and 
re-informed by the demise of feudalism in Europe. Feudal society was the common 
experience of all Europeans. Its main characteristics were collective identity, disre-
gard for individuality and the personalized rule of the feudal landlord. He shaped the 
identity of the household, set the rules upon which it functioned and decided about 
the lives of its members. His wishes provided the foundation for the household’s laws. 
Consequently, the legal could be changed at will. Personalized rule also meant per-
sonalized politics: the landlord exercised power in a direct way, including meting out 
justice. Therefore, he was free to use whatever means of power he wished to utilize.
Moving away from feudalism required institutionalized politics. Thus, the will 
of the ruler needed to be replaced by institutionalized rules of governance. Conse-
quently, this replacement was changing the role of law, for it became a chief factor of 
the institutionalization of politics. This new role of law was further enhanced by the 
growing size of the areas of jurisdiction. The households, be it by force or agreement, 
were combined into a much bigger space, for example, principality, the size of which 
made it impossible to rule over it in a direct and personal way. The prince needed a 
set of rules that had to be obeyed by his subjects and a set of institutions that could 
implement them. This eventually led to the creation of the modern state; and because 
the end of feudalism was gradual and uneven, various types of states emerged. This 
process was also prolonged. 
For example, the Icelandic Althingi was set up in 930. The Russian Duma was estab-
lished in 1906. The Magna Carta in 1215 severely limited the power of the monarch, 
which eventually would be almost entirely transferred to the parliament. In Russia, 
by contrast, the last tsar Nicholas II was still declaring his devotion to autocracy.
1  The Jagiellonian University in Kraków.
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Furthermore, the movement away from feudalism was a multifaceted process. 
One of the most important factors was the asymmetrical shift from collectivism to indi-
vidualism. The asymmetry derived from the interplay of the individualism of political 
freedoms and the collectivism of feudal society. The former eventually were institu-
tionalized in the form of rights that ushered in constitutionalism. The latter morphed 
into nationhood, the modern form of collectivism, which would be built into the state 
in the form of the welfare state dispensing public goods. As a result, the paternalism 
of the feudal household and the individualism of constitutional rule became inter-
connected. The interconnectedness, however, was not necessarily between two equal 
parts. In some states, there was more paternalism than individualism. In some other 
states, it was the other way around.
In Britain, the interconnectedness became strongly tilted towards individualism. 
The Magna Carta was the first step. What followed was a long process of limiting the 
ruler’s powers. The limitations became a list of do’s and don’ts the royal had to obey. 
Over the centuries, the list has become a combination of both written and unwritten 
measures that eventually led to a parliamentary rule and accountable government. 
The monarch became merely a symbol of the state’s authority with the task of protect-
ing its stability in case of a constitutional crisis.
The very fact that some constitutional limitations imposed on the power holder 
are unwritten well illustrates the utility of law in the British tradition of individualism. 
The main aspect of the utility is the very nature of law, for it is not simply to prohibit 
and punish but, instead, to nurture individualism and protect the rights of individu-
als. Therefore, the spirit of law is civic-mindedness and citizenship. As an English 
colonel put it, “… I do think that the poorest man in England is not at all bound in a 
strict sense to that government that he has not had a voice to put himself under… ” 
(quoted in Heater, 2004, p.63).
Still more, spirit does not necessarily require letters; but it does necessitate its 
proper comprehension, which becomes a form of guidance to civic attitude and 
behavior and, in the end, community of free individuals. Law exists to govern people, 
for they are not to be governed by arbitrary decisions of power holders. As such, the 
role of law became the rule of law. Subsequently, the legal was to protect the freedom 
and the practical was to protect the legal.
With such a strong emphasis on individualism, it is not surprising that pubic 
goods came only after the rule of law had been firmly entrenched in society. The first 
step towards the welfare state was the 1942 Beveridge Report on Social Insurance and 
Allied Services (Beveridge, 1944). By then, all segments of British society had the 
rights acknowledged and protected. In fact, being British meant having rights as an 
individual.
The role of law in continental Europe was not a duplication of the British approach. 
The French case of the interconnectedness was more balanced, for paternalism was 
not de-emphasized. The 1789 Revolution introduced the notion of Le Citoyen. She was 
now to be free, but she was also not to be hungry. The clarion call of the revolution 
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– liberté, égalité and fraternité – reflected the more balanced approach to rights and 
goods. Liberté was about rights. In this sense, the French revolution was similar to 
the British tradition of individualism. However, fraternité was about goods. The link 
between the two was égalité, especially for the third estate. Thus, while stressing the 
rights – the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen – the idea of the deliv-
ery of public goods by power holders was not rejected. This is why the declaration 
included several articles on taxes. This stood in contrast with the Magna Carta, which 
was about reducing taxes or not paying them at all (Vincent, 2012).
The combination of goods and rights was put in the context of nationhood (col-
lectivism) and national citizenship (individualism). Thus, being French meant being 
both free and provided with public goods; and the citizen was entitled to both, for he 
was French. The legal was to maintain Frenchness. The practical was to shelter and 
reinforce the legal. The role of law became the l’État de droit.
In Germany, the interconnectedness was similar to the British tradition, for it was 
equally unbalanced. This was also the chief difference, for in the German context the 
stress was put mainly on collectivism. Similarly to the French experience, the goods 
were put in the context of nationality. When Germany was unified by Bismarck in 
1871, its people were late with their formation of nationhood. Most Europeans had 
already developed their national identity. Being late was making the unification ever 
more difficult to accomplish. The main difficulty was the millennium of conflicts and 
shifting alliances among the German principalities.
Unifying them into one state, the Second Reich, required a means that would 
be acceptable to all members of the First Reich. The common unifying factor were 
public goods, for they had a long history in the German lands, going back to the medi-
eval times (Knox, 1993; Radich n.d.). Now Bismarck had to put them in the context of 
unification.
In 1883, he passed the Workers’ Health Insurance Act, followed by the 1884 
Industrial Accident Insurance Act and the 1889 Invalidity and Old-age Insurance Act. 
These schemes were national and constituted a system of national solidarity. They 
were designed for a collective, the German nationals, rather than for an individual. 
Thus, being German meant being entitled to them because one was a member of the 
German nation. Consequently, the welfare state became a means of nation building; 
and this was a task for the unified German state. To do so, the state had to have a 
tool for fulfilling the task. The social insurance acts required various regulations for 
implementation. Since the new German state passed the acts, it was also its role to 
issue the regulations and to execute them. Fulfilling the task became the primary role 
of law.
Bismarck could not solely use force to unify the Germans. Force is not an effective 
tool for identity formation. Nevertheless, he had to impose uniformity to eliminate the 
centuries-long regional divisions. The matter of creating national identity became a 
social question (James, 2000, p.63). The question was to be dealt with by the state pro-
viding public goods and doing so through law. However, unlike in Britain and France, 
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the law sought to instill collectivism at the expense of individualism and the rights 
that came with it. Hence, the legal was to promote Germaneness through social soli-
darity, which became an important part of the firming up of German nationalism. The 
practical was to serve the legal. The problem was how this should be effected.
Before the unification, the goods were dispersed at the regional level. Although 
state institutions of a principality were delivering them, this was done on behalf of 
the regional ruler. Therefore, the goods and the delivery mechanism were in a way 
an extension of personalized politics and rule carried over from the feudal house-
hold to modern times. Moreover, the regional leaders represented tradition, which 
for many ruling dynasties became a foundation for their legitimacy. By contrast, the 
goods and delivery coming from the newly created state lacked the tradition, author-
ity and respect of the regional leaders. These lacking elements had to be put in place.
In a speech to the Reichstag on May 9, 1884, Bismarck said,
Give the working man the right to work as long as he is healthy; assure him care when he is sick; 
assure him maintenance when he is old. … [I]f the State will show a little more Christian solici-
tude for the working man, then I believe that the gentlemen of the Wyden [Socialist] programme 
will sound their bird-call in vain, and that the thronging to them will cease as soon as working 
men see the Government and legislative bodies are earnestly concerned for their welfare (quoted 
in Krueger, 2000, p.118).
The paternalism of feudalism was recreated with all its characteristics. The Germans 
were to be provided again by the power holder, for the new government was just as 
caring as were the regional rulers. However, since Bismarck’s government did not 
have the patina of tradition, he had to modify the main elements of the tradition and 
move them to the national level.
First, because there was no dynasty that could support political stability, the 
methods of exercising power had to be adjusted accordingly. In the feudal household, 
the landlord could jump on a horse, move around the domain and point with his 
hand which way a new road was to be built. Now, to do the same, the hand had to be 
reinvented.
Second, the pointing needed to be realigned to reflect the changed settings of 
power: for example, the large size of the unified Germany; industrialization and its 
impact on stability, such as the workers’ movement; or the need to deal with matters 
related to development. The realignment was necessary for the new government to be 
efficient. Only then, was there a chance for the new hand to be effective and eventu-
ally legitimate. To accomplish that, Bismarck converted the authority of a German 
prince to the authority of the German state by modernizing the institutions of the 
latter and keeping the traditional character of the former. This was done by employ-
ing state regulation.
For instance, to administer the 1884 insurance act, he set up the Arbeitgeberver-
band in den beruflichen Korporationen, a bureaucracy responsible for a centrally 
managed system of payments for medical treatments and compensation monies to 
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accident victims. By 1886 the insurance covered agricultural workers. Thus, carrying 
over feudal authority in a modernized form, the central government become the sole 
provider of the benefits in a manner of a feudal ruler.
Of course, such a system required rules of operation. To manage the payment 
system, both the government and, upon instruction, the Arbeitgeberverband, could 
and did issue seemingly endless regulations clogged with detail. This was the gov-
ernment’s modern hand that was pointing out the direction of this and any other 
policy. Thus, the Rechtsstaat was put into practice, the kind of state that was feudal 
in spirt and origin, but modern in form and method. Its authority remained essen-
tially unchanged, as it was still imposing its will on the population without public 
consultation; and it continued to be the essential center of decision making. Just like 
in the Middle Ages, the center was able to shape to a significant degree the lives of 
the people who remained subjects, even if modernized. Therefore, instead of jumping 
on a horse to manage the household, the chancellor used regulation to manage the 
Germans. Law became the modern form and method; but the execution of power 
retained its feudal character. The sternness of the landlord’s rule was now reflected in 
the legalism of the Rechtsstaat. Consequently, the nature of regulation also retained 
its feudal features: it was prohibitive, controlling and collectivist.
Without individualism and rights, such as the rule of law or the l’État de droit, the 
Rechtsstaat was a modernizing factor, but it was not a tool of modernity. It became 
such a tool when the Rechtsstaat was supplemented and enhanced by Rechtssta-
atlichkeit – rule of law-ism – which was introduced to the Germans after the Second 
World War. It was also tailored to the country’s Rechtsstaat. It kept it in place; but 
added to it individualism and, hence, rights and, in general, the principles of liberal 
democracy.
From the perspective of a formal understanding, the term Rechtsstaat describes the type of state 
architecture and political order system in which all publicly applied power is created by the law 
and is obliged to its regulations and underlies numerous fragmentations of power and control 
mechanisms (“Bindung und Kontrolle”). Rechtsstaatlichkeit in this sense is a collective term for 
numerous (sub-)principles that allow the taming of politics by the law and shall avoid arbitrari-
ness. From the perspective of a more substantive understanding, Rechtsstaatlichkeit also expres-
ses democratic concerns and the respect to individual human freedom and equality and thus the 
commitment to a liberal and just constitutional order (Koetter, 2013).
This is why now “… many European writers … use the term ‘rule of law’ when they 
write in English about ‘Rechtsstaatlichkeit’.” (Silkenat et al. 2014, p.93).
The critical additions were the mechanisms and principles that were to tame both 
the usage of legalism and the legalism itself, for the former was allowing arbitrari-
ness and the latter was a tool of arbitrariness. The process of adding individualism 
and rights, however, was neither straightforward nor quick. After all, it required an 
outside intervention. After the defeat in 1945, the Germans were required to change 
fundamentally the state, its operations, and their attitudes towards it. In short, they 
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were required not only to modernize themselves, but, first and foremost, become 
modern.
Max Weber, while trying to figure out what makes society change in a profound 
way, for instance, by switching from authoritarianism to democracy, identified several 
factors of societal change, such as, the religious attitudes of the Protestants, the stock 
exchange or, indeed, the role of law. However, he concluded that the factor that con-
tributed the most to the change was the prevailing type of authority. According to 
Weber, there are three ideal types of it: traditional, legal, and charismatic. (Weber, 
1947, pp.324-423) The traditional type is based on deeply rooted principles of govern-
ing. As long as the ruler observes them, he is legitimate and, hence, is to be followed. 
In this type of authority, the relationship between the ruler and the ruled does not 
have to be institutionalized.
Legal authority rests on regulations created by law and is exercised only in accor-
dance with them. Everyone is supposed to follow the regulations, including those 
who hold power. Here, the relationship is institutionalized and impersonalized. The 
charismatic type rests on the assumed and accepted extraordinary qualities of the 
power holder:
… a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary 
men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional 
powers or qualities. These are ... not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of 
divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a 
leader (Weber, 1947, pp.358-59).
This relationship can be institutionalized, but does not necessarily have to be. The 
three types are mixed in real life. The combination of the traditional and charismatic 
types is usually a feature of pre-modern societies. A mixture of traditional and legal 
types is a characteristic of modernity. The transition from pre-modernity to modernity 
is tantamount to changing the prevailing type of authority in society. The change may 
bring structural alterations, and it usually does. But the transition always changes 
societal values. For instance, moving from feudalism to capitalism brought about 
entrepreneurship and societal individuation, for such is the Geist des Kapitalismus 
(Weber, 1947, pp.91-92; 2003, pp.47-78).
The Geist of the Rechtsstaat, despite its formal “mechanics” of modernity, was 
not a factor that would bring about the change of the prevailing type of authority. This 
was quite ironic, for Kant with his ideal of negative freedom is usually thought of to 
be the one who inspired the very notion of the Rechtsstaat (Strauss and Cropsey, 1987, 
pp.581-82). Thus, the state, to be lawful, that is, legitimate, must be a union of people 
governed by reason protecting freedom and individualism. The state is not to inhibit 
the people’s freedom, for it is the gist of limited government. This, no doubt, was an 
importation of the rule of law. However, because it came from outside, it was quite 
strange and not necessarily appreciated by the Germans at large. Not surprisingly, the 
Kantian importation was relatively quickly tailored to the German tradition.
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The term Rechtsstaat was coined in 1798 by Johan Wilhelm Placidus and popular-
ized by Robert von Mohl in 1844 (Silkenat et al. 2014, p.296). However, while popu-
larizing it, von Mohl moved from negative freedom to positive freedom. Instead of 
protecting freedom and individual rights, the state became the giver of them. Since 
the state was to be law-based, or Rechtsstaat, it retained to a degree its Kantian idea. 
Consequently, it was still suitable for the tasks assigned to the state by Kant. It was 
just a change of how the state was to do it, not what it was to do and why.
However, the change of the how meant that Kant did not succeed, but von Mohl 
did. The Germanization of the Anglo-Saxon rule of law, for the Americans had become 
a party to it by then, worked quite well. Since the Germans were only starting their 
acquaintance with the principles and practice of liberal democracy, it was not surpris-
ing that the Rechtsstaat became a modernized extension of feudal rule in the end.
To be sure, Germany was not an exception in Europe at the time. Russia, for 
example, was not much different. In fact, Russia is still not much different. The Duma 
of the beginning of the twentieth century was an attempt to introduce the rule of law 
to Russia. However, the introduction was not successful. Similarly to the Rechtsstaat, 
the Russian Pravovoe Gosudarstvo also became an extension of feudal rule. Unlike in 
Germany, Russia did not have a Kant of its own. Hence, the introduction of the rule 
was Russified right from the beginning. 
The Decembrist uprising of 1825 marks the intensification of the struggle for the constitution 
in Russia. Decembrist thinking, however, is highly ambivalent and contradictory, with the Sou-
thern Society represented by Pavel Pestel favouring a strong but republican state to achieve the 
aim of modernisation, while the Northern Society’s views on constitutionalism were more liberal 
and federalist while at the same time monarchist (Sakwa, 1996, p.115).
Thus, the choice was between a republic with a strong president endowed with 
powers similar to the absolutist rule of a king or a monarchy with a sovereign, perhaps 
gentle, yet still entirely in charge of the rights of the people who were to stay subjects 
rather than become citizens. This was not much of a choice, for both Societies were 
assuming that the state was the giver of rights rather than a protector of them. This 
put the Decembrists in direct opposition to the rule of law, even though they were 
demanding constitutionalism in Russia. The prevailing type of authority was not to 
be changed. The ruler, be it president or king, was to remain extraordinarily power-
ful, perhaps because only an extraordinary person, a charismatic figure, could have 
so much power. Paradoxically or not, the demands for constitutionalism, however 
understood, was the revolutionary part of the Decembrists, for in Russia constitution-
alism was deemed to be incompatible with the country’s political culture (Walicki, 
1987, pp.15-16).
The incompatibility was reflected in the Dumas. Those who were instrumental 
for setting up the bodies did not care much about them. The first two Dumas lasted 
less than 200 days, despite being dominated by the Kadets, who were supposed to be 
liberal and western. The third and fourth Dumas lasted five years each, and, while 
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lasting, they engaged in passing thousands of bills, thus pursuing legalism similar 
to that of the Rechtsstaat (Jackson and Devlin, 1989). The difference was the fact 
that while the German parliament operated in a state that was becoming increas-
ingly stronger, the Russian Dumas were passing the many bills in a country that was 
becoming steadily ungovernable.
The relationship between the legalism of the Dumas and the weakening of the 
state was only confirming the notion that the ruler must be strong. Consequently, 
law in Russia could only work if it was one of the tools of the ruler. If law was used by 
something or somebody else other than the power holder, it was pretty much useless, 
which is why it did not stop the decay of the czardom. This was the chief difference 
between the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo, which was stressing the power of the ruler, and 
the Rechtsstaat, which emphasizedg the strength of the state.
Consequently, the Rechtsstaat had the potential of moving German society from 
one based on the charismatic-traditional type of authority to the traditional-legal type. 
Thus, when coupled with Rechtsstaatlichkeit, the original legalism of the Rechtsstaat 
could be transformed into a foundation of a rule-of-law regime that requires a more 
detailed form of governance, often referred to as judicialization of politics (Blair, 1978), 
to protect the freedom and rights of the citizens. Thus, the state, and this remains the 
case in contemporary Germany, still relies on regulation, but now it is used to protect 
the freedom and rights of the citizens, not to rule over the subjects.
However, the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo, a term and concept that appeared in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century (Sakwa, 1996, p.116), had no such potential, for 
it still rested on the idea that power belonged to the Batushka, an extraordinary and 
paternalistic leader who holds it to protect and promote the well-being of Russia. Any 
institutionalization of power, such as the Dumas, went against the grain of Russia, 
therefore. No wonder, then, that the next attempt at using law as an instrument of 
modernization would only come in the late 1980s Soviet Union.
The constitutions in the Soviet Union had chiefly a propaganda role to play, just 
to show that the USSR was as democratic as any western state was. The exception of 
sorts was the 1918 constitution, for it, at least in theory, introduced federalism based 
on nationality. Had the federalism been indeed implemented, the Soviet Union would 
have been a very different state, most likely. But then again, the reason for the failure 
of Soviet federalism was the prevailing type of authority. Federalism requires sharing 
of power. This calls for a scheme of sharing that is institutionalized somehow, usually 
by the constitution. However, how can power be shared if the holder of it has, or 
is supposed to have, extraordinary qualities? Charisma, however based, cannot be 
shared.
The Pravovoe Gosudarstvo was included in the 1993 constitution of the Russian 
Federation. However, the term was revived during the Gorbachev period. At that time, 
rights of individuals and groups in relation to the state were looked at as something 
that was to be respected and weaknesses in the law were to be fixed. (Barry, 1992, 
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pp.xii-xiv). By the middle of the 1990s, the weaknesses should have been fixed, one 
could presume.
On the surface, the reforms seem impressive. An enormous number of laws have been drafted 
with the assistance of Western experts. Many have gone on to become law, either through the 
legislative process or via Presidential decree. … Given this [Soviet] legacy, merely passing new 
laws and revitalizing legal institutions is not sufficient. If these reforms are to be meaningful, 
they have to aspire to more; namely, to reshaping basic societal attitudes toward law. Absent 
attitudinal changes-that is changes in the underlying legal culture-even the best laws (from a 
technical point of view) will lie dormant (Hendley, 1996, pp.238-39).
Societal change can come either from above, which was the case in England or 
Germany, or from below, for example, France. Either way, there has to be a force 
determined to introduce reforms in a serious and profound way. So far, Russia has 
been lacking such a force. That is why the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo remains what 
the Rechtsstaat was before it was supplemented by Rechtsstaatlichkeit. In Russia, 
however, the pre-modern type of authority continues to prevail. And as long as it 
does, law will be a tool in the hands of the leader. Thus, the legal is to serve the ruler 
and the practical is to observe the law and, hence, serve the ruler. This is the nature 
of the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo. 
Steven Blank makes a good point:
Western failure to understand the crucial role that the absence of secure rights to property plays 
in the evolution of Russia and the failure to understand that without it and its historical deriva-
tions either a modern state with a genuine market economy or a state governed by law is incon-
ceivable have vitiated much Western analysis of Russia that insists on comparing it to states 
which have precisely this missing ingredient (Blank, 2008, p.234).
Indeed, the right to own property is one of the critical rights of a citizen. In Russia, 
this right has been absent so far. The tsars used to take away property from disobe-
dient aristocrats. Putin has done the same, for example, Yukos. Law is certainly an 
important element of the transition from pre-modernity to modernity, as long as it 
protects individuals from the arbitrary rule of a power holder. For law to play this role 
in continental Europe is a question of the balance between rights and goods. 
While analyzing the Rechtsstaat, Weber became strongly critical of the Sozialstaat. 
Weber’s SL [Sociology of Law] is first and foremost an intense confrontation with what was a 
transformation of state and society in Weber’s own time: specifically, the transition from the 
nineteenth-century liberal state, or Rechtsstaat, to the administrative/welfare state, or Sozial-
staat, of the twentieth century. (McCormick, 2007, p.2).
At the time, the Sozialstaat was a product of the complex set of the multitude of regu-
lations related to the distribution of public goods. As such, the Sozialstaat became 
indeed the vehicle for the movement away from the Kantian negative freedom towards 
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von Mohl’s positive freedom. Of course later, when the Rechtsstaat and Rechtssta-
atlichkeit will be moving the German state back to Kant’s vision of it, the Sozialstaat 
will move as well by being incorporated into the 1949 Grundgesetz. Until then, and 
certainly at the time when Weber was analyzing it, he had a good reason to associate 
the Sozialstaat with pre-modern paternalism. Going backward, however, is irrational, 
especially if law is used for this. After all, for him, modern western societies shared a 
legal order characterized by rationality (Kronman, 1983, p.73).
Thus, for Weber the Sozialstaat was a degeneration of the Rechtsstaat. The latter 
went the wrong way. Instead of fostering freedom and rights, it was strongly de-
emphasising both. And while doing so, it used law to institutionalize the personal-
ized rule of the chancellor by making the personalization impersonal or, perhaps, 
non-personal. In other words, the recreated modern feudal ruler was not the person 
who held the office of chancellor, but rather it was the chancellery itself, for it com-
manded both rights and goods to be dispersed through law but at the discretion of the 
office holder. 
By losing its original Kantian origin and therefore the idea to use reason to 
rationalize political rule, the Rechtsstaat was simply turning into a mere regulatory 
machine. 
In 1928, Hans Kelsen in his “Pure Theory of Law” (“Reine Rechtslehre”) radically 
affirmed the identity of the state and the law. The state was nothing but Rechtsstaat 
in a formal sense of the term (Koetter, 2013). 
The machine had no substance other than just producing regulations. In turn, 
regulations were just rules to follow by robots-like people. Reason was replaced by 
legalistic procedural mechanisms. The Sozialstaat was firming up the faceless, pater-
nalistic rule. Rights are normative, they need rationalization and they require citizens. 
A regulation on how to obtain, say, insurance payments, is just that – regulation.
Putin has been determined to set up the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo in that degener-
ated form. In fact, the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo was all along degenerated. However, to 
re-launch government in Russia, Putin had no choice. When he came to power, the 
Russian Federation was on the way to collapsing. The decade of Yeltsin’s presidency 
with its “wild, wild capitalism” was about to destroy whatever remnants of gover-
nance were carried over from the Soviet state.
That is where Putin came in. He was and is personally committed to reaffirming central state 
power vis-a-vis the “oligarchs,” the mass media, and the republics and regions. And what is scar-
cely less important than Putin’s determination to re-establish central state power is the fact that 
there are many in the federal administration-whether presidential or governmental-who have 
been waiting impatiently for such leadership. That a handful of rich businessmen should have 
exerted so much influence over public policy and the mass media is anathema to them, as is the 
idea that any republics or regions should be beyond central control. Putin, in other words, has an 
institutional base for reinventing the strong state. (Brown, 2001, p.47, italics original)
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Given the popular support for Putin coming from the Russians, they, too, were waiting 
for the strong leader and the strong government, for as Putin noticed, “… from the 
very beginning, Russia was created as a supercentralized state. That’s practically laid 
down in its genetic code, its traditions, and the mentality of its people” (quoted in 
Brown, 2001, p.51). Moreover, “[t]here [was] strong demand from within the federal 
center for a restoration of lost power. If Putin [could not] supply it, some of his current 
supporter [might] look for someone else who [would]” (Brown, 2001, p.51).
In the past, and not too distant, the ruler could simply apply terror, kill the oppo-
nents, real or imagined, and retain all the strings of power in his hands. Those times 
are gone now, especially after the Yeltsin decade. During the 1990s, Russia stopped 
being insulated from the outside world the way the Soviet Union was. This does not 
mean, however, that Russia has embarked on the road to liberal democracy. Instead, 
as it seems, the Russian Federation when it emerged from the USSR was more or less 
at the point Germany had been at the time of the unification: personal rule was longed 
for; the state was weak; governance was problematic; modernity was encroaching; no 
true reformers were present; and the legitimacy of the power holder was questionable.
Under the circumstance, when Putin came to power, his work was cut out for 
him. The Russian flirtation with western ideas and democracy in the 1990s became a 
miserable experience, similar to the Germans’ experience with the Weimar Republic. 
Thus going west was not an option; going straight back to the past was not an option 
either. Putin can be a lot of things to a lot of people, but Ivan the Terrible or Stalin he 
is not. The only viable choice was that supercentralized state; supercentralization, 
however, needed to be overhauled by being updated to accommodate the changes 
that occurred after the end of the USSR. 
Even though Russia had the pravovoe gosudarstvo as an idea since the nineteenth 
century, it was never really practiced. Instead, it was more of an ideal formed as a 
concoction of some western thoughts and practices mixed into Russia’s realties and 
tradition. However, now was the time to put the idea and ideal into practice. As Putin 
explained it,
A very important part of our common work is to strengthen the vertical structure of power. This 
presupposes control by the federal centre and effective feedback. I am confident that the State 
Council can be an excellent tool for such interaction (quoted in Brown, 2001, pp.50-51).
The Council is formally an advisory body to the president composed of regional 
leaders. When Yeltsin left office, the regional governors ran the federal units as if they 
were their personal fiefdoms. By gathering them in one place and under his control, 
Putin has neutralized their influence in the regions. This way the Council, which he 
controls, has greatly increased his power. And since the Council is institutionalized, 
regulation is the chief method of keeping tabs on the governors. Thus, by using law, 
Putin actually increased his power, which in Russia is not the usual way of doing it.
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Archie Brown points out Putin’s selective use of law as a way of strengthening 
his power (Brown, 2001, p.48). Blank highlights the role of law in the work of the 
FSB, as envisioned by Putin: “This [security] work must be done strictly in line with 
the law and all of your steps must be based on the Constitution and Russian laws” 
(Blank, 2008, p.247). This sounds like a “KGB by the book.” The security service, as 
the ruler’s direct instrument of power, can still be used whenever and wherever he 
deems it necessary. But this time, his control over the service and the service’s control 
over all others is to be done through law. The same is applicable to the tax-collecting 
service, for example.
The Federal Tax Service has also proposed expanding the range of sources that can or must 
submit information on the population’s incomes to the tax authorities. This would include orga-
nizations that pay cash prizes to individuals, information on all sales of movable property, and 
the sales of means of transport (Blank, 2008, p.248).
If the proposition is to make sense, the collection of the tax information and taxes 
requires a structure and regulation. Given the nature of the information to be col-
lected, the regulation has to be precise and detailed. Consequently, the legalism of 
the Rechtsstaat is replicated in the Putin version of the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo. Law, 
that is, regulation, reflects the changed supercentralization scheme instigated by the 
fleeting arrival of the west in Russia in the 1990s. Blank quotes a Russian analyst’s 
take on Putin’s use of regulation:
To retain his influence in the country, according to available data, he is putting the real prere-
quisites into operation: In the first place, he is de-facto putting the power structures under his 
jurisdiction, in the second place, the government and the Duma will be in his hands, in the third 
place, control over the mass information media will be switched to the government machinery, 
and in the fourth place, the role of the president’s staff will be reduced (as in the United States) to 
the technical servicing of the work of the new president (quoted in Blank, 2008, p.250).
This looks like the regulatory machinery of the Rechtsstaat.
He also refers to the idea of “regular government” that some tsarist reforms in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries tried to put in place in order to improve gov-
ernance. (Blank, 2008, p.250). If this idea indeed guides Putin, it cannot be a mere 
replication of it. 
The “regular government” was about centralized, flawless operation and, thus, 
perfect organization. In reality, the tsarist government was anything but flawless and 
perfect. It relied on force, ad hoc actions and improvisation. The tsars did not depend 
on law, even if they wanted to, precisely because of the malady of their rule, which 
certainly was the case in the nineteenth century. The tsarist bureaucracy was indo-
lent, corrupt and fragmented. Therefore, to set it up successfully, the “regular govern-
ment,” needs to be significantly “irregular.” What will stay regular is the status of 
the people, who are to remain subjects, and freedom and rights will continue to be in 
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the domain of the state. The irregular is to be the amplified efficiency of governance 
achieved through the use of law in the form of the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo readjusted 
through the inclusion of the Rechtsstaat.
Mr. Putin would take up this mission in earnest as president. Within months of taking over the 
presidency in January 2000, Mr. Putin worked to rebuild state power by constructing a “rule-by-
law state” where law formulated by the presidential administration would be implemented in 
the country by courts and prosecutors. This Putinist legal system relied heavily on the “strategic-
operational dichotomy” that Mr. Putin had outlined in his plagiarized thesis. The president for-
mulated strategic policy through lawmaking, and judges and prosecutors monitored the imple-
mentation of these laws though the judicial process. To implement this legal power vertically, 
Mr. Putin focused his attention on coordinating legislative policy with parliament by simplifying 
legal codes and signaling to judges and prosecutors that he would expand their power in return 
for loyalty (Partlett, 2012).
His rule-by-law state is to have an orderly structure for using law as a critically impor-
tant and positively efficient tool of modern governance utilized for an updated, that is 
institutionalized personalized rule of Russia’s leader. 
Using law to improve governance was also Gorbachev’s idea. 
[d]uring the last years of its life the Soviet Union turned to law like a dying monarch to his withe-
red God ...and the Congress and Supreme Soviet enact[ed] and amend[ed] statutes with the 
fervour of one who sees in legislation the path to paradise (Rudden, 1994, p.56).
Gorbachev desperately tried to save his power and the Soviet Union. Legislation was 
one of the ways to do so. However, he did not have a workable plan for reform and a 
way of executing it. Even worse, Perestroika and Glasnost carried the tint of western-
ization, which meant that they were to be planted into a milieu that was not fertile. 
This rendered them artificial. Moreover, he did not control the state apparatus. The 
bureaucrats by and large were in opposition to him. As a result, it could be bills or 
beats, for his reforms were Hail Marys thrown into the wind of disintegration and 
chaos. This is not the case with Putin. 
No doubt, Putin’s plan to strengthen Russia is systematic. It includes a vision 
of what a reformed Russia is to be like. It is to be efficient, governable, wealthy and 
influential. Also, it is to be regulation-based. But it is not to be western. Instead, it is to 
have some western elements squared with the Russian tradition.. It is to be a sovereign 
democracy, “…a concept linking selected western democratic attributes with a nativ-
ist Russia-centric vision” (Ruth, 2012, p.230; see also, Remington, 2007; Monaghan, 
2008; Stent, 2008), which is often promoted as “… a kind of new national ideol-
ogy” (Averre, 2007, p.174) or managed democracy “… [which] will have all the formal 
institutions of democracy: elections, parties, media, civil society, and so on. But the 
real autonomy of these institutions and, therefore, their real capacity to influence 
the actions of the state will be severely limited.” (Lipman and McFaul, 2001, p.116). 
The former is personalized rule by regulation, the latter is supposed to be Russia’s 
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contribution to the different forms of democracy, quite likely a Russian version of 
German democracy. 
Because of his KGB years, Putin is intimately familiar with Germany, the language 
and the ways the state and society work. If regulation works in Germany, it can work 
in Russia. If Germany is a democracy framed by the wide-ranging and all-embracing 
legislative system, Russia, too, can be democratic with its own equally comprehen-
sive regulation. Since Germany is rich, Russia can be rich as well. Germany is not a 
carbon copy of the Anglo-Saxon rule of law. Russia can also have its own version of it. 
Germany works well. Russia will work well, by the same token.
For Putin, there can only be one conclusion here: the Rechtsstaat is to be incor-
porated into the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo; but the incorporation must be on Russia’s 
terms. When this is accomplished, Russia will have the old ideal of the “regular gov-
ernment” in reality. The tsars did not do it. The general secretaries did not it. Putin, at 
least according to Putin, can do it. If so, he will be the saviour of Russia now and later. 
When he is gone, the Russian version of the rule of law will stay in place. There were 
Catherine the Great and Peter the Great, both imported western elements to Russia 
and this worked, but only for a while. Well, neither of them included law into their 
importations and used it to make their reforms successful. Now is Putin’s turn. Since 
he is employing the Russian version of the rule of law, the reforms will last, just like 
in Germany. Or will they?
The Rechtsstaat was from the beginning accompanied the Sozialstaat, which was 
constantly growing. In 1911 the Reich insurance system was extended to civil servants 
and, generally, white-collar workers. The unemployment insurance was introduced 
in 1927. More and more public goods were distributed to more and more segments of 
society. And as long as the Sozialstaat worked well, the Rechtsstaat could continue 
the trade-off: goods but not freedom and rights. When the state could not deliver the 
goods during the Weimar Republic, the governance was immediately weakened.
What about the Russian Sozialstaat? Where are the goods? They have never been 
aplenty in Russia. The USSR had problems with their quantity, quality and delivery; 
but then, the Soviet people did not pay taxes. Now, the Russians do. To be able to 
deliver the goods and maintain the original trade-off of the Rechtsstaat, Putin has 
to have the means, that is, functioning economy. Since Yeltsin linked it to the global 
economy, Russia’s economy has become driven by the markets. Of course, it can still 
be regulated, but it cannot be controlled the way the tsars or general secretaries could 
and did, or Bismarck.
When Bismarck was setting the Rechtsstaat, his government, like most other 
governments at the time, was involved in the economy in a direct way. That was 
then, however; now, in a globalizing world, state intervention has been substan-
tially reduced, for the role of the state has profoundly changed in recent decades 
(Lake, 2010; Goodhart and Taninchev, 2011). And so has the utility, quantity and 
quality of state regulation. Even worse, market economy needs independent courts 
that can adjudicate contractual disputes, for example, without the unduly political 
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interference. Putin, however, wants loyal judges, not independent ones. Independent 
courts would require sharing of power. However, sharing of power has been so far 
incompatible with Russia’s rulers. 
The absence of a functioning Sozialstaat in Putin’s Russia is certainly a problem 
if his Pravovoe Gosudarstvo is to succeed. But can he solve the problem if he puts in 
place the Sozialstaat, efficient as it could possibly be, no matter how difficult this 
task would be? Jürgen Habermas summarized Weber’s critical view of the Bismarck-
ian Sozialstaat in the following way: 
Paradigms harden into ideologies insofar as they systematically close themselves off from the 
perception of radically new situations and resist different interpretations of rights and princip-
les, interpretations that press for acknowledgment in the light of radically new historical experi-
ences [,] . . . [which] stabilize themselves through professionally and judicially institutionalized 
monopolies on interpretation and permit only internal revision according to their own standards 
(Habermas, 1996, p.221).
Because the Sozialstaat that Weber dealt with lost rational-formal law, it could not 
adopt itself to radically new situations, that is, societal change. 
By the time Habermas analyzed the Sozialstaat, it had regained its rationality, 
which is why it now strengthens constitutional democracy. It is so, for
… [l]aw is … both institutionally administrative and socially participatory because it translates 
popular will into government action. It is generated by public communication but also reaches 
back into society to foster the conditions of further communication. (McCormick, 2007, p.216)
Whether Weber or Habermas, Putin’s Pravovoe Gosudarstvo appears to be doomed. 
If it is Weber, degeneration of any kind by definition cannot succeed. The 
Rechtsstaat without Rechtsstaatlichkeit is out of date and out of purpose, therefore. 
A creation from the nineteenth century cannot work in the twenty first century. The 
kind of society that existed then does not exist today.
If it is Habermas, then Putin is playing with fire. The non-degenerated form of 
the Sozialstaat will create solidarity leading to the formation of community whose 
members will demand rights, for they will act rationally. To put it crudely: instead of 
choosing to be fed rather than have rights, the Russians will sooner or later choose 
both.
Law is an important factor of societal change, but only if it is in the form of rule of 
law. And if it is, the state becomes the representation of the political will of the people. 
This is not the case with the Pravovoe Gosudarstvo, for it instills collectivism by regu-
lation. The state is the representation of the will of the power holder. And rights can 
only by afforded by the state. Law is also essential for community formation: to live 
together, we need rules. To live by them, the rules ought to be a result of a deliberative 
process, for law is a practice, “… an assemblage of rules, principles, canons, maxims, 
customs, usages, and manners that condition and sustain the activity of governing” 
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(Loughlin, 2003, p.30). As such, law is public because it is formed on the basis of 
public will; it changes along with society, for it is the sum of its will. In the Pravovoe 
Gosudarstvo community is not formed; it is imposed. Law is private, for it is formed 
by the power holder. It changes when the power holder decides to change it, for it is 
the sum of his will.
The Rechtsstaat has been a prominent part of the development of law, legal 
systems, practice, and culture in Europe. It has significantly contributed to the devel-
opment of codified law. At first, it facilitated the introduction of regulation as a step 
in the process of moving away from feudalism. Later, with the Rechtsstaatlichkeit, 
it became a way of incorporating the rule of law, thus turning into a path to liberal 
democracy. As a result, the Rechtsstaat has markedly modified the substance of the 
legal and the utility of the practical. The legal has changed from what the ruler has 
passed to what the state as the representative of the popular will has legislated. The 
practical has moved from serving the ruler to becoming the practical expression of 
representation through which “… conflict [can] be positively harnessed, appropriate 
governing arrangements devised, and real political will established” (Loughlin, 2003, 
p.64).
Walter Bagehot, while commenting on the British Reform Acts of 1832 and 1867, 
observed:
A new Constitution does not produce its full effect as long as all its subjects were reared under 
an old Constitution, as long as its statesmen were trained by that old Constitution. It is not really 
tested till it comes to be worked by statesmen and among a people neither of whom are guided 
by a different experience (Bagehot, 1873).
Given the central position of Germany in Europe, the country’s political influence 
and intellectual prominence, the Rechtsstaat played a prominent role in the rearing 
of both the rulers and the ruled. At first, it transformed personal, direct rule of the 
feudal landlords into institutionalized, personal rule of post-feudal rulers, and con-
verted peasants into subjects. With the addition of Rechtsstaatlichkeit, the rulers have 
become elected officials and the subjects have become citizens. In the end, by now 
almost all of Europe’s states and societies moved from “We the Ruler” to “We the 
People”.
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5  Magna Carta and the Rise of Anglo-American 
Constitutionalism
5.1  The Great Charter
The history of institutions is inseparable from the history of ideas, but sometimes it 
is the institutions that inspire the development of political ideas. In case of Magna 
Carta that became part of the English constitution it certainly was the latter. A practi-
cal solution to political problems caused by the rebel barons gathered in London in 
1215, Magna Carta established principles fundamental for the institution of the rule 
of law which later on British and American political thought has spread throughout 
the modern world (Madden, 2005, p.10). My main research question in this essay is to 
what extent an interesting parallel between Magna Carta and its legacy and later con-
stitutional developments that took place in Europe and America can be determined. 
This parallel, or perhaps even inspiration, would indicate that there is a common her-
itage to the ideas of constitutionalism in Western political thought and legal culture. 
In order to do that I look at the ideas that shaped Magna Carta and their transmission 
into later periods and contexts. One of these contexts that is examined here is the rise 
of constitutionalism in the Polish Commonwealth in the early sixteenth century. 
The English barons upon whose demand king John decided to grant the first 
charter of liberties that we know, the famous Magna Carta Libertatum, insisted simply 
that the king obeys his own rules. The dispute was to be set not by war, but trough a 
legal process. Sixty three clauses included in the document had local and universal 
meaning, it was a hotchpotch of various interests, but it also had appeal to justice. The 
most fundamental of these was the idea that the king must be bound by the law of his 
kingdom, that the law which comes from the ruler is observed by him so that he does 
not act in a tyrannical way. But it was not the king who willingly singed the Carta, it 
was the position of the barons who made him do so and thus brought to an end the 
state of civil war. There is a strong similarity between the English barons at Runny-
mede meadow demanding their liberties and the Polish noblemen in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries declaring that they would not fight a war or agree to changes 
in dynastic succession if the king did not grant them certain rights (called privileges). 
The aim of this article is to bring to light this and other parallels in medieval and 
early-modern European history so that Magna Carta can be seen as one of the most 
important documents of early constitutionalism. Its significance lies in both legal and 
1  The Jagiellonian University in Kraków.
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symbolic meaning, in the message that it conveyed upon others both in England and 
elsewhere as to what were the limits of monarchical power and who decided about 
these limits. Although the Great Charter ‘did not save England from Tudor despotism’, 
as one author observed, it “was despotism of fact rather than of law.” As a charter of 
liberties Magna Carta did not mentioned any sanctions in case the king infringed upon 
the rights it mentioned, and that certainly was one of its weaknesses, but at the same 
time it was a clear assertion of fundamental rights of various groups within society, 
however differently they have been listed at different periods. It will be argued that 
Magna Carta is unique in comparison with other similar documents issued in medi-
eval Europe because of the uniqueness of the English unwritten constitution as well 
as legal and political culture that it helped establish throughout the centuries. But 
those other instances of constitutional developments, including above all the Polish 
development help situate Magna Carta and political and legal ideas it instigated in a 
broader context of medieval Europe and early-modern republicanism.
Chapter 39 of Magna Carta states the credo of modern constitution in Europe and 
later on in America: “No free man shall be arrested or imprisoned, or disseised or 
outlawed or exiled or in any way victimized neither will we attack him or send anyone 
to attack him, except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land” 
(Rothwell, 1975, p.312). In the fourteenth century the same right was granted to Polish 
nobility (the difference was that instead of a ‘free man’ the act referred to ‘a noble 
man’, the category somehow more limited although it was soon to include around ten 
percent of the Polish society). The Coronation Charter issued by Henry I on 5 August 
1100 precedes Magna Carta as an example of a promises made by the new king to 
various sections of his feudal community including the church (Turner, 2003). This 
medieval custom of the new king biding for support and making a pledge with his 
people was to become common in Poland, especially with the rise of the Jagiellonian 
dynasty which itself was established as the result of an agreement between nobility 
and the king. It was precisely that first basic text of Henry I which the rebellion of 1215 
demanded that it should be confirmed and reissued. And both documents start with 
the liberties of the church and then proceed to feudal incidents. 
In his statute of 1225 reissuing Magna Carta, Henry III states again that the liber-
ties in question were “to be held in our kingdom of England forever.” It was a royal act 
of will: spontanea et bona volunta nostra. In a similar manner the liberties of Magna 
Carta as well as the Charter of the Forest were approved and renewed by Edward I in 
1297. The concession of the king was a transaction made and remade for the benefit 
of all parties concerned, by men “used to receiving grants of liberties” (Holt, 1993, 
p.47). Granted in perpetuum the charters were unusual as they were going beyond 
the original concession and reflected the emergence of the communitas regni, a politi-
cal phenomenon and a concept of men who were now in possession of liberties that 
could not be simply dismissed or invalidated. In this sense Magna Carta was a con-
stitutional act, the origin of future legislation (e.g. the Provision of Merton of 1236) 
and thus the first statute. But it still remained a privilege. It was the same manner of 
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issuing at the same time a statute binding upon the kings in perpetuity and a privilege 
granted with a certain sections of the society in mind that prevailed in Poland from 
the fourteenth century onwards. 
Magna Carta became real and not only symbolic as a constant point of refer-
ence for those discontented subjects of their monarch, first in England and then in 
American colonies, who simply demanded the reconfirmation of the document as the 
starting point for political reform and guarantee of justice, or as a safeguard against 
tyrannical rule. Shortly after king Jonh’s death in 1216 the Great Charter was quickly 
reissued in 1217 and its definitive version came in 1225. When thirty years later the 
barons of king Henry III demanded again that the king would keep and observe the 
charter of liberties of England, this validation of the charter was a significant act, an 
example of the personal oath of the king that he would abide by the terms agreed 
earlier by those present at Runnymede. Henry Bracton, the English jurist whose 
legal theory must have been influenced by the Great Charter, declared that ‘The law 
makes the King’, and not the other way round, adding that ‘there is no king where 
will rules and not law’ (White, 1908, p.268). The fundamental legal principle now was 
that the king must not take the definition of rights into his own hands, but must  
proceed against none by force for any alleged violation of them until a case has been 
made out against such a one by “due process of law” (McIlwain, 1975, p.78).
An important question that needs to be addressed is whether the king was legally 
bound to reissue Magna Carta or was it purely his will to do so? The king and the 
nobility with him took a solemn oath to observe omnes libertates praescriptas. In other 
words, it came as the result of their will and thus the king had only a moral obligation 
to stand by his oath. Henry III reissued Magna Carta simply by his own free will (spon-
tanea et bona voluntas nostra) and not as a binding constitutional law by some other 
source (McIlwain, 1975, p.73). Such interpretation comes from Henry Bracton (Mait-
land, 1887) stating that prince’s will is law in accordance with lex regia that stipulates 
what the law already is, promulgated by the king after a discussion with his magnates 
who demand observance of an ancient custom. A long tradition of treating the charter 
as valid was to make it a clear part of what was later called “the ancient constitution” 
of England. According to Bracton, binding law was the result of king’s will being in 
conformity with lex regia, the laws the people have chosen. For American founders it 
came almost naturally to include Magna Carta in their own constitutional provisions 
as an ancient custom the subjects of the English king could call upon. 
In England Magna Carta was seen as sacrosanct still in the fourteenth century 
and statutes that conflicted with it were ruled invalid, which as a norm was confirmed 
by a statute enacted by Edward III in 1369 who further developed what was to be 
called ‘a due process of law’ (Turner, 2003). However, by the mid fifteenth century 
Magna Carta was overshadowed by high politics and the strong reassertion of royal 
sovereignty by the Yorkist and Tudor monarchs. But even then Magna Carta remained 
the first of statutes of the English constitution, protector of landed property. Ignored 
by Henry VIII, in the seventeenth century Magna Carta and the doctrine of ancient 
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constitution that was emerging played the key role in the conflict between king and 
Parliament. The notion of ‘the ancient constitution’ was used by members of Parlia-
ment who searched for a body of laws and customs that imposed limits on the royal 
power over the subjects. But it was Sir Edward Coke who took the English constitution 
as “a chain of royal confirmations of English law, stretching back to the age of  Edward 
the Confessor and and beyond” (Turner, 2003) and insisted that “the king by his proc-
lamation or other ways cannot change any part of the common law, or statue law, or 
the customs of the realm” (Wilson, 1777, p.75). 
5.2  Magna Carta as a Model in Medieval and Early-Modern Europe
In Central Europe a similar development took place in Hungary and later on in Poland. 
The Golden Bull of Hungary (Aranybulla) of 1222 issued by King Andrew II who, like 
King John I in England, was forced by his nobles to accept an act that placed consti-
tutional limits on the power of the monarch. The edict established the basic rights 
and privileges of Hungarian nobility and clergymen. Caused by Andrew’s excesses 
and extravagances, the act contains 31 articles reaffirming previously granted rights 
and bestowing new ones: “Since the liberties established by St. Stephan the king in 
favor of the nobles of our realm was well as of other persons have been diminished in 
many respects by the authority of certain kings. […] We therefore desire to fulfill their 
requests in all respects as we are obliged to do […] for the better preservation of the 
royal dignity which can be done better by no one other than by them. We grant both to 
them and to other men of our kingdom the liberty given by the holy king” (Bak, 1999, 
p.34). There is no textual link between the document and Magna Carta although we 
may speculate that their affinity is so striking that there must have been some inspira-
tion coming from the English charter (Rady, 2014).
In 1241 Danish king Valdemar the Victorius issued the Jutland Code which estab-
lished the concept of the legal order as a contract between ruler and people. It was 
strengthened by the charter of 1282 signed upon the demand of nobility by king Erik 
V. Both documents are regarded as forerunners of the subsequent Danish constitu-
tional law. The Jutland Code, the oldest civil code in Denmark, was first drafted by 
a royal committee and passed by the Lndsthing at Viborg before being finally issued 
by the king. In 1326 it was ratified as official law and made applicable to all parts of 
Denmark (Orfield, 1954). According to the Code, legislation was to be based on uni-
versal justice to be legitimate. In other words, the source of law was to be found in 
natural law and not in the will of the ruler. In stating that ‘No man may meddle with 
the law, and the king may not set it aside without the will of the land’, it followed 
Magna Carta as a single document valid in the entire kingdom that aimed at making 
the law a binding power upon the ruler and the ruled. Like Magna Carta, the Code 
provided a regular and fixed form to the ancient customary law without constituting 
anything unknown before. The result of struggle between the king and nobility, the 
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Charter of 1282 secured a number of rights to nobility including the king’s promise 
not to convict anyone without legal basis and not to rule in an arbitrary manner. The 
Code and the Charter were adopted by assemblies comprised of king, bishops and the 
nobility constituting together a representative body whose union was needed to make 
the new law valid. The Preamble of the Jutland Code stated that “A land must be built 
on law […]” which must be “honest and just, reasonable and according to the ways of 
the people. It must meet their needs and speak plainly so that all men may know and 
understand what the law is. The law is not to be made in any man’s favour, but for the 
needs of all who live in the land” (The Jutland Code 2008, p.21). 
The Privileges of the Union of Aragon granted by the king in 1287 is another 
instance of a statute for which the Magna Carta could serve as a model. “The King 
vows and binds himself, his heirs and successors and any person acting on his or 
their part not to arrest, detain, expropriate or hold the property of any of the nobility 
or others of the Kingdoms of the Crown of Aragon.” Consequently, the idea behind the 
Privileges was that of the sovereignty of law, of making resistance to the crown legal 
though extraordinary (Madden, 2005, p.167). From the earliest times in Spanish politi-
cal thought justice was not only the end of human society, the norm regulating politi-
cal community and the only justification of the state or rather the political rule was its 
duty to secure justice (Madden, 2005, p.14). The document was unique in the Middle 
Ages as it contained a clause allowing that the reigning king may be abandoned and 
another elected if he contravenes the articles of the Privileges (Gissey, 1968, p.88). 
In the 1355 Treaty of Buda and the Košice privilege of 1374, Louis of Anjou, king 
of Poland and Hungary promised certain analogous rights to Polish nobility to ensure 
Angevin dynastic claim, the unprecedented succession of a female to the Polish 
throne. The charter of 1374 exempted the nobility from any payment of taxes to the 
crown, except a minor duty on their lands, without their explicit approval. It also 
assured the nobility that the most important royal appointments would go only to 
Poles and that offices in regional administration in each province would go to candi-
dates nominated by the local nobility. The charter also stated that the nobility would 
be required by law to fight without pay within the borders of the kingdom, but any 
military service outside its borders was to be remunerated at a specific rate (Fedoro-
wicz, 1982). At Košice Louis I also renewed a pledge made during his coronation to 
maintain the Polish kingdom’s territorial integrity. 
Similarly, the privileges issued at Jedlnia (1430) and Krakow (1433) by King 
Władysław Jagiełło in order to secure the succession of his progeny to the Polish 
throne, granted to the whole nobility one of the most important civil liberties: 
Neminem capivabiums nisi iure victum (‘We shall not imprison anybody unless they 
have been convicted by law’), as the first words of the document stated. Although it is 
underestimated and forgotten in the history of European legal culture, the Neminem 
Captivabimus granted the rights that were comparable to those granted not only by 
Magna Charta but also by the later Habeas Corpus Act of 1679. In 1454 the nobility 
were granted the right to participate in the legislative process by which new law 
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proposed by the king could not be valid without the approval of the convention of 
the gentry called the landed diets. Finally, the constitution called Nihil Novi issued 
in 1505 demanded that the king had no right to legislate without the consent of both 
chambers of Polish parliament, the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies (Izba Posel-
ska). From then on, it was impossible to introduce new laws or make changes related 
to the political system without consent of the nobility. The constitution, which was 
fundamental to the consolidation of nobility’s political role, its representation as well 
as the mixed political system, proclaimed that:
‘General laws and public acts do not apply to individuals but to the whole nation, thus, on this 
general Sejm in Radom, we, with all of the Kingdom’s prelates, councils and representatives of 
sejmiks (local assemblies of nobles) deemed as fair and just that from now on nothing new (nihil 
novi) can be decided by us and our successors without the approval of senators and representa-
tives of sejmiks. No ordinance that would bring dishonour on the Commonwealth, harm anyone 
or aim to change the common law and public freedom can be enacted’ (Szymanek, 2005, p.123).
At the sejm in Radom, king Alexander Jagiellon promised also, at the representa-
tives’ request, to observe the laws (confirmatio iurium) (Volumina Constitutionum, 
1996, pp.172-173). In practice, it meant accepting the superiority of law in the state 
and acknowledging it as a source of all authority. The Commonwealth’s law was to 
originate from a widespread consensus and was to be directed at the common good, 
since it concerned res populi – the community and its well-being.
Like the Great Charter, the privileges limited royal power, and at the same time 
they transformed the relationship between the ruler and the nobles into a contractual 
relationship. Although formally the act of a monarch, in fact they made up a kind of 
social contract and contained the obligations of binding character supported with 
the clause on the possibility of renouncing the allegiance to the ruler (the right of 
resistance). This constitutional development contributed to the victory of the repub-
lican principles in Poland, which was best illustrated by the replacement of the term 
“Regnum”, which so far was used to describe the Polish Kingdom, with “Respublica” 
(Rzeczpospolita), which highlighted the equality of its members/citizens. The goal of 
the nobility and republican political system, under the leadership of the king and par-
liament was to protect and maintain freedom from domination and self-government, 
which in practice frequently led to a conflict between freedom and the authority. 
During that period a number of small charters of liberties (often called privileges 
as they were usually granted only to the nobility) and statutes shaped a constitution 
of a limited mixed government, the monarchia mixta of the Polish and later on Pol-
ish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Similarly to England and Venice, Poland was called 
rzeczpospolita – res publica or commonwealth for its supreme norm was the welfare 
of the political community, bouns communi, and liberty of its citizens. The various 
acts of Polish monarchs granting rights and liberties to the citizens of Rzeczpospolita 
became a cornerstone of the doctrine of liberty cherished by republican writers and 
the whole class of noblemen. Subsequent concessions of the monarchs who often 
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simply due to historical circumstances (e.g. external threat) were willing to limit 
royal prerogatives gave rise to a speedy development of a representative parliamen-
tary system concentrated in the lower chamber of the Sejm and traditional land diets 
(sejmiki). This was further strengthened with the right of nobility (as a social class 
independently of the material status of each citizen) to elect the king. 
The formula of the Charter of Liberties of 1215: “We have also granted to all the 
free men of our realm for ourselves and our heirs for ever, all the liberties written 
below” (Rothewell, 1975), which also applied to the Charter of the Forest, was not 
present in the Polish charters, but it was taken for granted that each subsequent 
monarch was obliged to keep all liberties intact. This was became a formal require-
ment imposed on elected monarchs in form of Articuli Henriciani first issued in 1572 
which by and large were a written seal to all existing constitutional rules and liberties 
and of the kingdom and thus could be treated as the first constitution of the Kingdom 
(Lewandowska-Malec, 2009, pp.21-22). Additionally, all elected kings were supposed 
to enter a specific contract with the representatives of Rzeczpospolita called Pacta 
convent, a document that comprised of various obligations, promises and plans for 
reforms. Like Edward III in 1225, the Polish kings of the Jagiellonian dynasty, which 
itself was established as a contract between the king and nobility, and subsequent 
elected monarchs had to promise that nothing would be sought that would weaken 
or infringe the liberties. The transaction was to be constantly reinforced to ensure its 
permanence and certainty. And the very election of a king by consent of the subjects 
was seen as a sufficient guarantee of law and order of the commonwealth. Stanislaw 
Orzechowski, one of the most prominent republican authors in the sixteenth century 
stressed that a king is nothing more than the ‘mouth of the kingdom’ obliged by the 
free and lawful election to acting only in accordance with the will of his subjects and 
the law (Orzechowski, 1972, p.104). 
The insistence of being granted in perpetuum in the case of both English Charters 
was unusual (2008, p.48). Another feature that both the Magna Cart and the Polish 
statutes and privileges shared was the fact that they were official documents with 
more and more detailed provisions. And as the final version of Magna Carta was to 
be used as vehicle for legislation, ‘a source of law as well as a conveyance of liber-
ties’ (Holt, 2008, p.50), the same could be said of the statutes the Polish nobility so 
cherished. Similarly, these documents shared the unique feature of being both statute 
and privilege at the same time. Citizens could appeal to them against acts of govern-
ment and the courts treated them as law that they would follow (Holt, 2008, p.51). 
The difference between these acts was quite striking. While Magna Carta was by 1422 
confirmed in over fifty councils of parliaments, and had more general application as 
it referred to the category of “freemen”, the privileges of Polish nobility were treated 
as the best weapon of free citizens against absolutum dominium and were limited to 
that were social class. And while Magna Carta was to be reinterpreted and adjusted 
to circumstances (as the very term ‘freemen’ was changing), the liberties of nobility 
were treated as fixed and unchangeable; they could only be extended. In the fifteenth 
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and sixteenth centuries neither Polish nor English authors argued against monarchy. 
They were in favour of a mixed polity, monarchia mixta, or, to use the term which 
gained currency in today’s scholarship, ‘a monarchical republic’ (Collinson, 1987). It 
was taken for granted in both Poland and England that only the ancient model of a 
mixed constitution could guarantee that the rule of law and liberty were preserved. 
Charters of liberties and privileges contributed to the development of a mixed 
constitutional system of government in Poland that was first founded upon such con-
cepts as corpus regni and in the sixteenth century replaced by new terms such as 
corpus reipublicae and respublica. New representative system now comprised of the 
king, treated not as a sovereign, but as an administrator of the kingdom (Zaborowski, 
1507), and two chambers of parliament. Stanislaw Zaborowski stressed at the begin-
ning of the sixteenth century that communitas regni was higher than the monarch 
advocating sovereignty of the people and arguing that the king was not the owner, 
but only an administrator of the kingdom. The 1505 Constitution Nihil Novi stated that 
nothing new could be decided without consent of nobility expressed by Izba Poselska 
– the lower chamber of parliament. It strengthened political liberties of citizens and 
successfully limited any attempts of the king to strive towards absolutism. The right to 
participate in state decision-making granted to all citizens became a crucial element 
of republican liberty and was additionally secured by civil liberties including religious 
freedom and freedom of speech. Although the concept of an ‘ancient constitution’ was 
not used in Poland, the statutes that guaranteed liberties also guaranteed the rule of 
law and limited government and were the main claim of the movement for the ‘execu-
tion of the law’ in mid-sixteenth century to limit various practices (e.g. granting royal 
estates to senators for loyalty and support) that infringed upon old customs and laws. 
The struggle of nobility against absolutum dominium on the one hand and the domi-
nant position of aristocracy in government on the other hand not only gave the noble-
men prominent position in political community for three centuries, but vastly influ-
enced political consciousness supported by the republican theory that flourished in 
the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries (Pietrzyk-Reeves, 2012). Additionally, the 
Act of Warsaw Confederation of 1573 guaranteed freedom of conscience and religious 
toleration to all estates of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
The term ‘golden liberty’ which comprised of all the rights, liberties and privi-
leges that the nobility could enjoy had a different practical meaning from the term 
‘ancient constitution’, but its symbolic connotation was similar. It referred to funda-
mental norms of the commonwealth whose sacred statutes could only be preserved 
as long as its practical validity was intact. At the same time the development of nobil-
ity’s privileges and consequently the growth of rights of the nobles had an enormous 
impact on the constitutional system of the Polish Commonwealth since it generated 
the mechanisms and legal guaranties of the nobility’s privileged position in the rep-
resentative system of mixed government (Uruszczak, 2008). The concept of cardinal 
or fundamental laws understood as the laws of superior and invariable character was 
fully established in the seventeenth century. These laws could be supplemented by 
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new provisions but they were not subjected to review. They included Articuli Henri-
ciani, pacta conventa, principles of free election of the monarch and all the privile-
gies, including particularly those that guaranteed the nobles individual liberties, as 
we would call them today, including protection of private property, freedom of con-
science and religious freedom as we, as well as equal political rights. 
Different historical circumstances led to different constitutional developments 
in Poland and England. The May Constitution of 1791, the second written constitu-
tion after the American constitution, was an attempt to establish a better institutional 
structure and to secure the rights of all three estates of the Commonwealth. In England 
some of the most important provisions of Magna Carta including habeas corpus were 
strengthened with numerous other acts including the Bill of Rights of 1689 and its 
lasting significance as both a symbol and fundamental law was reinforced so that its 
most fundamental provisions never lost its validity. 
5.3  Magna Carta in America
Magna Carta is unique in comparison with other similar documents issued in medi-
eval Europe because of the uniqueness of the English unwritten constitution as well 
as the legal and political culture that it helped establish throughout the centuries. But 
it was especially in America that Magna Carta became a symbol of a limited govern-
ment in legal and political thought. It influenced American constitution even more 
greatly than European constitutionalism for it was taken by English colonists as the 
most cherished part of the legal tradition of their homeland that they still (until 1776) 
belonged to. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties of 1641 included a different list of 
liberties and provisions, being issued in different times and different circumstances, 
but the idea behind it seems to be similar to that of the Great Charter; to secure as 
many liberties to the colonists of Massachusetts as necessary at the time for the sta-
bility of churches and the commonwealth. Soon before the outbreak of the Ameri-
can Revolution in 1775, colonial lawyers and pamphleteers turned to Magna Carta 
for support against the British king. In October 1774 the first Continental Congress 
adopted a resolution which claimed that the colonists were doing ‘as Englishmen 
their ancestors in like cases have usually done, for asserting and vindicating their 
rights and liberties’ (Declaration 1774).
Later on it was the conviction of the Founding Fathers that England was founded 
on ancient constitution and that it was a government of law not of man. This idea of 
establishing the new fundamental law – a constitution for the colonies which were 
now an independent political community came from the long tradition of the common 
law and legal and political culture. John Adams insisted that “Where the public inter-
est governs it is a government of laws, and not of men […] If, in England, there has ever 
been any such thing as a government of laws, was it not magna charta?” (Adams, 1787, 
p.126). American colonists’ attitude to politics and government, as Bailyn observed, 
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“was fundamentally shaped by the root assumption that they, as Britishers, shared 
in a unique inheritance of liberty” (Bailyn, 1967, p.67). Among the first amendments 
to the new constitution ratified in 1791 to compose a Bill of Rights, number five most 
closely resembles 39th chapter of Magna Carta promising that no person shall be 
“deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law”. The phrase “due 
process of law” would prove to be remarkably elastic in expanding the rights of Amer-
ican citizens. And amendment 6 follows provisions of chapter 39 promising accused 
persons the right to a “speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury,” and the right “to 
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation,” the right “to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him”, to call “witnesses in his favor,” and to have “counsel 
for his defense.” The colonists and the Founders of the American Republic treated 
Magna Carta as fundamental law, standing above both king and Parliament and unal-
terable by statute. Their commitment to such higher law strengthened their ambition 
for written constitution and the final federal constitution of 1787. And today the Great 
Charter has even higher symbolic meaning in the USA than in Britain supporting the 
concept of limited government in American legal and political thought. As Hazeltine 
in somewhat exaggerated words put it:
The history of the Charter’s influence upon American constitutional development […] should 
be illuminating alike to subjects of the Crown and citizens of the Republic. Above all it teaches 
them that English political and legal ideals lie at the basis of much that is best in American ins-
titutions. Those ideals, jealously preserved and guarded by Americans throughout their whole 
history, still form the vital force in political thought and activity within the Union (Hazeltine, 
2012, pp.225-6).
Magna Carta was a symbol of liberty in early America and it remained so today. It is 
liberty understood as the absence of arbitrary power that could undermine the basic 
rights such as habeas corpus or free speech. The colonists’ fundamental claim to 
ancient rights was the best weapon to protect themselves from the British rule when 
injustice occurred. Magna Carta thus provided both a symbol and a tool to strengthen 
the claims of the people in their relationship with political authority, to make this 
relationship more contractual and consequently to establish constitutional norms as 
fundamental, sacred and demanding respect of all.
5.4  Conclusion
Symbolic as it might be, Magna Carta, and especially its chapter 39, proved a lasting 
source of the doctrines which it launched on the mainstream of political thought and 
jurisprudence in Europe and America. By the seventeenth century such key concepts 
as trial by jury, the rule of law, limited monarchy, habeas corpus and Parliament’s 
right to control taxation were traced back to the English charter. Parallel statutes or 
charters issued in other parts of medieval Europe never gained such prominence, but 
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they also played a very significant role in shaping the doctrine and institution of con-
stitutionalism that is of fundamental law of a political community. It was especially 
so in Poland where the roots of constitutionalism were indeed to be found in various 
charters of rights and privileges granted to the regnum and more precisely to its citi-
zens who not only secured legal protection against absolutism (absolute dominium 
as they called it at the beginning of the sixteenth century) in the form of the rule of 
law and sovereignty of law, but above all established the foundations of a free politi-
cal community – a monarchical republic whose citizens could enjoy liberty greater 
than that of most European societies at the time. During the period of A deep crisis of 
Rzeczpospolita in the eighteenth century it led to yet another development: the first 
written constitution later called the Constitution of 3 May adopted in 1791 which in 
different historical circumstance would perhaps have led to a similar stable constitu-
tional order as that of the United States of America. The second and third partitions 
of Poland stopped that development. The story of Magna Carta is different for unlike 
other similar documents of medieval or early modern Europe it never fully lost its 
validity and binding force, it was never abandoned or outlawed in its entirety by some 
other act or event. 
Bibliography
Adams, J. (1787). A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States. London: John 
Stockdale. 
Bailyn, B. (1967). The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Bak, J. M. (Ed.) (1999). The Laws of Medieval Kingdom of Hungary, 1000-1301. New York: Charles 
Schlacks. 
Collinson, P. (1987). The Monarchical Republic of Queen Elizabeth I. Bulletin of the Jon Rylands 
University Library of Manchester. Vol. 69, No. 2.
“Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress” (1774 [1927]). In Documents Illustrative 
of the Formation of the Union of the American States. Selected, arranged and indexed by C. C. 
Tansill. Washington: Government Printing Office.
Fedorowicz, J. K. (Ed.) (1982). A Republic of Nobles: Studies in Polish History to 1864. Cambridge 
University Press. Cambridge.
Gissey, R. E. (1968). If Not, Not: The Oathe of the Aragonese and the Legendary Laws of Sobrarbe. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Grodziski, S., Dwornicka, I., Uruszczak, W. (1996). Volumina Constitutionum 1493-1526. Warszawa: 
Wydawnictwo Sejmowe.
Holt, J. C. (2008). The Ancient Constitution in Medieval England. In E. Sandoz (Ed.), The Roots of 
Liberty: Magna Carta, Ancient Constitution, and the Anglo-American Tradition of Rule of Law. 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Lewandowska-Malec, I. (2009). Sejm Walny Koronny Rzeczpospolitej Obojga Narodów i Jego dorobek 
ustawodawczy (1578-1632). Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka.
Madden, M. R. (2005). Political Theory and Law in Medieval Spain. New Jersey: The Lawbook 
Exchange Ltd., Clark.
Maitland, F. W. (Ed.) (1887). Bracton’s Note book. A collection of cases decided in the King’s courts 
during the reign of Henry the Third. London: C.J. Clay and sons. 
74   Bibliography
McIlwain, Ch. (1975). Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Orfield, L. (1953). The Growth of Scandinavian Law. Philadelphia: The University of Pennsylvania 
Press.
Orzechowski, S. (1972). Mowa do szlachty polskiej przeciw prawom i ustawom Królestwa Polskiego 
uporządkowanym przez Jakuba Przyłuskiego. In S. Orzechowski, Wybór pism. Wrocław: Zaklad 
Wydawniczy im Ossolinskich. 
Pietrzyk-Reeves, D. (2012). Ład rzeczypospolitej. Polska myśl polityczna XVI wieku a klasyczna 
tradycja republikańska. Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka.
Rady, M. (2014). Hungary and The Golden Bull of 1222. Bantica 24-II, pp. 87-108.
Rothwell, H. (Ed.) (1975). English Historical Documents 1189-1327. London: Eyre and Spottiswoode.
Szymanek, A. (Ed.) (2005). Konstytucja Nihil novi, in “Nihil novi.” Z dorobku sejmu radomskiego 
1505 roku. Radom: Stowarzyszenie “Anno Domini”
The Jutland Code and Erik Kippling’s Charter, (2008). In The Danish Democracy Canon, The 
Committee established for the purpose of drawing up a democracy canon and the Danish 
Ministry of Education. Online: http://pub.uvm.dk/2008/democracycanon.
Turner, R. (2003). The Magna Carta throughout the Ages. London: Routledge.
Uruszczak, W. (2008). Species privilegium sunt due, umum generale, aliud special. Przywileje w 
dawnej Polsce. Studia z Dziejów Państwa i Prawa Polskiego. Vol. 11, pp. 19-38.
White, A. B. (1908). The Making of the English Constitution: 449-1485. New York: Knickerbocker 
Press. 
Wilson, G. (Ed.) (1777). The Reports of Sir Edward Coke, Knt. J. London: Rivington and Sons. Vol. VII.
Zaborowski, S. (1507). Tractatus de natura jurium et bonorum regis et reformatione regni ac eius 
reipublicae regimine incipit feliciter, Cracoviae.
Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski1
6  The Case of France: Vitality of the Republican Legal 
Tradition
In my view, a prerequisite for the recognition of the unique nature of French con-
stitutionalism is the multi-aspect analysis integrating legal, doctrinal and historical 
elements. I make analysis of the key sources for the French republican tradition: con-
stitution, declarations of human and civil rights (beginning from the Declaration of 
Human and Civil Rights of 1789), adjudications of the courts, and opinions of consti-
tutionalists and statesmen. The interpretation of these sources confirms vitality and 
continuity of the French republican tradition in which sovereignty of the nation and 
indivisibility and secularity of the republic play primary roles. Statism, centralism, 
and opposition to the strong position of the judiciary system are the principles deter-
mining the unique characteristics of the French constitutionalism. The Fifth Repub-
lic, established by Charles de Gaulle in 1958, did not change the French republican 
tradition. Contrary to the popular thesis, the constitution of 1958 did not establish 
a republican monarchy. De Gaulle embraced republican tradition defending it in a 
fierce dispute with Vichy and founding the Fifth Republic through the institutional 
revolution (including strong presidency, consolidation of executive power) conducted 
within the framework of its primary principles.
It is impossible to understand the uniqueness of French constitutionalism as long 
as the notions of republic and republican legal tradition are not discussed. At the same 
time they carry a particular meaning on the Seine and do not match their universal 
interpretations. According to the universal theories (Szlachta and Pietrzyk-Reeves, 
2004; Filipowicz, Gładziuk and Józefowicz, 1995), republic is an alternative political 
system for the hereditary transfer of power (in this meaning elective monarchies were 
actually republics) or, in the extended version, they see the essence of republic in the 
existence of community of citizens gathered around laws and values. On the other 
hand, French republic is primarily the outcome of the French Revolution that estab-
lished the new legitimation of power based on the specifically understood idea of the 
nation’s sovereignty and molded its values in the stark contrast to the monarchist 
tradition (Quermonne, 1992). In Maurice Agulhon’s view (Agulhon, 1990; Carcas-
sonne, 2007; Luchaire and Cognac, 2008; Vimbert, 1992) being a republican primarily 
means being an advocate of the non-personal, non-hereditary, non-permanent, and 
non-arbitrary power and republic means identification with the tradition deriving 
from 1789.
1  University of Lodz.
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6.1  Idea of the Sovereignty of the Nation and Its Ramifications
Thus, in France, the notion “republic” conveys content different than that offered in 
the universal interpretations and means not only opposition to hereditary transmis-
sion of power but also its new legitimacy inspired by the philosophy developed by 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau; and, which is equally significant, some axiological project 
expressed in the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights, with a key role of the rules 
of the indivisibility and secularity of Republic. The sentence spoken by de Gaulle on 
the Square of Republic in September, 1958, just prior to the constitutional referen-
dum, that republic was “the sovereignty of the people, the call of liberty, the hope 
of justice,” (Maus, 1998) includes one of the most famous formulas determining the 
French understanding of the republic. This was repeated by Philippe Séguin (1988) in 
his famous speech delivered during the debate on the Maastricht Treaty ratification. 
He reminded that republic has a unique meaning in the French political tradition as 
it is not only a kind of the institutional system but a system of shared values molded 
by the heritage of revolution. 
Republic is primarily a system of the commonly shared values that molded France into what it is 
still today in the eyes of the world. The Republic of France exists – just as the Republic of Rome 
once existed. This motto has remained the same since the very beginning: the sovereignty of the 
people, the call of liberty, the hope of justice (Séguin, 1988, pp.311-321).
Given such context, we will better understand the opinion offered by the outstanding 
French historian (Furet, 1989; Furet, 1994) who said that republic is the meaning of 
the French intellectual tradition that developed over the last two decades of the 19th 
century, when the revolution accomplished its goals and became institutionalized. 
“Only the victory of republicans over monarchists in early years of the Third Republic 
is an ultimate proof of the victory of revolution in all the country” (Furet, 1994, p.10). 
In the essay “A Real End of the French Revolution” François Furet (1994) asserts that 
Jules Ferry, a teacher and a missionary of the 1789 principles, is a symbol rather than 
an instrument of that long and victorious campaign. Republic was ultimately molded 
when the legal institutionalization of the heritage of French Revolution was effected. 
Passing the act that recognized La Marseillaise as the national anthem (1879), recog-
nition of 14 July as the national holiday by the Senate in 1880, and the 1875 constitu-
tional amendment defining relations between public authorities, which excluded res-
toration of monarchy (Droin, 2009). Article 8 of the act on the organization of public 
organs was supplemented with the following sentence: “A republican form of the gov-
ernment may not be subject to any revision of the constitution. Members of the fami-
lies that ruled in France are unelectable for the office of the President of Republic.” 
(Godechot, 1970, p. 337). The 1884 amendment abolished public prayers following the 
inauguration of the new term of the assembly chambers (previous section 3 of article 
1 of the aforementioned act set forth that “On the Sunday following the opening of 
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the session, prayers shall be raised in churches to ask for support for the Assembly 
members in their work”) (Godechot, 1970, p.334) and introduced a reform of Senate 
consisting in the deprivation non-dismissible senators of mandates and abolishment 
of preferences for rural districts (Bigaut, 2000). 
Moreover, the two last decades of the 19th century witnessed introduction and 
development of the state and secular educational system developed by Jules Ferry. 
The last stage of the revolution institutionalization process comprised introduction of 
the radical separation of Church and State (Poulat, 1987; Remond, 1985).
Noteworthily, the republican nature of the state, secularity and indivisibility 
of Republic are – according to the Constitutional Council’s ruling of 27 July 2006 – 
inseparable from the French constitutional identity (Wojtyczek, 2008; Wójtowicz, 
2010a; Wójtowicz, 2010b; Conseil-Constitutionnel, 2006). In this way the Constitu-
tional Council confirmed that the heritage of French Revolution identifies core con-
stitutional values. Before that, as early as in 1953, the Council of State highlighted 
the republican constitutional tradition, exposed in the Declaration of Human and 
Civilian Rights of 1789, in the preamble to the Constitution of 1946. Vimbert (1992) 
analyzed the notion “republican tradition” understood as a set of fundamental repub-
lican values confirmed by the historical experience and political practice.
Thus, it is no doubt that the French Republic is the country where citizens iden-
tify themselves with the heritage of the French Revolution. This marks a new begin-
ning for the French statehood, which is manifested by the lack of any references in 
the republican constitutions to the heritage of the pre-revolution state. The Nation 
is defined as the community molded by history and culture, which is present in the 
German and Polish constitutional tradition, but rather a political community united 
around the heritage of the revolution. It is because of this reason that Philippe Séguin 
(1988) asserted that “a notion of the nation is stronger than a notion of Homeland”. 
This explains the opening of the Republic to the people not molded in the French cul-
tural environment but accept the heritage of the revolution as well as an open sense 
of citizenship based on the law of the world (Séguin, 1988). Chantal Delsol (2011) used 
to write in the similar spirit: “Republican France predominantly wished to maintain 
the unity between multicultural groups, embrace all the people but still be united”.
Republic also molded a new meaning of patriotism understood as an act of the 
people’s disagreement with the conquest of France combined with the identification 
with republican values. “If we were to identify the day of its birth, I would say it was 
rather Valmy, when people took up arms, and not the Convention on the day after, 
when Assembly Members made decision to overthrow the monarchy” – Philippe 
Séguin (1988) said in the aforementioned speech. When Comité général d’études 
appointed by the Résistance surveyed its members, nearly all respondents associated 
republicanism with patriotism. An anonymous historian involved in the survey made 
the following conclusion: 
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French people perceive republic as a system of all people, it is a great idea that heightened 
people’s feelings in all national issues. It is Republic that repelled a threatening invasion in 1793, 
revived French feelings toward the enemy in 1870, managed to maintain French unity between 
1914 and 1918, during the time of dreadful ordeals; its splendor is the splendor of our people and 
any defeat is our pain (Michel and Mirkine-Guetzévitch, 1954). 
Moreover, the Republic molded by the heritage of the French Revolution, is rather the 
country of the nation than the community of citizens in the spirit of republican tradi-
tion derived from Ciceron. In the Ciceronian tradition “Republic is the matter of the 
Nation” and “the Nation is not just any group of people gathered by any means but a 
large group of people united by the recognition of the same law and the benefit of the 
shared living.” (Szlachta and Pietrzyk-Reeves, 2004). Meanwhile, regarding the French 
Republic, the existence of the real community of citizens supporting specific laws and 
values is not as essential as the very fact that the people possess the state built on the 
values molded by the revolution heritage. This is why Gérard Baudson (1994) asserts 
that a concept of the state-nation is a voluntarist and political creation. “Thus a con-
tract consists in establishing the state – therefore «resorting to the state» is something 
most essential. If the state-nation disappears, a social contract between citizens will 
be severed.” (Baudson, 1994). It appears that the social isolation of de Gaulle and 
Résistance resulted considerably from the lack of tradition of national activity outside 
state structures. 
The notions of the national sovereignty and volonté générale set forth in the Dec-
laration of Human and Civil Rights (Articles III and VI), molded under the influence of 
Rousseau, are fundamental in the French republican tradition). Primarily, attention 
should be paid to the radicalism of the sovereignty transfer from the royal power onto 
the nation. Implementation of this rule resulted in dramatic ramifications as even the 
Constitution of 1791 – formally a monarchist one – challenged royal sovereignty. In 
his book on the French constitutionalism, Michel Morabito expressed a view that the 
Constitution of 1791 – pursuant to the 1789 ideals – challenged the royal sovereignty 
investing the king with a status of the people’s representative. The monarch exercised 
the executive power and participated in exercising the legislative power but had no 
share in the constitutional power that solely depended on the legislative bodies repre-
senting people (Bourmaud and Morabito, 1996). Similarly, Adam Piasecki (1928) in his 
work on the parliamentarism of the Third Republic, concluded that: “In France, the 
transfer of sovereignty from the king onto the nation was revolutionary. The Constitu-
tion enacted by that Assembly, affixed with the declaration of human rights, is the 
manifestation of the theory of national sovereignty adopted in the hereditary mon-
archy.” (Piasecki, 1928). Hence the basic difference between American and French 
revolutionary experience may be identified. In the first phase of American revolution, 
before the constitution of the Union was enacted, the people’s right to participate 
in the legislation process or the ban on actions without the people representative’s 
consent, were expressed in the Bill of Rights of the states of Virginia, Maryland and 
Massachusetts (Jellinek, 1905), while the French declaration challenged totally the 
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monarchy’s participation (negation of royal sovereignty) as well as the participation 
of intermediary organizations (such as corporations) stipulating that it was solely the 
people who could exercise the sovereign power. 
Total exclusion of the monarchy from the area of sovereignty as early as in the initial 
phase of the French Revolution is not the only hallmark of the French understanding 
of people’s sovereignty. More importantly, the idea of people’s sovereignty developed 
under the influence of Rousseau’s thought and was combined with the concept of the 
general will. According to the expression offered by Georg Jellinek (1905), a renown 
German lawyer, volonté générale, which “makes autonomous decisions about its 
boundaries and neither should nor may be limited by any power,” (Jellinek, 1905) 
is absolutist in the thought of the author of the Social Contract. Thus, in Rousseau’s 
view, sovereignty may solely be granted to the entire nation based on the complete 
ceding of individual rights to the nation-sovereign. (Jellinek, 1905; Boucher and Kelly, 
2003; Pietrzyk-Revees, 2010). In his excellent sketch, Georg Jellinek (1905) expressed 
a view that the social contract developed by Rousseau and inspiring the Declara-
tion includes only one clause: waiver of all individual rights in favor of society. “An 
individual retains not a single atom of law at the moment he becomes a member of 
the society. He is invested with all the rights by the volonté generale that unilaterally 
determines its boundaries and no power may or should restrict them. Even the owner-
ship right is granted to an individual only with the state’s consent.” Jacques Maritain 
offers a similar opinion. In his view, a myth of the general will was used to transfer 
the separate and transcendental royal power to the nation that was also invested with 
a separate, transcendental, and absolute power (Maritain, 1993; Maritain, 1938). It is 
hard to reconcile the French republican tradition with Tocqueville’s view where it is 
the individual’s sovereignty that provides the basis for the nation’s sovereignty at the 
last count (Tocqueville, 1996). 
An absolutist understanding of the general will underlies the idea of the sover-
eignty of the act as the outcome of its expression. Thus the sovereignty of the act 
would mean its primacy, subject unlimitedness and a rule that it may not be subject to 
the review of constitutionality. A number of scholars, including J. Barthélemy, P. Duez, 
L. Duguit or M. Hauriou, put forward a proposal to review the constitutionality of acts, 
which would give citizens a right to institute such review in the event of violation of 
the constitutional rights of individuals. Yet such proposals were rejected as contradic-
tory to the rules of Republic (Starzewski, 1928; Duez, 1929; Kubiak, 1993). Although 
provisions of the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of 1789 were assumed to have 
a special status, but at the same time it was assumed that parliamentary obligations 
to effectuate them are of only moral nature since the resolutions passed in the Assem-
bly are not subject to any verification as they express the general will. Noteworthily, 
the French republican tradition is not free from internal tensions. On the one hand, 
Declaration of 1789 recognizes freedom and ownership as natural human rights that 
are not subject to the statute of limitation. On the other hand, however, the nation’s 
general will is absolutist and poses a threat to the rights of an individual in Rousseau’s 
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view. As we could see, advocates of the establishment of the review of constitutional-
ity of acts had to address that question in the doctrinal dimension. 
6.2  Statism and Centralism
Thus statism and centralism found solid support in the idea of the nation’s sover-
eignty defined in such manner. The administrative monarchy was replaced by indi-
visible, unitary, and centralized republic. Tocqueville’s works include a penetrating 
description of the continuity of administrative centralization since the decline of mon-
archy until mid-1800s (Tocqueville, 1994; Tocqueville, 1996). “Meanwhile, Revolution 
was against the monarchy and provincial institutions. Driven by the blind hatred, it 
destroyed everything that had been before its outbreak, both absolute power and any 
organizations that could weaken its force. Revolution was republican and centralist 
at the same time” (Tocqueville, 1996).
In the aforementioned paper, Jacques Maritain (1993) also discerned the continu-
ity between monarchy and republic in this sphere since both political models did not 
tolerate the rights of fragmentary communities in the state.
The centralism of the French Republic remained its hallmark until modern times. 
Inability to reconcile the French model of republic with the federation and confedera-
tion model is quite obvious. The rigidity of French centralism is particularly notice-
able in the list of the decentralization range in the unitary states. Notably, in early 
1980s French Constitutional Council considerably limited the range of reforms aimed 
at the state’s decentralization. Their resumption by president Chirac required consti-
tutional amendments, which were implemented in 2003 (Favoreu and Philip, 2007; 
Ohnet 1996). 
François Furet and Michel Morabito indicated that rejection of historical and 
more complex legitimization theories in the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of 
1789 must have inevitably led to the centralization and refusal to grant corporations 
public and state rights. François Furet (1994) wrote about that rejection during the 
crisis of the legitimization-concept monarchy, most strongly expressed in the works 
of Henri de Boulainvilliers, who emphasized the rights of intermediary organizations 
as the third – along with the royalty and nation – partner of the contract constitut-
ing France. On the other hand, Morabito mentioned a political concept developed by 
Malby, which recognized the nation as the compound community of social classes, 
putting stress on “the separate representation of different social classes inside the 
organ of the legislative power.” (Morabito and Bourmaud, 1996). The idea of the 
nation’s sovereignty and related rule of indivisibility has also a statist and centralist 
sense. Noteworthily, in their extensive commentary to the Constitution of the Fifth 
Republic, François Luchaire and Gérard Conac show its numerous ramifications. 
Indivisibility of the republic involves a unitary nature of the state, concentration of 
all normative power in the central state organs, a ban on investing local and regional 
 The Case of France: Vitality of the Republican Legal Tradition   81
communities with the competences in foreign policy affairs and, on the other hand, 
extensive competences of the government administration in the control over local 
self-governments. Authors highlight the fact that voting in the European Parliament 
elections is not the manifestation of sovereignty nor its delegation to the institutions 
that would be irreconcilable with the rule of indivisibility of the republic. Moreover 
– in their view – that rule results in the indivisibility of French nation, which means 
a ban on granting collective rights to the language, religious, and ethnic minorities 
(Luchaire and Conac, 2008). 
It should be reminded that political rules of the French revolution were aimed to 
affect the rights of associations and corporations. In the extreme scenario, this meant 
a ban on establishing any associations or corporations. This is the provision of Article 
1 of Loi Le Chapelier (“Le Chapelier Act”) passed on 17 June 1791: “Since the aboli-
tion of all forms of corporations in the same class or occupation is one of the bases 
of the Constitution, it is forbidden to recreate such corporation under any pretext 
whatever” (Ptak and Kinstler, 1999). The Act banned any forms of corporations or 
associations of the “citizens of the same class or occupation,” introduced fines for 
organizing such associations and prohibited administration to accept any addresses 
or petitions “written on behalf of the class or occupation” (Ptak and Kinstler, 1999). 
Assembly members were convinced they enforced the provisions of the French Con-
stitution that recognized solely individual and people’s rights. Corporation rights 
were recognized as a threat to the freedoms confirmed in the Declaration of Human 
and Civil Rights. Noteworthily, advocates of the corporation rights had to challenge 
the republican rules. René de La Tour du Pin, a precursor of the corporations-based 
political solutions, criticized the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights. In his view, 
the Declaration inspired liberalism and socialism and denied associations their rights 
recognizing only individuals and the nation (Strzeszewski, 1985). It also should not 
be surprising that Léon Duguit – the author of the solidarist concept of law – was 
extremely critical about the notion of the nation’s sovereignty and republican legal 
rules and supported recognition of the rights of economic and professional corpora-
tions (Duguit, 1921). 
Republic continued to deny the rights of associations and corporations even after 
the severe Le Chapelier Act had been repealed. The French political model prohibits 
investing professional and economic corporations with public rights, which is quite 
common in a large number of the European countries. Economic interests are repre-
sented exclusively inside the state structures, which explains a unique nature of the 
strongly statist model of the French capitalism. In the 1930s, a manner of express-
ing opinions about the bill became institutionalized in the form of the Economic 
Council. Initially, the Council acted on the basis of the presidential decree of January 
1925 and then the act of 1936. In the Fourth Republic, the Council became a constitu-
tional institution. Characteristically, it is this institution that Konstanty Grzybowski 
recognized – just like the Council of State – as an intermediary body limiting the 
power (Grzybowski, 1947). Given the lack of the real social bodies independent of the 
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administration structures, it was the national institutions enjoying autonomy, such as 
the Council of State or the Economic Council, that were to check the political power. 
The latter one developed as a consultative institution. It is quite meaningful that no 
decision was made to invest it with a right to contribute to the development of the 
collective contracts. This was due to the alleged threat of the development of corpora-
tionism beyond the state’s control (Grzybowski, 1947; Bloch, 2008). 
6.3  Opposition to the Rule of Judges
It should also be noted that the republican tradition remained reserved toward a 
strong position and independence of the judiciary. One of the key rules of the French 
judicial system was the nomination for the position of judges done by the executive 
power (Perrot, 1991; Renoux, 1992). Notably, the French judiciary is not regarded as 
an independent power but as a function. The document produced by the Bardoux 
Committee, which is going to be thoroughly analyzed below, included one of the most 
interesting opinions about the crisis of the Third Republic and the conclusion that, 
unlike British, French judiciary has no position of independent power (Bardoux, 
1936). It is recognized that judicial institutions are not intended to fulfil the idea of 
the nation’s sovereignty, which is confirmed in the commentaries to the Constitution 
of the Fifth Republic (Carcassonne, 2007). Encroachment of the judiciary into legisla-
tive powers has always been regarded as a violation of the French republican model. 
This distrust was manifested in the speech delivered by Nicolas Sarkozy in July 2008 to 
begin the work on the revision of the Constitution (Documentation Francaise, 2008). 
A critical attitude toward a strong position of courts is also explained by an explicit 
objection to the judicial control over the constitutionality of acts (Starzewski, 1928; 
Kubiak, 1993; Garlicki, 1993). For the same reasons, a specific model of the adminis-
trative decisions control excluding any participation of the courts of general jurisdic-
tion has been developed (Izdebski, 1990; Longchamps de Berier, 1962).
The idea of the nation’s sovereignty – “the sovereignty of the will of all people” 
according to the definition offered by Carré de Malberg (1931) – has become the most 
crucial element of the continuity of the republican political system, legitimization of 
national authorities, and law (an act as a manifestation of volonté générale) (Vedel, 
1990). In his thorough study on the Third Republic, Adam Piasecki (1928) emphasized 
that the notion of the nation’s sovereignty, taken from the philosophy developed by 
Rousseau, provided the ideological basis for the constitution of republican France. 
Presumably, this was even the basis of all post-revolutionary constitutions except 
two periods: the Restoration between 1815 and 1830 and Vichy. The essential contro-
versy between Republic and Restoration, discussed by Furet, should not be regarded 
as a journalistic formula since this is a good reflection of the fundamental differ-
ence between French monarchist and republican tradition. Only the Constitutional 
Charter from the period of Restoration, effective between 1815 and 1830, restored the 
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monarchic legitimization rules and challenged the republican order. According to 
Adhémar Esmein, an outstanding French law expert, whose influence on teaching 
constitutional law in Europe is difficult to overestimate, “The most significant rule 
expressed by the Great Revolution is a principle of the nation’s supremacy. Apart from 
the 1814 Chart, it was recognized and adopted as the basis in all – so much different 
– French constitutions” (Esmein, 2001). Thus a principle of the nation’s sovereignty 
was the basis of the constitutional monarchy from the years 1789-1792, including the 
July Monarchy, Consulate period, and First and Second Empires. It is true that the 
republican tradition opposed Bonapartism and its personalized and arbitrary power. 
Yet it should be remembered that the empire adopted republican axiology along with 
the reference to the nation’s sovereignty and spread the revolutionary political and 
legal heritage beyond the borders of France. 
As the idea of the sovereignty of the nation was a primary element of the repub-
lican tradition, it was unavoidable that the question about the subject of sovereignty 
became one of the central constitutional issues. Regarding these issues, the republi-
can tradition is diverse. Jacobin Republic and the Second Republic, albeit different in 
many respects, followed Rousseau’s thought in their recognition of the direct democ-
racy (First Republic), universality of civil-political rights and direct presidential elec-
tions (Constitution of 1848). For many years, the Third Republic associated republi-
can principles with the parliament’s supremacy, which was a reference to Sieyès who 
justified a monopoly of legislative power over the expression of sovereignty (Sieyès, 
1989) in his famous writing, “What is the intermediary organization”? 
The Republican constitutional doctrine developed by Adhemar Esmein provided 
a battery of arguments in support of such a political system. In Esmein’s view, ethos 
and competence of the parliament members offered the best guarantee of respect for 
freedom and rational decisions beneficial to the public good. This outstanding lawyer 
openly referred to Montesquieu’s thought and fiercely opposed any forms of sover-
eignty exercised directly by the nation. He rejected the institution of referendum as 
he perceived this as a populist threat and a risk of the destruction of law (Esmein, 
1928). Contrary to the warnings De Gaulle gave in his historic speeches delivered in 
Bayeux and Espinal, the Fourth Republic followed those traditions. Article 3 of the 
Constitution of 1946 expressed this explicitly, setting forth that in all fields, except 
the Constitution, “nation exercises sovereignty through its representatives sitting in 
the National Assembly.”
So what is the Fifth Republic that celebrated the 50th anniversary a few years 
ago? I am deeply convinced that the Constitution of 1958 proves vitality of the repub-
lican legal tradition. Contrary to a widespread opinion this is not the republican mon-
archy (Aron, 1997; Duverger, 1974). 
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6.4  The Fifth Republic – Institutional Revolution within the 
Framework of Republican Tradition
De Gaulle grew up in a family whose members were monarchists but he advocated 
state patriotism and accepted republic as a permanent form of France’s existence. 
His views matured under the influence of Maurice Barrès and evolved into the state 
patriotism that accepted the republican and nationalist writers, such as Charles 
Péguy, and the republic as such. De Gaulle’s state patriotism was inclusive toward 
the diverse ideologies and sought consolidation of the state as a tool of the power of 
France (Duhamel, 1986). Thus De Gaulle did not think about combining the monar-
chist and republican traditions but rather the republic integrating a number of ideo-
logical families. During WWII, as the leader of Free France, he consistently and with 
great determination consolidated the republican tradition in the confrontation with 
Vichy. He had a right to write in his memoirs that in 1940 he “saved Republic from 
being buried” as it was abandoned by the vast majority of political elite (De Gaulle, 
1968). Hence Retablissement de la legalite républicaine, proclaimed on 9 August 1944, 
was a logical consequence of the legal and national doctrine of Free France. In the 
years 1944-1946, as the prime minister of the provisional government, he transformed 
the republican principles into the foundations of post-war France. Owing to de Gaulle, 
the ideas of indivisibility, secularity, and the democratic and social state gained the 
status of the primary constitutional rules in the Constitutions of the Fourth and Fifth 
Republics. It should be stressed that de Gaulle totally accepted the rule of sovereignty 
of the nation as the principal one for the public order. Moreover, he was convinced 
that this rule should involve the democratization of France. This was a deep sense of 
the decision made in autumn 1945 on the constitutional referendum, which meant 
that the nation was granted the right to participate in pouvoir constituant. Thus, it is 
doubtless that de Gaulle consolidated the republican and constitutional identity of 
France. Therefore, the Fifth Republic could only be established as an institutional 
change in the republican axiology. 
In the preamble to the Constitution of 1958, the French nation proclaimed attach-
ment to the human rights and principles of the national sovereignty, just as set forth 
in the Declaration of 1789 and the preamble to the Constitution of 1946. Article 1, 
fundamental to the state’s identity, defined France as the indivisible, secular, demo-
cratic, and social republic. The preamble and the three first articles of the constitution 
integrated all crucial republican threads (Constantinesco and Pierre-Caps, 2004).
At the same time, a deep institutional shift was effectuated. The Fifth Republic 
built a strong presidency, which received a mandate in the 1962 general elections; 
consolidated the executive power, which was then entrusted to two bodies, at the 
expense of the legislative power; but retained the government’s accountability before 
the parliament and introduced direct democracy. The reform of 1958 provided tools 
that enabled France to pursue active national policy and retain a strong position in 
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Europe. The speech Michel Debré delivered in a forum of Conseil d’État, claimed that 
“all French political power system must be reconstructed. Otherwise, there will be no 
state, no democracy and, consequently, no France and Republic.” Those words were a 
perfect manifestation of the reformatory intentions but also proved that French politi-
cal elites did not abandon their superpower ambitions (Maus, 1998). Noteworthily, 
De Gaulle democratized the republican legal tradition according to the view that the 
supreme form of sovereignty is the sovereignty exercised directly by the nation. Theo-
retical arguments for abolishing the parliament’s supremacy were developed by two 
outstanding lawyers: R. Carré de Malberg and René Capitant (Maus, 1998; Capitant, 
1954). The Constitution of the Fifth Republic provided for a considerably wider range 
of the public vote: introduced general presidential elections, parliamentary elections 
due to the dissolution of the parliament, and, along with the constitutional refer-
endum, a legislative referendum. It should be highlighted that on the day when the 
Fifth Republic was established, France was the first big European country that imple-
mented the institution of referendum for making decisions crucial for the country, 
including constitutional amendments. Since that time referendum has become a con-
stitutional instrument in Italy and other countries. 
6.5  Conclusions
I would also like to draw attention to one negative aspect of the republican tradition 
– elimination of the solutions contrary to the French understanding of the nation’s 
sovereignty and indivisibility of the republic. It was this specific understanding of 
sovereignty, as something that only the whole nation may exercise, that did not allow 
de Gaulle to transform the corporate ideas into practice and introduce the representa-
tives of professions and business organizations to the Senate. De Gaulle endeavored to 
do this twice: in 1958 and 1969 – in the referendum. In both cases the opponents of his 
proposal highlighted its contradiction to the principle of indivisibility of the republic, 
which forbade any redistribution of sovereignty. The power of republican tradition 
did not allow for any evolution of the Supreme Judiciary Council into the corporative 
body. The Minister of Justice retained a right to appoint judges and supervise pros-
ecutors. This is a manifestation of the traditional republican distrust of the judiciary. 
And last but not least, a unique control of the constitutionality of acts, established 
by the Fifth Republic, was adjusted to the republican tradition. A preventive control 
still predominates, which means that the law of the Republic may not be challenged 
ex post facto. The request for the constitutional review made by individual, provided 
for in the amendment of 2008, is not an open constitutional complaint and may be 
effectuated only when the request is addressed to the Constitutional Council through 
the Council of State or the Court of Cassation. Finally, the principle of indivisibility 
of the Republic guards the Unitarian French system and determines the limits for the 
increase of competence of the territorial self-government. 
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Something I consider a negative aspect of the republican tradition may inspire 
studies on the function of the principal constitutional rules and identity. Undoubt-
edly, the principle of the sovereignty of the nation and indivisibility of the French 
Republic enjoy a unique status. They determine the internal cohesion of the constitu-
tion, its identity in external relations, and relationships between the French constitu-
tion and the European law. Thus the Fifth Republic proves vitality of the republican 
legal tradition. 
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Ferenc Hörcher1
7  Is the Historical Constitution of Hungary Still a 
Living Tradition? A Proposal for Reinterpretation
A similar ideal constant is the constitution, the moral territory and property, as it were, of Hun-
garians. This is again a fix point in the universe. The constitution can be violated a thousand 
times, and it is possible to govern without it or against it. But even if this goes on for centuries, 
a true Hungarian will nevertheless regard the constitution as living and valid (Babits, 1939, 70).
7.1  The Historical Constitution of Hungary: A Diffuse Concept
To write about the historical constitution (történeti alkotmány) of Hungary is not easy 
for more than one reason. First of all, because the meaning of the term is not readily 
detectable: it is not a well-defined corpus of written legal norms. Hungarian legal 
and political life was until the end of the 19th century based on (written or unwritten) 
customary law, and its constitutionality was not an exception to that (Rady, 2015); 
second, because its birth is unclear. Although one of its acclaimed cornerstones was a 
rather early legal document, the Golden Bull from 1222, often compared in this tradi-
tion to the Magna Charta’s role in the constitutional tradition of the United Kingdom 
(Hantos, 1904), the idea that this piece and other legal norms, statues, decrees and 
their legal principles and customary procedures could be taken together as the body 
of a constitution took a long time to take hold, from the early 16th century, when 
István Werbőczy collected the private laws of the country,2 through the early seven-
teenth century revolt of István Bocskai, whose arguments in defence of his activity 
was based on quasi-constitutional grounds (Zászkaliczky, 2012), up until the short 
18th century, when the estates actually worked out the system which used as one of 
its central pillars the idea of the “ancient constitution” (avita constitutio, ősi alkot-
mány). Accordingly, In László Péter’s interpretation, the historical constitution is in 
fact in power only from the end of the eighteenth century: “Between 1790 and 1918, 
the nobility’s ancient constitution, avita constitutio, provided a potent and enduring 
source of a shared Hungarian past” (Péter, 2012b, p.191). 
1  Pázmány Péter Catholic University and Hungarian Academy of Science.
2  The privatly published law collection, which had no official status, gained authority through the 
constant reference to it in the courtrooms and local and national diet chambers of the country. There 
is a recent English translation of its text with commentaries (Stephen Werbőczy, 2005, usually referred 
to simply as Tripartitum).
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While the birthdate of the constitution is still debated, there is an agreement 
among scholars that it was at the end of the eighteenth century that an awareness 
of the constitutional practice of the country awakened, and that the short interval of 
political upheaval, following the death of Joseph II and the outbreak of the French 
Revolution, resulted in an unprecedented outburst of constitutional debate and con-
stitutional activity as well, during the diets of 1790-1791, and 1792 (Szijártó, 2005) 
(Concha, 2005). Inspired by the legal theories of the Enlightenment (in particular by 
Montesquieu, whose reference to Hungary made him a popular author, and his opus 
magnum, The Spirit of the Laws, “the bible for the nobility”3 (Péter, 2012, p.156), real 
efforts were made to reform the constitutional settings of the country, resulting in the 
composition of long documents of reform legislation plans. The Committees of the 
diet put together long lists of suggestions (called operatum) in the fields of commerce, 
law, urbarium, and so on, which were meant to be discussed during the next diet. 
However for political reasons they were sent to the archives of the chancelleries, and 
were only reconsidered four decades later, in 1831 and 1832. In spite of this cancella-
tion of the fulfilment of constitutional reforms, the hot constitutional debates of the 
early 1790s represent the creation of a public constitutional discourse in Hungary.
A further point which makes the task so challenging is the so called doctrine of 
the Holy Crown. This idea was claimed to originate in medieval times, and to consist 
in the view that “from the Middle Ages the king and the diet (later parliament) have 
jointly possessed the Holy Crown, in which Hungary’s legal and political sovereignty 
resides” (Péter, 2012c, p.148). The textual basis of the doctrine is Section I Tit 4 (1) of the 
Tripartitum, but the doctrine depends on a contested interpretation of the text. Accord-
ing to Péter, who is rather critical of the reading which substantiates the doctrine, “In 
Werbőczy’s view, the nobility through its customary rights shared, together with the 
counties and the diet, power with the crown, rather than with the king in the crown” 
(Péter, 2012c, p.149). According to his reconstruction of the growth of the doctrine, it 
appeared sometimes in the early 19th century and became more fuly elaborated in the 
1830s. It was refined by legal historians and political theorists, including Imre Hajnik, 
Győző Concha and Ákos Timon, but “the most effective promoter of the doctrine” was 
“the eloquent Count Albert Apponyi” (Péter, 2012c, p.150). Interestingly the doctrine 
survived the disintegration of the original Hungarian state, of the Habsburg Empire 
and the devastating effects of the Trianon peace treaty (1920), which left the kingdom 
of Hungary one of the losers of the Great War, without many of its inhabitants and ter-
ritories, and served therefore as one of the pillars of the official neo-baroque ideology 
3  This is Montesquieu’s famous reference to the Hungarian nobility: “The house of Austria has ever 
used her endeavours to oppress the Hungarian nobility; little thinking how serviceable that very no-
bility would be one day to her. She would have drained their country of money, of which they had no 
plenty; but took no notice of the men, with whom it abounded” (Montesquieu, 1777, Vol. 1. Book VIII, 
ch. 9).
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the interwar Hungarian regime, called Horthy-era (Péter, 2012d). During its long and 
troubled history, the doctrine of the Holy Crown served as the foundation stone of 
Hungarian exceptionalism, an idea that Hungarian history and the constitution that 
grew out of it, in some ways represented a unique colour in European history, a kind 
of Sonderweg, which excludes any easy comparison with other countries’ historical 
achievements. The doctrine itself lost its relevance during the Communist takeover, 
but it was reborn in late Kádárism (1970s and 1980s) and at the time of the transition 
(1989-1990), and it still embodies a virulent political subculture in Hungary.
After we have considered these difficulties, we can define the aims of the present 
paper. It is going to be an exercise both in the history of political thought and in nor-
mative political philosophy. The aim is to give a longue durée account of the consti-
tution, by which we can summarise some of the main achievements and a few of 
the main failures of its history. Before that, there will be a theoretical section, which 
examines the way a reconstruction of constitutional thought may reveal a more gener-
ally Hungarian “constitutional culture,” which can serve for the abstraction of a con-
stitutional philosophy. By drawing conclusions from its failures and achievements 
the paper will undertake to propose a philosophical reinterpretation of the meaning 
of the constitution, connecting it with some parts of the new Fundamental Law, but 
trying to avoid the legitimacy issue of the latter. 
7.2  Political Thought, Constitutional Culture and the “Philoso-
phy” of the Constitution
Political thought is closely related to political action and agency and political action 
is in turn closely related to human ideas and even ideology. The history of political 
thought is, therefore, a reconstruction of thought to shed light on human action and 
agency.4 It is therefore not separable from political history. If you want to understand 
what a certain political statement in the past really meant, you have to understand 
how it was related to human action. The way a historical protagonist thinks about a 
political situation does not necessarily determine the way she reacts, but knowing 
how she thought about it is most probably very informative of the possible choices she 
could make of potential actions. So the reconstruction that is made possible by the 
history of political thought of the thought of political agents might turn out to be quite 
useful for political historians as well. The mutual connection between the history of 
political thought and political history is therefore rather close.
4  In addition to the writings rooted in Cambridge-style history of political thought, the following 
methodological argument was inspired by R.G. Collingwood and Michael Oakeshott. 
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However, there is a further dimension to the nature of political thought to con-
sider. The concept of rational choice is not always the best description of how political 
agents decide and act. Certainly emotions and other irrational impulses also have an 
important role in the decision making process of political agents. And crucially, as in 
other types of activity, there is a large field of political action, where people behave in 
an unreflective manner. Routine is an important part of politics, and social routine is 
directed by individual habits and custom. Politicians have a large reservoir of expe-
rience of the past, and they can rely on it when they choose. When they act out of 
routine, they rely on this unreflective, habituated knowledge of how to do things. In 
other words, they rely on what their experiences and education, on their character (as 
it was called from the ancients up to the end of the early modern period) or, as Bour-
dieu would call it, on their habitus. Character – and habitus – formation is mostly the 
responsibility of the agent’s environment, it depends on the kind of exchanges one 
earlier had with others and with the hard facts of the world, and the way they config-
ured the agent’s character. In the case of politics, this external environment reflected 
in the character or habitus is rightly considered the specific political culture of the 
specific community. 
The analysis of linguistic utterances to reconstruct the discourse is the primary 
aim of the history of political thought. It should, therefore, shed light not only on 
the way people acted, but also on the way agents’ ideas and actions interacted, and 
were already preconditioned by the particular political culture of their environment. 
In other words, expressed human thoughts can help the interpreter to reconstruct 
the outline of the particular political culture the given individual was formed by, and 
was also part of. This claim is based on the Heidegger – and Wittgenstein – inspired 
recognition that a political speaker/author is overtaken by the language she uses. But 
language is only one form of the way tradition actually controls the agent’s behav-
iour and thinking: culture manifests itself in a number of other ways, too, some of 
which are not even identified by the agent, who, paradoxically, displays the features 
of a common political culture in the very moment when she becomes an autonomous 
personality, with her own style of thinking and action. By comparing the linguistic 
performances of different members of the same political culture history of political 
thought hopes to distinguish what is characteristically personal, and what belongs 
to a common political culture characteristic of the community to which the agent 
belongs.
The following analysis of the Hungarian historical constitution develops from the 
assumption that it is not simply a collection of written laws or well defined norms, but 
a certain political culture, a constitutional culture (Sólyom, 2015). Therefore, the aim 
of the analysis is not simply to make sense of the ideas of particular political agents 
– for example, those of the particular members of the nobility who forced Andrew 
II to issue the Golden Bull, or of Stephan Werbőczy when he collected the civil law 
customs of his country, or Bocskai or Rákóczi rebelling against the Habsburg monarch 
pleading to the constitutional tradition, but rather to understand what exactly did 
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it mean to refer to the historical constitution for any members of the political com-
munity. A constitutional culture will certainly prefigure the political agents. In other 
words, through a short analysis of its vocabulary, this essay would like to outline the 
constitutional culture of the historical constitution.
7.3  Historical Layers of Constitutional Life in Hungary
If we want to reconstruct the historical development of constitutional life, which 
includes constitutional thought and action in Hungary, we have to understand that 
one of its central elements is its traditional nature. For the historical constitution is 
principally a way of thinking that relies on the wisdom of earlier precedents to gain 
insight into constitutional questions of the present. This attachment to tradition is the 
more surprising that this was a country characterised by a rather discontinuous and 
staggered history, resulting in an uneven development of constitutional thought. Its 
birth was not signalled at once, but may be traced back retrospectively, and therefore 
the tradition’s starting point fades into the mist of time immemorial.5 Its application 
requires a backward looking technique of legal argumentation, and such a procedural 
obligation means that new contexts will necessarily reconfigure the past, in order 
to update the actual content of the law. In other words, history builds layers upon 
layers, in an unplanned, spontaneous manner. As this spontaneous growth results in 
a rather uneven development, there is no point in a paper like this to try to tell it as a 
continuous story in a full, rounded narrative. Rather, we will try to plumb testholes 
here: samples from different political contexts, in a chronological order, I order to 
show the full dimension of the constitutional architecture, with all its different his-
torical layers. 
7.4  Founding the Historical Constitution? The Golden Bull
The Golden Bull is a “decretum, a royal charter of liberties” (Péter, 2012e, p.115), 
issued by King Andrew II of Hungary in 12226 (Zsoldos Attila, 2011) (Rady, 2014). We 
know it from a letter by the king to Pope Honorius III that a large crowd of the nobility 
demanded “that he should confirm the liberties that St Stephen, the holy king, had 
granted to the nobility.” In other words, in its very starting point the constitutional 
practice is backward looking, using a historical argument. The demand was based on 
a suspicion that Andrew II was responsible for “harmful practices which amounted 
5  It is noteworthy that a reference to times immemorial is a common element of the Hungarian and 
the British constitutional thought (Pocock, 1987).
6  The text of the decree is by now available in English and Latin (Werboczy, 2005). 
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to abuses of royal authority.” The demanded confirmation included privileges, such 
as “the exemption from taxes, limits on the military duties of the nobles and their 
right not to be arrested without first being summoned and sentenced by due judicial 
process.” This is again important because it gives ample proof that the subjects of 
the decretum belong to an exceptional minority, the nobles who can claim particular 
exemptions and privileges on a traditional basis. This was explained by the fact that 
the distinction of noble and non-noble assigned the chance to participate in the polit-
ical life of the country, and participation granted the “ancient” liberties to those who 
actually contributed to the common good. Through this decretum the nobles wanted 
to get guarantees to defend their position against the new barons, and therefore the 
Golden Bull was not interested in trying to weaken royal power. Due to the fact that 
the specific constitutional standing of the nobility has proven to be surprisingly 
stable during the centuries, one of the most important characteristics of the Hungar-
ian constitution is that it is traditionally a noblemen’s constitution. A further point 
of the Golden Bull that needs to be stressed is the fact that it only reaffirmed what is 
called by Joachim Bahlcke the culture of liberty (Libertaskultur): a political culture 
where the participation in the political system was based on the liberties that were 
donated by the king as an expression of personal trust (Balcke, 2005) (Zászkaliczky, 
2012) (Varga, 2004). This centrality of the notion of liberty became again a key notion 
of constitutional thinking in Hungary, where the special privileges of the individual 
noblemen came to mean first the liberty of the order or estate of nobles, as a whole, 
and later that of the country (ország), the political community of the Hungarians as 
instituted by the constitutional tradition itself. 
7.5  Stephen Werbőczy
As we have seen, the Golden Bull already referred to liberty in the past tense, as 
something which was secured by the great king earlier, this decretum itself became 
the most important reference point later when, quite irregularly, political debates 
were fought with arguments which referred to earlier customs of royal privileges to 
the nobles as precedents. Martyn Rady, in a paper dedicated to its relevance, makes 
the following, seemingly contradictory claims: “In the century following its issue, all 
mention of the Golden Bull disappeared,” and yet “Perhaps indeed, as Henrik Mar-
czali slyly observed, the whole history of Hungary’s constitution was, like Bishop 
Stubbs’s observation on Magna Carta, a commentary on the Golden Bull” (Rady, 
2014) (Marczali, 1896, p.79). Yet this contradiction dissolves as soon as Rady makes it 
obvious that references to the Golden Bull were sporadic in the first decades because 
the text of it turned out to be too radical, including the famous resistance clause.
However, this backward referencing, which is already characteristic of the lan-
guage of the Golden Bull, becomes notorious with Stephen Werbőczy’s painstak-
ing efforts to put down into a legal collections the customary law of Hungary. The 
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connection between the Golden Bull as the precedent, and the Tripartitum, as the 
collection came to be called, as the interpretation of it, is made obvious by Rady, 
too: “The Golden Bull was additionally used by the lawyer and politician, Stephen 
Werbőczy, to lend the semblance of antiquity to what he claimed were the inviolable 
privileges of the Hungarian nobility” (Rady, 2014, p.106). In the modern English trans-
lation of the collection of customary norms, which the protonotary of the courts of the 
judge royal and voivode of Transylvania presented to the diet of 1514, and as judge of 
the personalis (személynök) published privately in Vienna in 1517, without winning 
the official consent of the king, became the most important reference point itself, for 
later discussions of the content of the ancient constitution of Hungary (Rady, 2005, 
xxvii). “Its principles and provision laid down the substantive law of noble land-
holding, the special privileges enjoyed by the Hungarian nobility, and the practices 
and procedures to be followed by the royal courts” (Rady, 2005, p.xxvii). Werbőczy’s 
collection is important because it remained the most notorious point of reference 
whenever issues of constitutional significance were brought up. In this way, it was 
regarded as the final authority, even if the exact meaning of its provisions were some-
times hotly debated. But it served as a written proof of what the consuetudo or in more 
general terms the law of Hungary contained. Péter László is ready to regard it, there-
fore as a handy summary of “Hungary’s ancient constitution,” perhaps not meant as 
such in the time of its creation, but regarded as such by all participants of Hungarian 
political and legal life (Péter, 2005, p.xiii). This could happen because of the continu-
ous labour invested into the interpretation and reinterpretation of it, allowed by the 
specific nature of customary law. It allowed legal practitioners to regard law as “not 
made or created” but as “ius, right, which exists as the approved habits and usages of 
the commune” (Péter, 2005, p.xiv). In other words, the Tripartitum enjoyed a special 
status, an authority of the law, coming from its continuous use by the whole com-
munity, transforming it into “the tacitus consensus populi,” the tacit consensus of 
the populace, which of course meant the nobility only, and its relation to the Crown 
“a kind of contract between the king and the diet of the ország (noble community)” 
(Péter, 2005, p.xv). This contract had two partners, the crown and the totum corpus 
of the ország, the latter offering constant loyalty to and armed defence to the Crown 
in times of emergency, the latter providing the liberties of the nobles, which could 
be enforced according to the resistance clause six of Chapter Nine in the First Part 
of the Tripartitum. This clause referred back to the Golden Bull, claiming that if the 
ancient privileges were damaged, the nobles (as a corpus) had the “liberty to resist 
and oppose him without the taint of infidelity” (Werboczy, 2005, p.57.) One should not 
wonder that in the 18th century, when Hungarians learned from the legal theorists of 
the Enlightenment that what they possessed was a kind of contract, on which however 
a whole edifice, a “system of a ‘constitution’” was built, they became so obsessed with 
it, that they were not ready to give it up in the wholly changed atmosphere of the 19th 
century as well, when as a result of the settlement between the two countries, the 
Kingdom of Hungary coalesced with the Habsburg territories of Austria, they still kept 
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it, and it remained the source of constitutional ideology up until the first written con-
stitution drawn by the communists after the second world war.
7.6  Stephen Bocskai
The special status of the Tripartitum is partly due to a further fact: during the cen-
turies it came to serve as the basis of reference for the fight for independence of the 
country. After the Turkish invasion when the country was cut into three parts, we see 
constant struggle in the country between rivals to get the Hungarian throne. One the 
one side we find the Catholic Habsburg rulers, who claimed power mostly over the 
North-Western territory, while Hungarian and Transylvanian candidates fought for 
the independence of the country. One of the contenders was Stephen Bocskai (1557-
1606), a protestant nobleman, who served in the Habsburg chancellery in Prague 
and Vienna and later became prince of Transylvania, the eastern part of the terri-
tory, present day part of Romania. His fight for the crown represents in paradigmatic 
form the agonistic opposition between country (ország) and court (udvar), in a situa-
tion when the nationality and the religious affiliation of the royal family is different 
from the main body of the nobility. While the Habsburgs were interested in widening 
their control over the whole territory, the Transylvanian Hungarians played a strategic 
game of oscillating between the power-centres of Vienna and Constantinople. They 
tried to win support against that power which seemed to be momentarily the more 
dangerous, in order to preserve some kind of a balance of power between the three 
parts of the country. The conflict over sovereignty between the Habsburg court and 
the Transylvanian princely court was, of course, coloured by a confessional antago-
nism: the reformation proved to be very successful in the Eastern and Northern part of 
the country, which made a counter-reformation seem quite necessary for the Catholic 
Habsburg dynasty. Both of these dimensions of the conflict (territorial control, con-
fessional rivalry) were present in the ideological basis of István Bocskai’s movement, 
which led to a short, but quite successful War of Independence in 1605. As a result 
of it he could negotiate on both sides, with the Turks as well as with the Habsburgs. 
When analysing his political thought, in the historiographical tradition Bocskai 
is represented either as one who was relying heavily on the resistance clause of the 
Golden Bull, as it was transmitted by Werbőczy7, or as using the Golden Bull only as 
a cover up in the ideological warfare, while his really radical idea of armed resistance 
was rooted in a Calvinist reformed theological conviction.8 It is unquestionable that 
7  Benedek Varga attributes roughly this position to historians like Ferenc Eckhart, Imre Révész and 
Gyula Szekfű (Varga, 2006, p.29).
8  Varga lists in this camp Kálmán Benda, László Makkai and with a slightly different orientation, 
Katalin Péter. 
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the political system of estates, often called feudalism, incorporated into its own prac-
tice the defence of religious freedom as an ancient right and liberty. It was Bocskai 
who firmly established the final argument of rebellious resistance against the uncon-
stitutional measures of the court, which came to characterise Hungarian politics time 
and again afterwards for three centuries, resulting in quite a number of lost fights 
of liberty against more powerful monarchs. But Bocskai himself succeeded to show 
that religious freedom can also be defended by reclaiming ancient rights. The estates 
learnt that it is rewarding ideologically if they refer back to their ancient rights, and 
as a result ever since they kept referring to the Golden Bull and the Tripartitum, which 
helped the latter document to gain unparalleled position in Hungary’s constitutional 
life: it came to be seen as the main form of expression of the Hungarian feudal ideol-
ogy, of the ancient constitution (Zászkaliczky, 2015, p.22). Bocskai’s innovation led to 
an ideological unification as well: the political theology of Hungarian Protestantism 
integrated the paradigm of ancient constitutionalism, which on the other hand had 
an impact on this latter discourse as well: the resistance clause won an unparalleled 
priority in the constitutional thought of the country, which indicated that in case the 
Habsburg’s keep enforcing their own vision of politics (i.e., a centralised empire with 
a united legal system), the Hungarians will never give up their fights to adhere to their 
own constitutional tradition, which included the right to resistance as well (Zászka-
liczky, 2012b). After expelling the Turks from the central parts of the territory of the 
Kingdom of Hungary, the Habsburgs could successfully enforce their will, and let the 
Hungarians exclude from the body of constitutional norms the resistance clause; but 
the idea itself remained, and was easily available even in the political turmoil of 1848. 
To sum up: “the Bocskai revolt and its legal results brought about the integration and 
final emancipation of the Protestant Churches into the estates polity (Ständestaat) as 
well as the emancipation of the political theology of Hungarian Protestantism, the 
first steps towards a modern political culture” (Zászkaliczky, 2012, p.294).
7.7  Transforming and Reflecting Upon the Historical Constitution: 
The Eighteenth Century
While the political struggle in the 17 th century was largely fought along confessional 
lines, the 18th century saw in the Kingdom of Hungary a transformation of political 
life, leading from what is called in the historiography “confessional” estates polity to 
a “constitutional” estates polity (ständisches Konstitutionalismus) (Szijártó, 2012).9 
While earlier the confessional confrontation could have been manipulated by the 
9  I am grateful to Professor Szijártó for the email correspondence in which he suggested to provide 
the German equivalent for the latter expression.
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ruler, now the confrontation shifted to the opposition of the diet and the ourt. In 
questions of defending their “constitutionally guaranteed” privileges, the nobility 
was united, independently of their confessional identity. It is also interesting that in 
this new situation the lower nobility (bene possessionati) gained the upper hand from 
the aristocracy, which earlier was regarded as pars sanior (Szijártó, 2012, pp.39, 47). 
It was in this context, and as a result of learning from Montesquieu that the estates 
of the nobility were actually in possession of a constitution, that actual references to 
the term constitution appeared in the constitutional legal discourse. They learnt it 
from The Spirit of the laws that a system of rights and privileges is nothing less but a 
constitution. As László Péter put it: “They discovered, not unlike Molière’s burgher 
who learnt that he was speaking ‘prose’, that what they possesses was a ‘constitu-
tion’ rather than just a collection of customary rights” (Péter, 2012, p.156). It is also 
from this period that the dualist character of the constitutional arrangement becomes 
obvious – while earlier king and the diet worked hard to cooperate and to find com-
promises, from this time ont here is a constant struggle between them over questions 
of souvereignty. Although it was undebatable that the Crown, meaning in this case 
simply the king was superior to the diet, the king was obliged by custom to negoti-
ate with the diet, which latter had certain techniques of enforcing that their views be 
taken into account by the king (including the tactical use of their votes for more tax 
or military support). 
It is from the end of the 18th century that references to a venerable ancient con-
stitution began to be used. Szijártó specifically refers to the diet of 1790, when the 
deputy instructions of the deputies of Somogy county explicitly use the term consti-
tution.10 He also claims that the analysis of the ceremonial speeches of the diet signal 
the latin word „constitutio” (speeches at the diet in those years were mostly given in 
latin) from 1792, in which year both the primate József Batthyány, and the persona-
lis József Ürményi used it, the former calling attention to the aim of preserving the 
“ancient constitution” (Szijártó, 2015, p.27). Péter László refers to Article X of 1790 as 
“the first statutory reference to the ‘constitution’”.11
Part of the reason for this transformation of the terminology might have been that 
the direct state intervention with the aim of radically transforming the constitutional 
arrangements by king Joseph II provoked strong resistance. No doubt this unprec-
edented conflict with the king, who withdrew most of his reforms on his deathbed, 
as well as the American experience, the Dutch and French revolutions, which intro-
duced hot debates of constitutionalism on an international scale, took part in the 
10  Beside his own findings, Szijártó also refers to (Melhárd Gyula, 1906, p.60.) He admits that in 
these texts the expression used is sarkalatos alkotmány (appr. cardinal constitution).
11  The Article „enacted that the kingdom had to be ’ruled and governed according to its own laws 
and customs’ because it had its own character and constitution (propriam habens consistentiam et 
constitutionem)” (Péter, 2012b, p.193).
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sequel in the first half of the last decade of the 18th century, which was an unprec-
edented fermentation of constitutional thought in Hungary. One should not under-
estimate the relevance of this phenomenon because of the seemingly dead end of all 
these efforts when the king, using the Martinovics conspiracy as a shop window case, 
closed down all possibilities of constitutional reforms. We are reminded by Szijártó 
that the simple fact that political participation was so high is a secure proof that this 
turn towards the constitutional discourse within the institutional framework of the 
estates, mainly using the country assemblies and the national diet, prepared the way 
for a more modern democratic political culture. In this respect Szijártó himself refers 
to the views of other researchers like Ambrus Miskolczy and Károly Kecskeméti, who 
again emphasise the importance of the late 18th century developments (Szijártó, 2015, 
p.27; Miskolczy, 2005, p.199; Hörcher, 2016). However, Szijártó offers a few caution-
ary remarks as well. First that this special kind of “constitutionalism” did not have 
a democratic content in the modern sense of the term, and in fact the aabsolutist 
opponent of this movement, the Habsburg government, was more forward-looking 
in a number of issues, including its peasant policies and religious toleration. And, 
second, that although the sharp political conflicts of the dualist model foreshadowed 
the kind of party politics which is characteristic of modern parliamentary systems, in 
fact a lot was lost with the eclipse of a cooperative model between court and country, 
characteristic of the earlier system, and still in work in the first half of the 18th century 
(Szijártó, 2012, p.48). We shall have to return to this apparent contradiction in our 
assessment of the failures and achievements of the historical constitution.
7.8  The Golden Age of Historical Constitutionalism: The Nine-
teenth Century
If the 18th century created the preconditions of a thriving constitutional life in the 
country, the 19th century can comfortably called the heyday of the historical constitu-
tion of Hungary. Starting with a period of latent reform work on what was called lin-
guistic neologism (nyelvújítás), it continued with an intense period of a two decade-
long constitutional reform movement, when the political class got widened up, by 
members of the lower classes of the nobility and non-noble intellectuals (called lite-
rati by Péter), which led to the legal revolution of the April laws of 1848, followed by a 
War of Independence, which was lost, but regained in the form of the 1867 Settlement, 
which created the new state-formation of the Austro-Hungarian dual monarchy. 
Péter, in one of his seminal papers, chose two simple aspects to describe the 
specificity of Hungarian political thought and action in the 19th century, the struggles 
around language and the idea of the “ancient constitution” (Péter, 2012b). Analysing 
an article by the editor of one of the earliest political journals, Hazai Tudósítások, by 
its editor, István Kultsár, entitled “Who are Hungarians?” comes to the conclusion that 
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“the term magyar nemzet (Hungarian nation, FH) may not have acquired its modern 
senses before the language movement of the literati fused with the political reform 
programme that emerged within the nobility to establish a civil society based on the 
principle of legal equality” (Péter, 2012b, p.188). The linguistic reforms proved more 
successful than the constitutional struggle. It started in 1792 with article VII, which 
“introduced Hungarian as an ordinary subject in grammar school” and led through 
“Article III of 1836,” which “declared the Hungarian text of the laws (rather than the 
Latin) to be authentic,” to 1844 “when Law II made Hungarian the sole language in 
which laws were enacted” (Péter, 2012b, p.189). 
With the constitutional reform the development was not quite so linear. For 
reformers (aristocrats, nobles, and non-nobles) had to fight on two fronts: they had 
to defend the ancient constitution (in other words the liberties and privileges of the 
nobles – representing by now the whole nation12) against the centralising trespasses 
of the court and its government), and fight to break down those very privileges in 
order to let the people enter behind “the ramparts of the constitution” (az alkotmány 
sáncai).13 While the first front was obvious by then, the second front was one in which 
the nobles had to turn against their own interests. The solution to this political riddle 
was the strategy of the extension of rights (jogkiterjesztés) instead of a termination 
of privileges, which would have perhaps a more radical (more democratic) internal 
effect, but should have annulled the ancient constitution and should have authorized 
Vienna to provide a new constitutional framework or even a non-constitutional form 
of government. After the bloodless revolution of 1848, the April Laws “broke the back 
of the old order based on hereditary right and introduced independent, representa-
tive and responsible government” (Péter, 2012b, p.195). Although the new regime was 
forced into a hopeless war of independence where the Hungarian civic militia was 
crushed down with the help of the overwhelming power of the Russian Tsar’s army, 
1848 “set a standard for Hungarian politics that outlasted even the Monarchy.” In 
the 1867 Settlement, the lost constitution was “repossessed’ and a new balance was 
created between the Crown and the nation” (Péter, 2012b, 195). However, the story is 
once again unfinished: “Although the drawbridge of the constitution was lowered in 
1848 and in 1867, the gates were not flung wide open.” (Péter, 2012b, p.195). 
Even more importantly, a serious distortion was introduced during the 19th 
century: a constitutional doctrine that worked as an ideology, which led astray the 
constitutional development of the country. This is the famous doctrine of the Holy 
Crown, the idea that the constitutional history of the kingdom is unparalleled, as 
it was based on an acclaimed thousand years of history, and represented a specific 
vision of politics. In a long and detailed investigation, Péter traces back the birth of 
12  “When Kossuth makes the claim that Hungary ‘belongs to the Hungarians’ and refers to ‘our con-
stitution’ the referent is no longer the nobility but the nation led by the nobility” (Péter, 2012b, p.195).
13  The expression, used by Pál Felsőbüki Nagy in 1827, became a famous adage of the period. 
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the doctrine to the oppositional figure of Count Albert Apponyi, a “magnetic person-
ality and oratorical brilliance,” who in the 1889 Great Defence Debate provided the 
political context of the Holy Crown doctrine, a joint production of the exceptionally 
talented and influential theorist Győző Concha, the excellent Vienna educated legal 
historian and legal theorist Imre Hajnik, and Ákos Timon, another representative of 
the turn-of-the-century Hungarian style, but Germanic (dogmatic) historical school 
of law, all the three of them having chairs at Budapest University. The terminological 
shift that prepared the way for the doctrine was that ország (country) was replaced 
by the more modern notion of állam (state). While earlier there was “a dualist divi-
sion between king and ország, according to the new doctrine “ ‘the subject of sover-
eignty was the Holy Crown’ which comprised the crowned king and, ‘in former times 
through ennoblement, today through the franchise’, the members of the crown.” In 
other words the modern (German Staatsrecht) concept of the state was always there 
in the Hungarian historical constitution, only called the Holy Crown, which led to 
the conclusion that “neither the Monarch nor the People but the State itself ought 
to be regarded as the subject of state sovereignty” (Péter, 2012f, p.225). This innova-
tion served the function to widen up the space for the Hungarian government once 
again on two fronts: against the Monarch, who tended to rely on his ancient ius reser-
vata (the reserved right of the sovereign), and against the individual rights of citi-
zens and the institutions of civil society. This distortion of the original balance of king 
and parliament was most obviously expressed in the autocratic principle of the law, 
which Péter regarded as a common feature of the Habsburg Monarchy and imperial 
Germany, and he found it as the major obstacle to democratic (rule of law) develop-
ments in Hungary, which brought with it in Hungary a fatal obstruction of the growth 
of civil rights (unlike in the other half of the Dualist Monarchy) (Péter, 2012g; Cieger, 
2015). His fulminatory view of the doctrine is due to the fact that he regarded it as 
“constitutional radicalism” which “resulted in the introduction of an instability in the 
political life of the Hungarian part of the Monarchy” (Péter, 2012f, p.224). 
7.9  Anachronistic Afterlife, Death and Revival (?) of the Historical 
Constitution: The Twentieth Century
The instability led to government crises in the early 20th century, but the regime 
could survive until the outbreak of the First World War. However, as Hungary lost the 
World War, the the Allies revenged with a fatal blow: the kingdom of Hungary lost 
the majority of its historic territory and population. This moment should have been 
seen as the end of its constitutional tradition and the occasion to redraw its consti-
tution (Romsics, 1999, p.81). Because the historical constitution, as noted, was part 
of an ancient, customary kind of constitutional culture, it managed to survive even 
this political catastrophe. The new political system that came into power after long 
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months of authoritarian regimes in power (first the red revolution of the Hungarian 
Republic of Councils, later what is called the white terror of a radical right counter-
revolutionary regime), and which was stabilised around the personal charisma of the 
would-be regent, Miklós Horthy, an earlier admiral of the Dual Monarchy, kept the 
state’s form of kingdom, except that it did not allow the Habsburg dynasty to take 
the throne. Horthy himself served as an uncrowned king at the top of the political 
regime that, as many other interwar regimes in the region, had an authoritarian char-
acter (Turbucz, 2014). While Hitler’s takeover was due to the fiasco of the Weimar 
constitution of Germany, the Kingdom of Hungary did not work because of its anach-
ronistic nature. This anachronism is captured by the term phrased by Gyula Szekfű, 
who called the contemporary Hungarian society a “neo-Baroque society” (Szekfű, 
1920/1938). The official ideology of this state was a kind of revisionism or irredentism, 
which radically questioned the justice of the Trianon treaty and expressed the hope 
of Hungarians that the lost territories and the lost native population can be regained 
– a major cause of Hungary joining Germany at the outbreak of the Second World 
War. Keeping the constitution was also a political manifesto, which sent the message: 
Hungarians do not accept the external constraints of the stronger, and keep to their 
own constitutional tradition.
In reality, however, the historical constitution lost its credibility, as after the col-
lapse of the dual monarchy there was in fact no need to keep the “közjogi kérdés” 
(the question of public law) on the agenda, except for territorial demands, which, 
however, were largely determined by the foreign political constellation, and could 
not be hoped to bring any positive results by simple techniques of elaborate legal dis-
putes. The historical constitution, however, had two further aims which it could very 
well serve: first, to hinder a democratic turn by the introduction of universal suffrage 
which was on the agenda in more and more European countries in those years, and 
with it to postpone the defence of individual rights. The anti-democratic tendencies 
could be recognised in the party system as well, or in the workings of the Parliament, 
where real competition could be avoided. And second, to hinder social mobility, by 
ensuring that the historical liberties and privileges of the nobility and the aristoc-
racy (including the system of large landed estates) were defended, and this way a 
wide spectrum of society could not in fact avoid experiencing extreme poverty. Beside 
those of the traditional estates (the aristocracy, the nobility and the Church) the state 
served the interest of the so called Christian-national middle classes – as opposed to 
the large groups of agrarian paupers, and those city-dwellers who were of non-Hun-
garian origins, including the Jews, against whom they introduced a whole series of 
legislation, and half a million of whom they left preys of the anti-Semitic Nazi regime 
of the German Reich after the outbreak of the Second World War.14 That this sort of 
14  For a contemporary critique of the anachronistic social structure and the previaling antisemitism 
of the interwar period and during the Second World War, see Bibó, 1982-1984; Bibó, 1982-1984b.
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scapegoat mechanism could be so easily operated against a group of citizens is a sure 
sign that at that time the historical constitution was not able to serve the function 
which we expect from a constitution, meaning a defence of individuals against the 
monopoly of state power. The illusion of gaining back earlier territories blinded the 
political elite, including the regent, and made the country the prey of Hitler, who used 
the Hungarian political class for his own purposes and then occupied the country to 
make sure of their loyalty. After the suicide of Prime Minister Pál Teleki, in 1941 there 
was no real leadership in the government, which resulted first in the Nazi takeover in 
1944, and then in the total surrender of the country before the 1945 Soviet communist 
invasion.
There is no wonder that the newly consolidated communist regime wanted to get 
rid of the historical constitution. Following the Soviet example of the Stalinist consti-
tution, a new statutory constitution was introduced in 1949, ending the long story of 
the historical constitution, and starting a new era of quasi-constitutionalism under 
a totalitarian kind of rule. This was a written constitution, which ascertained the 
leading role of the communist party, and this way operated an oppressive party-state 
system, along the teaching of the official Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Although commu-
nist rule was interrupted by the revisionist revolution of 1956, led by the earlier com-
munist leader, Imre Nagy, János Kádár, the new first secretary backed by the Soviets 
once again consolidated a slightly milder system, and ensured its survival and his 
personal leadership in it until 1989. There is no need to dwell long on this period, as it 
was a shop-window kind of constitutionalism, which did all that it could to encumber 
the external recognition of its real nature, which remained totalitarian down to the 
bottom. 
The transition of 1989 prepared the way for a new constitutional regime after 
a fair general election in 1990. The election laws were collated among the partici-
pants of the National Roundtable Agreements, and this way it ensured the transi-
tion to a genuinely democratic system. Although a lot of political commentators had 
serious worries about the new political settlement, which were originally meant to be 
only transitory, no government majority could again put on the agenda constitution 
drawing. However, a two-third majority enabled Fidesz to draw a new constitution 
once again, claiming that the 1990 one was based on the earlier, illegitimate 1949 
one. The new Fundamental Law of Fidesz, which was itself illegitimate according to 
its critics, because the parliamentary opposition had not participated in the drawing 
of it, and the population did not formally accept it, made an effort to revitalise the 
historical constitution. In its ideological orientation, called the National Avowal, it 
provides the following historical judgement: 
We do not recognise the suspension of our historical constitution due to foreign occupations. 
… We do not recognise the communist constitution of 1949, since it was the basis for tyranni-
cal rule; therefore we proclaim it to be invalid. … We date the restoration of our country’s self-
determination, lost on the nineteenth day of March 1944, from the second day of May 1990, when 
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the first freely elected organ of popular representation was formed (The Fundamental Law of 
Hungary, 2011, National Avowal).
There are serious problems of legal technique with a constitutional text that claims to 
be rooted in the earlier constitution, but which calls the former constitutional regime 
annulled, because of the fact that it served a totalitarian regime. But a more significant 
problem is that the new Fundamental Law is open to charges of illegitimacy because 
of the opposition being left out from the procedures of drawing it. As a result it is not 
yet certain whether it can survive the next election – although it has already survived 
one, but that election was won by Fidesz, the same party that has drawn the Funda-
mental Law. Consequently, its heroic effort to turn back time, and to reintroduce what 
is called the achievements of the “historical constitution” is still rather doubtful.15 
The success of such an innovative step depends on the reaction of the constitu-
tional court, which is accused of being full of Fidesz-friendly constitutional judges, 
but which wants to preserve its own professional reputation based on the decisions 
of the first period of its history, when it was led by its first president, László Sólyom, 
whose heritage of the constitutional culture of the post 1990 Hungary is still relevant 
for the present constitutional court. This tension between the spirit of the new Fun-
damental Law and the constitutional culture of the constitutional court cannot be 
easily resolved. Some of the norms of the fundamental law try to reshuffle the sense 
of the constitution, like in article R where it is claimed that “The provisions of the Fun-
damental Law shall be interpreted in accordance with their purposes, the National 
Avowal contained therein and the achievements of our historical constitution” (Fun-
damental Law, 2011). However, so far there is no agreement how to identify the real 
“achievements” of the historical constitution in the above quoted text. The constitu-
tional court, of course, has all the powers to make sense of this imprecise term; but 
apparently it is not too keen to do so, and constitutional or legal historical scholarship 
has not achieved too much so far, either (Hörcher, 2015).
15  See the text of the National Avowal: “We honour the achievements of our historical constitution 
and we honour the Holy Crown, which embodies the constitutional continuity of Hungary’s statehood 
and the unity of the nation” (The Fundamental Law of Hungary, 2011). I think that the close concep-
tual link drawn here between the historical constitution and the Holy Crown makes a potential inter-
pretational breakthrough rather difficult, because of the strong reactions amongst lawyers against a 
return to the veneration of the Crown.
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7.10  The Achievements and the Failures of the Historical 
Constitution
In a relatively early writing, published in 1994, the later constitutional court judge, 
and even later president of the constitutional court, Péter Paczolay gave his thoughts 
on the relation between the historical constitution and conservative legal thought 
(Paczolay, 1994). Paczolay, who was a legal theorist and political scientist before he 
became a judge, claimed that: 
The historical constitution characteristically and necessarily interlocks with the conservative 
philosophy of state and law: with the principle of continuity and gradual development. The 
changes of Hungarian public law had a conserving nature, beside its natural progression. The 
stability behind the reforms, the adaptation of the ancient principles to the new circumstances, 
about which the Hungarian public law theorists tended to write, echo the ideas of Burke (Paczo-
lay, 1994, p.33).
In his historical reconstruction Paczolay points to two historical events that broke 
the continuity of the traditional historical constitution: these were in 1919 the estab-
lishment of the Soviet type Republic of Councils and in 1949 the Communist written 
constitution of Rákosi. While neither of them was legitimate, the latter, written (kar-
tális) constitution is claimed to have actually terminated the historical constitution. 
In Paczolay’s view even if Hungary wanted to, it could not turn back to the historical 
constitution, as it is by now unfortunately discredited. Using a traditional metaphor 
he claims that the constitution’s building was totally destroyed by the storms of the 
20th century. It cannot be brought back, and no new historical constitution can be 
created, it is conceptually impossible. It is inevitable, therefore, he claims that Hun-
garians will live under the jurisdiction of a charta-like constitution, which however 
has to preserve from the ancient Hungarian constitution whatever is possible to be 
preserved. He thinks that the 1989 constitutional process was not the “most fortu-
nate” but he takes it even so legitimate, and finds in it in some aspects a return to the 
pre-1949 one. The most important point where he thinks that the customary nature of 
the historical constitution can be reintroduced is the judge-directed development of 
law (bírói jogfejlesztés). While this possibility was excluded from the socialist concept 
of the law (which had as its ideal the Kelsenian type of legal positivism), after 1989 
there is a chance to return to the Hungarian legal traditions in this respect through 
the Kúria’s role in the development of the law. Through the legal interpretation of the 
judge the lacunas of the law can be filled up, which was quite naturally achieved in 
the historical constitution due to the customary nature of the law and precedents. 
The constitutional interpretation of the law by the judge is a new development which 
helps to inject a customary-historical element into the constitutional life even if the 
constitution itself is written.
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Paczolay’s ideas were realised at the same time by the activist self-perception and 
practice of the first president of the Hungarian constitutional court, László Sólyom. 
His ideal, the so-called “invisible constitution,” was the custom of the court to build 
around the written norms of the constitution a context of interpretations, in their 
judgements, which, in order to dig out the constitutional principles behind the text 
of the particular norm, sometimes went recognisably beyond the original intention 
of the lawgiver. Interestingly, however, it was exactly the conservative lawyers and 
politicians who criticised the practice, claiming that the practice of the constitutional 
court stretched much beyond what was originally intended for them in the model of 
the separation of powers. Here, of course, a similar argument appeared as the one 
used in the case of the United States Supreme Court, where conservative judges try 
to adhere to the original meaning of the text as the norm, and claim that activism in 
interpretation can dangerously miss the original intention of the lawmaker or simply 
the original meaning of the text of the law (Pilon, 2001). Sólyom’s original intention 
was to try to build a coherent system of the interpretations of particular debated issues 
in the light of the text of the constitution, and this way to fill in the gaps of the con-
stitutional text and logic and to defend the constitution from any spontaneous con-
stitution drawing intentions of the parliament for pragmatic political purposes.16 In a 
later writing Sólyom made it clear that he saw the point of the criticism, but thought 
that it was based on a misinterpretation of his metaphor, when it was understood 
as referring to “activism and countermajoritarian aspirations of the Court” (Sólyom, 
2000, p.41). 
László Sólyom’s understanding of the historical constitution became once again 
relevant in the context of the debate about the new Fundamental Law, drawn by the 
two-thirds Fidesz majority in 2010-2011. Sólyom provided a serious critique of the new 
venture that he thought might endanger the whole edifice of the invisible constitution. 
When he realised the importance attached to the notion of historical constitution by 
the drafters of the Fundamental Law, he innovatively rephrased his former concept, 
claiming that in fact the real meaning of the historical constitution was exactly the 
invisible constitution built around the text of the written constitution by the court, in 
the way implied by Paczolay’s earlier essay. In other words he suggested that if there 
is a constitutional demand to return to the historical constitution, one should look 
at the court’s jurisdiction during its 20 years history: “the Fundamental Law states 
that its provisions shall be interpreted in accordance with the achievements of the 
16  According to Sólyom: “The Constitutional Court must continue its effort to explain the theoretical 
bases of the Constitution and of the rights included in it and to form a coherent system with its deci-
sions, which as an ’invisible Constitution’ provides for a reliable standard of constitutionality beyond 
the Constitution, which nowadays is often amended out of current political interests; therefore this 
coherent system will probably not conflict with the new Constitution to be established or with future 
Constitutions” (Decision 23/1990, 2000, p.126).
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historical constitution – but the achievements which can be used today evolved after 
1990. The new constitution of that period incorporated also the achievements of 1848 
and 1946. And the constitutional court, since then kept writing a historical constitu-
tion, if you want” (Sólyom, 2011). 
But there is a further step in Sólyom’s innovative interpretation of the historical 
constitution. He claims that in fact constitutional life consists of written or unwritten 
norms, and a certain form of constitutional culture attached to it. “A new constitution 
cannot repeal the legal culture, into which it is born. These two mutually form each 
other in the long run… Constitutional culture is continuous, it takes shape slowly – 
so far it is comparable to the historical constitution. A written constitution can also 
follow the radical transformation of social demands and the ever new face of consti-
tutional culture” (Sólyom, 2011). Obviously his hope is that in spite of the constituent 
power’s intention, the new Fundamental Law – the text of which is to a large extent 
simply taken over from the 1989-1990 constitution – cannot cut itself away from the 
constitutional reality which consists of the written constitutional norms and of the 
constitutional culture into which these norms are born.
It is too early as yet to judge whether Sólyom’s hope will be fulfilled. But it is sure 
that his understanding of the historical constitution is heavily bottlenecked. Neither 
Paczolay nor Sólyom could accept the revival of the idea of the historical constitution 
cherished by Babits in our motto. They absolutely doubt that the historical constitu-
tion could survive the four decades of the written Soviet-type constitution, which they 
both claim to be illegitimate. 
The present paper is based on a different assumption. According to this assump-
tion, constitutional reality is a social construction, which means that it can be delib-
erately changed – perhaps not too abruptly, but slowly and gradually. If there is a 
consensus among constitutional lawyers and other legal practitioners, politicians, 
and the opinion mongers that the historical constitution should be regarded as still 
valid, it is only a question of time, interpretational innovation, and invested energy to 
draw the conclusions of this consensus in the long run. As already the title of the new 
constitution (i.e., Fundamental Law) suggests, the intention behind its drawing was 
that it will serve as a key text in the process of reconquest of the historical constitu-
tion, one which in the same time takes responsibility also for its renaissance. 
Certainly there posit serious obstacles that hinder the realisation of this inten-
tion. Most importantly one should be careful not to get anachronistic or simply 
foolish by taking some parts of the historical constitution verbatim. After all, who 
wants to revive feudal social conditions, the ius reservata of the kings, or anti-semitic 
legislation? Only the carefully chosen key elements should be saved for the benefit of 
future legal argumentation, and a special care should be paid to neutralize the nega-
tive effects of the potential survival of its failures. Undoubtedly a more thoroughgoing 
analysis than what is possible in this paper is required to address this pressing issue. 
This paper can only argue that a written Fundamental Law does not per definitionem 
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exclude the possibility of the legal presumption that the historical constitution is still 
alive, the only problem being that we cannot as yet define properly the content of it.
But one further step may be taken here: to formulate a proposal about the direc-
tion towards which the new interpretation of the reborn historical constitution could 
be switched. 
7.11  How to Reinterpret the Tradition of the Historical 
Constitution?
One of the key problems of the 1989/1990 Hungarian constitution was that ordinary 
citizens could hardly identify with the view of politics that it presented. Instead, the 
general public regarded the document as the constitution of law professors, legal 
experts and lobby groups primarily interested in individual rights. This was partly 
due to the fact that its text and the court’s interpretation tried to join the Western con-
stitutional discourse, without taking due care about the home ground. Therefore, a 
lot of the members of the political elite could not easily catch up with it. Consequently 
it quicly lost those otherwise interested in politics but not interested in present-day 
constitutional theoretical nuances or human rights lobbying. 
But what is the guarantee that the historical constitution, a theme offered by the 
new, 2012 Fundamental Law, would look more sexy in the eyes of its present audi-
ence? A strong conviction tells us that the future of the Fundamental Law is in the 
hands of professional constitutional lawyers and the courts. Theoretically oriented 
lawyers’ interpretation of it should lend it a cogency, and their job it has been offer 
a vision of the rebirth of the historical constitution which is compelling to the next 
few generations. In other words, the interpretation of the past should be tuned to the 
expected tastes of the future. But, certainly, traditional Kelsenist lawyers are naturally 
not in favour of it. And the constitutional lawyers of the last twenty years, mostly from 
a younger generation, who were brought up on the vision of the constitution trans-
mitted by the constitutional court, or directly picked up at fashionable or second-rate 
European or American universities, in fact reside on the other side of the debate. And 
Hungarian conservatism, which has overthrown the earlier constitution, is not yet 
sufficiently intellectually robust to take up the challenge to make sense of the refer-
ences in the Fundamental Law to the achievements of the historical constitution.
To conclude, I respectfully offer my own, non-legal suggestions how to use the 
historical constitution today. My starting point is the social constructivist assertion 
that if there are good reasons why to refer to the historical constitution as a living 
document, it could be done. Next, I admit that, as Paczolay already saw, the historical 
constitution was destroyed in the 20th century. But I would add, presumably in agree-
ment with such diverse authors as Szekfű and Bibó, that since the end of the dualist 
period (late 19th early 20th centuries) the Hungarian constitutional mindset wandered 
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seriously astray. And third, let me suggest that historical deadlocks can offer lessons 
from which important conclusions or lessons might be drawn.
Thus, here are a few of the lessons of the earlier discourse of the historical con-
stitution which I take to be relevant even today constitutionally. First, obviously, one 
should reconsider one of the most important trait of the historical constitution, its 
dualist nature. As shown, the doctrine of the Holy Crown was quite a late arrival, but 
the cast itself has a long history, where the king and the country (ország) obviously 
represent the two scales of the balance. The lessons from this old constitutional divi-
sion include the one István Szijártó has drawn: that there is a republican element in 
the way the ország functioned in the 18th century. Yet it is also remarkable that due to 
this dualist structure, the diet was forced to cooperate with the king and to look for 
viable compromises in these negotiations. In other words, at least until the second 
half of the 18th century, the dualist structure brought with it less an agonistic struggle 
and more a constitutional culture of compromises. It is only since then that a sharper, 
zero-sum game has been started in the political arena.
Second, another early experience was the confessional division of the constitu-
tional life of the kingdom. It was partly due to the fact that the Habsburg dynasty 
was emphatically Catholic – although Szijártó also mentions that there were occa-
sions when their political interests could override their confessional identity. The 
early success of the reformation, mostly in the northwestern parts of the country, is 
relevant because it could contribute to the schizophrenic nature of the population, 
inhabitants of the three parts spoke different political languages, and the theological 
controversies explain the early politically motivated cultural wars which were occa-
sioned by the confessional struggles. It also explained the persistent existence of rival 
historiographies – the loyal Catholic ones talked about loyalty, while the protestant 
ones cried in a non-compromising manner liberty. 
Third, if we turn to the heyday of constitutionalism, the long 19th century, a key 
question concerned the fate of the county or local assembly, which had a power to 
take over a lot of the burdens of political life, but this way frustrated the state’s central 
authorities. This conflict is also easy to explain in the language of despotism (Vien-
nese central authority) versus liberty (local communities), but already the centralists, 
a group of well educated, politically active intellectuals, from the 1940s were keen 
to call attention to the general misfortunes caused by geographic and institutional 
fragmentation. On the other hand, local communities could accumulate practical 
knowledge about political necessities, which again lead to a political (or constitu-
tional) culture based on political participation and the demand of autonomy and 
self-government.
Fourth, a further question is the returning historiographical commonplace that 
Hungary arrived late in liberating not only its serfs, becoming the country of three 
million beggars, but also in offering constitutional rights to its bourgeois middle 
classes, in particular the city-dwelling burghers. The issue called the question of 
cities (városi kérdés) became quite hot during the Reform era, but was not solved in 
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a proper manner even in the April Laws. And although the period between the Set-
tlement with Austria and the First World War saw an unprecedented urban growth, 
Hungary remained comparatively underdeveloped, as far as urban centres, industry 
and commerce is concerned in the last decades of its being a kingdom. And even more 
importantly, social mobility turned out to be even slower and severely limited, which 
could have been one of the key indirect reasons behind the anti-Semitic feelings, leg-
islation and the state’s betrayal of its Jewish citizens during the time of the Holocaust. 
Fifth, and finally, a further dimension of the historical constitutional experi-
ence of Hungarians might be relevant even today: that the kingdom of Hungary was 
constitutionally part of a larger whole, called Habsburg empire. Although the politi-
cal elite since the time of Werbőczy tried to play on the national monarch’s issue, 
and regarded the dualistic arrangement only as a concession, when they accepted 
the system, they also participated in stabilising it. In a comparison of the Hungarian 
kingdom and Austria, in or after 1848, the Hungarian part seems to be much more 
liberal than the other side of the political spectrum, as it had its own well defined and 
practiced constitutional arrangement, while Vienna, which was on other hand more 
urbane and unchecked, followed in a much slower tempo the fate of Western capi-
tals, by checking the monarch’s direct power. It would be nice to see how the general 
public in Hungary relates to these issues nowadays, when the imperial logic of Europe 
towards the small countries is once again easily felt and seen, for a population which 
learned from the Russian invaders that autonomy matters. 
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Arkady Rzegocki1
8  Polish Constitutional Traditions
Poland has one of the longest traditions of parliamentarism and constitutionalism in 
Europe. It reaches as far back as the fourteenth century, and a well-formed constitu-
tional system dates to the beginning of the sixteenth century. Long and uninterrupted 
constitutional and parliamentary tradition is one of the reasons why the Polish case 
has to find its chapter in a study on the development of constitutionalism.
While France sets example as a country where estate monarchy evolved into 
absolute monarchy and where royal powers were eventually put under control and 
limited, Poland is an exemplary model of a country where medieval estate monarchy 
was decentralized with the growing participation of citizens and civic representative 
institutions. In a word, the Polish system of governance evolved first into constitu-
tional monarchy and then into parliamentary monarchy bypassing the absolutist 
stage.
Most overviews of the Polish constitutionalism start with the Act of Government 
of 3 May 1791 (“1791 Polish Constitution”). It was a milestone in the rich and arduous 
history of the Polish constitutionalism, however it was preceded by other legal acts 
that formed a ground upon which constitutional state developed. The 1791 Polish 
Constitution, or the so-called 3rd of May Constitution, was the first act of governance 
in Europe to introduce reforms of political system. Its only predecessor in Europe was 
the 1755 constitution of Corsica. What is remarkable about the 1791 Polish Constitu-
tion was the fact that it was a product of evolution rather than revolution as it intro-
duced reforms into constitutional and parliamentary system that had already been 
in place for centuries. Historians point to the fact that, contrary to the then current 
political trend to limit central organs of government and royal power and to give more 
power to the citizens, the 1791 Polish Constitution went in a different direction, by 
instituting hereditary monarchy, that is, by cancelling elective monarchy, by limiting 
elective rights of the nobility, and by cancelling the principle of consensus in the par-
liament (LT liberum veto). The reasons for a more guarded approach to the protection 
of citizens’ rights and freedoms in Poland were the need to strengthen the central 
government in otherwise federalist and decentralized state in the face of the danger 
from the neighbouring absolutist states.
Poland may be considered a constitutional monarchy from the sixteenth century 
onwards. Although it did not have a single act setting out the roles of the most impor-
tant organs of state power, it nevertheless had a number of institutional regulations, 
such as, for example the lex et rex rule, that is, the rule of the superiority of the law, 
which applied in all of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania. The legislature of the 
1  The Jagiellonian University in Kraków.
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early 16th century Jagiellonian state and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth should 
be recognized as the forerunner of Polish constitutionalism. In the same vein, the 
English constitutionalism draws its fame from a long-standing tradition despite the 
fact that it has no single constitutional document and its “unwritten” constitution is 
embodied in a variety of documents and sources. The sum of the written documents 
and regulations that applied in the Jagiellonian state allows us to conclude that the 
Jagiellonian monarchy was a constitutional monarchy in the beginning of the six-
teenth century, that is, 183 years before the Glorious Revolution in England.
Despite historical evidence testifying to the remarkable constitutional tradition 
in the Jagiellonian state, it is England that has been deemed the first constitutional 
monarchy, emerging as a result of the Glorious Revolution and change of dynasty 
in 1688-1689. Thus, England has been called “the mother country of parliaments” 
and the Westminster model of parliamentarism has been adopted in many countries 
of the former empire. British-style parliamentarism was successfully implemented 
in Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and therefore it comes as no surprise that 
England and Great Britain are the first associations with parliamentarism, constitu-
tional governance, and democracy across the world. There is no doubt that the fame 
of the English parliamentarism is well-earned and the influence of English legal and 
constitutional model has been beneficial to many countries. 
That said, the beginnings of the English constitutionalism and parliamentarism 
were difficult and problematic. Like most European countries in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century, England was heading towards absolutism as subsequent mon-
archs gradually limited the role of the parliament. Four changes of religion between 
1540 and 1605 fuelled religious conflict and national discord. Henrician denial of 
papal supremacy ended with the Elizabethan state demanding total conformity. The 
reformation led to rebellions, social unrest and radical protests in the seventeenth 
century. Visible signs of those tumultuous times are still to be found in England’s 
landscape and public space. These exist ruined monasteries – for example, Oxford 
and Cambridge colleges located in former cloisters, virtually no medieval stained 
glass from England and the so-called priest holes or priest tunnels, that is, hiding 
places for priests still to be seen in the principal Catholic houses of England from the 
period. Protests were expressed in manuscript and in print. London, a major interna-
tional port, became the centre of European book smuggling and severe censorship. 
De Optimo Senatore (“On the Best Senator”), a famous political treatise of Laurentius 
Grimalius Goslicius (PL Wawrzyniec Grzymała Goślicki) (c. 1537-1607) a Polish politi-
cal writer, ecclesiast and diplomat was published in 1568 in Venice and published 
in English translation in London in 1598 with multiple omissions on questions of 
Catholicism, republican political setup and critical outlook on hereditary monarchy 
(Bałuk-Ulewiczowa 2009, pp.12, 140-146). Goslicius’ book enjoyed an enduring liter-
ary reputation and had a great political impact in the English-speaking countries, as 
it is known to have run into several editions and was published by William Oldisworth 
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in 1773 titled Accomplished Senator. It is believed to have impacted two American 
founding, Thomas Jefferson and Thomas Paine.
English and Polish outstanding contributions to the constitutional and parlia-
mentary tradition in Europe are evident in the articles of 1815 Vienna Congress. By 
that time most European states had constitutions, with the exception of three Central-
Eastern European powers – Austria, Prussia and Russia. It took a few decades until 
absolutist Austria and Prussia drafted their first constitutions, and it was not until 
1906 that Russia adopted its first constitution. Thus, eighteenth-century partitions of 
Poland were executed by three absolutist states that did not recognize constitutional 
order.
It is worthwhile remembering that Poland’s former capital, Krakow, with its royal 
Wawel Castle, was the seat of the king as well as the venue where the diet would 
convene from the sixteenth-century onwards. Similarly, the Royal Castle in Warsaw, 
was first of all the place where the king convened the Diet (PL Sejm) to adopt consti-
tutions to be approved by three deliberating estates – the king, the Senate and the 
Envoy’s Chamber. These are the visible historical proofs to the long constitutional and 
parliamentary tradition in Poland.
The key to understanding European constitutional tradition is the evolution of 
several medieval European states into estate monarchies in which the power of a 
prince or a king was limited not only by the natural law (divine law), papal or impe-
rial authority, but also by the will, rights and privileges of the estates. Unanimity and 
consensus of various estates was the condition upon which new taxes were levied and 
important decisions made. The king had to secure the consent of the political estates, 
hence the emergence of consultations and consulting bodies, that is, estate assem-
blies. First assemblies to served as consulting agencies to the sovereign appeared at 
the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries on the Iberian Peninsula. The English 
assembly dates back to the beginning of the thirteenth century, and the French 
Estates-General emerged a century later. In German lands and the Low Countries 
the assemblies were formed in the fourteenth century. It may thus be concluded that 
one of the main features of the political life of Latin Europe in the fifteenth century 
was limited sovereign power and estate assemblies to approve of the key political 
decisions in the state. Similarly, efficient estate assemblies existed in the Kingdom of 
Hungary, Bohemia and Poland.
In Poland the tradition of adult male gatherings or rallies (wiec) to discuss and 
make decisions may reflect Slavonic prehistory. Historians point out that the Slavonic 
tradition of the rally as a political venue of expression may be the prototype of later 
political practice to hold large estate assemblies. 
Estate assemblies were convened by the Polish princes during the period of 
Poland’s fragmentation in the thirteenth century. The tradition was continued after 
the unification of Poland under the two last kings from the Piast dynasty, Ladislas I 
(1261-1333) and Casimir III the Great (1310-1370). The assemblies held in various lands 
would have been endowed with legislative and self-governaning powers. In the same 
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period the king convened country-wide meetings which passed legislation and served 
as advisory bodies soon to be called the general sejm (sejm walny).
Historians claim that the assemblies that took place in the towns of Sieradz, 
Radomsko, and Lublin after the death of Louis I of Hungary (1326-1382) may in fact 
be called sejm, that is, parliamentary assemblies of the estates. These were confed-
erations convening for the purpose of securing political rights, and the decisions 
taken during those assemblies effected the country’s political system and govern-
ment. In 1386 in Lublin a decision was made to propose the Polish throne to Jogaila 
(c. 1352/1362-1434), the Grand Duke of Lithuania and to offer him to marry Queen 
Jadwiga of Poland (1374-1399). He had been crowned King of Poland in 1384 and was 
the heiress to the Polish crown. The royal election that took place in Lublin became 
henceforth the founding rule of the Polish political system.
The diet that convened in Piotrków in 1492 deliberated from January 18 until 
March 3, 1493. From this time onward all diets of the Kingdom of Poland and later 
of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania were bicameral. The Upper Chamber 
(effectively the Senate) evolved from the royal council while the Lower Chamber (aka 
Envoys’ Chamber) was the gathering of the deputies from the nobility estate elected 
at the dietines (sejmik), that is, the local assemblies of the nobility. Locally elected 
deputies had participated in sejm deliberations in earlier periods, but it was not until 
1493 that the bicameral sejm became normalized. From 1493 until 1793 parliamentary 
sessions were held at more or less regular intervals and were the key element of the 
political system of government in Poland-Lithuania. In his seminal work Chronology 
of the Polish Sejm, Władysław Konopczyński listed 245 parliamentary sessions which 
roughly constitutes one session per less than 1,5 year.
Estate monarchy gradually evolved into constitutional monarchy and subse-
quently became parliamentary monarchy. The Polish system of government devel-
oped in an evolutionary way, as the sovereigns granted privileges to the nobility of 
the sword in order to secure their support in military campaigns, in levying taxes 
and in questions of dynastic succession. However, the new privileges for members of 
the knightly estate meant a significant increase in their responsibility for the country 
and in the matters of state. Bestowing of privileges was preceded by lengthy debates 
and disputations that constituted part of Poland’s sophisticated political culture. In 
most cases the laws passed on those occasions confirmed to existing privileges and 
regulations. The long confirmed by subsequent parliaments dated back to at least 
twelfth century, and it would be worthwhile to mention the ones that were the most 
important for the emergence of constitutional monarchy.
The 1355 Privilege of Buda issued by King Louis I of Hungary listed concessions 
and promises to the nobility estate (szlachta) and at the same recognized their right 
to elect the king. The privilege was made to ensure succession of Louis and his heirs 
to his uncle’s Casimir III the Great throne of Poland. In Buda Privilege Louis resigned 
from demanding financial support for his court while making royal progress in 
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Poland. He also solemnly promised to compensate any losses incurred by the nobles 
in wars abroad.
In the 1374 Privilege of Košice, King Louis I of Hungary made new concessions to 
the Polish nobility to secure the future accession of one of his daughters to the Polish 
throne. Here the King promised to keep Polish lands intact and to regain all lands that 
had been previously lost. He also gave assurances he would not hand over the castles 
and offices of the land to foreigners. He exempted the nobility from most of the taxes 
and limited their military service to the cases of country defense only. The 1430-1433 
Jedlna-Krakow Privilege by King Ladislas Jogaila granted members of the nobility per-
sonal and property-related inviolability and immunity as well as exemption from all 
dues. Moreover, the king lost the right to call general levy (pospolite ruszenie), hence-
forth it was the right and responsibility of the dietines.
King Casimir IV Jagiellon issued his most important privileges and charters for 
Lesser Poland in Cerekwica in 1454 and in Nieszawa (the so-called Cerekwica-Nieszawa 
Privileges). The King made a solemn promise not to levy new taxes, not to summon 
general levy and to seek noblemen’s consent at provincial dietines when making new 
law. The 1496 Privilege of Piotrków issued by King Jan I Olbracht exempted the nobil-
ity from custom duty on imported and exported goods and it also granted the right of 
free navigation in all the rivers of the Polish Kingdom. The 1501 Privilege of Mielnik 
signed by Alexander Jagiellon to secure his own accession to the Polish throne after 
the death of his brother Jan I Olbracht expanded the powers of the Senate and hence-
forth the senators held much of the power in matters of state. The privilege substan-
tially limited the monarch’s power as the king was only to preside over the senate and 
did not have right to nominate senators. Moreover, failure by to the king to accept the 
decision of the senate freed the citizens from their oath of loyalty to the king. 
The evolution of the constitutional system in Poland-Lithuania was concluded 
by the adoption of the so-called nihil novi constitution of Radom in 1505 during the 
reign of King Alexander Jagiellon. The original title of the constitution, Nihil novi 
nisi commune consensu (“nothing new without the common consent”), symbolically 
marked the process of constitutional and parliamentary reform. It was the moment of 
a fundamental political change as the constitution proclaimed that legislature would 
no longer be the sovereign’s exclusive domain and the general bicameral diet repre-
senting the three estates would henceforth be the chief legislative authority respon-
sible for levying taxes, issuing privileges and regulations. Lawsuits involving secular 
groups would henceforth be the domain of secular courts.
The list of fundamental constitutional reforms should include the law adopted 
in the times of the elective king Stephan Bathory. On March 3, 1578 the king resigned 
his prerogatives as the supreme judge in favour of the Crown Tribunal consisting of 
27 noblemen deputies elected annually in judicial dietines (sejmik deputacki) and 6 
ecclesiastical members elected by the ecclesiastical chapters. The Crown Tribunal 
(Iudicium Ordinarium Generale Tribunalis Regni) was the highest court of appeal 
in the Polish kingdom and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In 1581 the Grand 
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Duchy of Lithuania instituted the Lithuanian Tribunal. It was the most important 
judicial institution that settled matters between members of the nobility. It operated 
by rule of consensus in the first two votings, and the majority decided in the third 
voting if consensus could not be reached. Thus, in 1578 in Poland and in 1581 in Lithu-
ania a secular high court was instituted which took over the royal judicial prerogative.
In his seminal study on the history of Polish law and statehood, Wacław Urusz-
czak argues that constitutional monarchy was formed in the Jagiellonian state as a 
result of evolution after the adoption of the Nihil novi constitution by the Sejm in 1505 
(Uruszczak, 2015, Uruszczak, Baran, Karabowicz ed. 2007). The Nihil novi constitu-
tion introduced parliamentary system of governance and set the foundation of a state 
based on the rule of law where the law ruled and not the people. It also set the basis 
for a state of free citizens and introduced the principle of parliamentarism into Polish-
Lithuanian political life, which meant collective law making and the need for any 
law to be promulgated. The Nihil novi constitution marked the beginning of modern 
constitutionalism in Poland and in Europe at large.
The Radom Sejm further ordered the Chancellor and Primate Jan Łaski to codify 
the fundamental statutes and privileges of the Polish law. Łaski’s Statute was pub-
lished in 1506 in Krakow. It was a collection of publicly issued constitutions, decre-
tals, edicts and statutes, and it was the first ever official codification of law published 
in the Kingdom of Poland.
The 1569 Union of Lublin was a milestone in the history of governance system in 
Poland and Lithuania. A formal Act of Union was sealed by the King and signed by the 
representatives of the noble estates of the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania during the general sejm in Lublin. The Act of Union set the political 
framework of a state henceforth to be called the Commonwealth of the Two Nations. 
There was to be a real union between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy 
of Lithuania with one coat of arms, one sejm, one foreign and defence policy and 
one currency. Lithuania kept its own treasury, offices, and administration, army and 
courts (Davies, 2013, p.121). The king was to be elected in free election and crowned 
king of Poland in Krakow. General Sejm was instituted to convene in Warsaw. The 
Senate would consist of 113 senators from Poland and 27 senators from Lithuania, the 
Envoy’s Chamber would consist of 120 deputies from Poland and 48 deputies from 
Lithuania. The Act of Union passed the unification of legal system. Interestingly, the 
document was closely studied at the English Court of Queen Elizabeth I when English-
Scottish Union was drafted in 1603 (Tomaszewska, 2009, p.95).
After the death of the last Jagiellon King Sigismundus Augustus in 1572 two 
laws were passed that affected the system of governance: the Warsaw Confedera-
tion (1573) and the so-called Henrician Articles (1573). The Act of Warsaw Confedera-
tion was a constitution-like document promulgated for the community of citizens. It 
was the expression of the political will of the political nation of the nobility and as 
such it confirmed the importance of the rule of law in the public sphere, it also estab-
lished the free election of the king to be attended by the entire nobility carried out in 
 Polish Constitutional Traditions   119
concordance and on a viritim basis. It introduced the principle of religious tolerance 
in the political system of Poland-Lithuania, which was a remarkable achievement in 
a multi-religious state.
Henrician articles were in fact considered eternal constitution of the Common-
wealth of the Two Nations, which was effective until the end of the eighteenth century. 
The articles spelled out the competences and areas of power of the elective kings as 
well as their relations with the Chamber of Envoys and the Resident Council of Sena-
tors. In a word “it warranted the grounds of the State’s political system” (Tomasze-
wska, 2009, p.46). Every subsequently elected king was obliged to swear on the Arti-
cles. In addition, in times of free election the so-called pacta conventa (“articles of 
agreement”) were drawn up in a form of a contractual agreement between the newly 
elected king and the country’s political nation. Each newly elected king was obliged 
to sign the articles and thus express his respect for the laws of the Commonwealth 
as well as to make clear his undertakings in the realms of foreign policy, taxes, and 
defence. Pacta conventa were thus “a collection of constitutional norms and regula-
tions drawn by the members of the Sejm during the convocation Sejm. They specified 
the most important goals of domestic and foreign policy and were a binding docu-
ment for the period of the elective king’s term of office” (Konstytucje Rzeczypospolitej 
www.trybunal.gov.pl).
The Government Act, or the so-called Third of May Constitution, was passed in 
the course of the Four Years’ Sejm in 1791. Although it was adopted with some proce-
dural mistakes, it was nevertheless accepted by the dietines. It introduced tripartite 
division of powers, strengthened royal power and substantially reformed the admin-
istration. The Constitution was supplemented by three other constitutional acts 
which complete the process of the reforms in the Commonwealth, namely the Act on 
Towns (March 18, 1791), the Reciprocal Guarantee of the Two Nations (October 20, 
1791) and the Constitution of the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia (May 1792). After 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ceased to exist as a result of partitions in the 
eighteenth century, the only other constitutional project that may be considered a 
continuation of the previous constitutional tradition was the 1807 Constitution of the 
Duchy of Warsaw promulgated by Napoleon Bonaparte. It introduced the civil code, 
or the so-called Napoleonic Code based on Roman law.
Several later constitutional regulations pertaining to the partitioned Polish-Lith-
uanian territories should be listed, among them: the Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Poland, a state created out of the Duchy of Warsaw at the Congress of Vienna. Tsar 
Alexander I of Russia promulgated the constitution for this part of the occupied 
Polish territory on November 27, 1815. Other constitutions adopted in the partitioned 
territories included the Constitution of the Grand Duchy of Poznań (1815) and the 
Constitution of the Free City of Krakow (1815, 1833) as well as the Acts of the Novem-
ber Uprising such as the Address of General Józef Chłopicki (1830), which explained 
the necessity to introduce war dictatorship and called upon the nobility to defend 
constitutional rights and freedoms. The Act of Deposition of Russian emperor Nikolai 
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I Romanov from the Polish throne as well as a joint act of November 29, 1831 pro-
mulgated by the united Sejm Chambers instituted National Government as well as 
described its system and competences.
Massive collection of constitutional acts listed above undoubtedly bears witness 
to one of Europe’s richest constitutional traditions. Parliamentarism and constitu-
tionalism were so much part of the Polish political identity that the three absolutist 
monarchies involved in the partitions of Poland decided to introduce constitutional 
system of governance in some parts of the occupied territories. This was the case in 
Russian-dominated Kingdom of Poland where one of the most liberal constitutions 
was drafted by prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski as well as in the lands under Prussian 
occupation (the Grand Duchy of Poznań) and in the Austrian territories (the Free City 
of Krakow).
Given the long-standing Polish constitutional tradition, it comes as little surprise 
that the Poles contributed significantly to the political reforms of the Austro-Hungar-
ian Empire, especially in the financial sphere, thanks to the involvement of Julian 
Dunajewski, Austro-Hungarian Minister of the Treasury. They also contributed to the 
development of the Austro-Hungarian constitutional sphere through the proclama-
tion of the December Constitution in 1867, which granted autonomy and freedoms to 
various parts of the empire.
The development of constitutionalism was accompanied by the development of 
parliamentarism as well as by the unprecedented political participation in the six-
teenth and seventeenth century. According to Richard Butterwick, the development 
of the political culture of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania was unmatched by 
the political culture of any other country as not only was it based on efficient Diet and 
dietines but also on active participation of large groups of nobility in the public life 
(Butterwick, 2005, 2007). The nobility made up 7 to 10 percent of the entire popula-
tion of Poland-Lithuania (in Mazovia region it reached up to 30 percent). Nobility was 
a numerous estate whose only foreign equivalent was Hungarian nobility. In contrast, 
only 5 percent of population received the vote in the 1832 Reform Act in England – the 
mother of parliamentarism.
Estate monarchies produced a long list of rules, regulations, privileges and rights 
that guaranteed freedoms and autonomy to subsequent estate, towns and guilds. 
Near the end of the Middle Ages, kings, princes and communities sought indepen-
dence from emperors and Popes. On the other hand, some sovereigns were strength-
ening their position by centralising their states. The nation states that emerged during 
that period were accompanied by three concepts: the state, sovereignty, and national 
interest. Machiavelli’s The Prince introduced the concept a modern state (lo stato). 
The theory of sovereignty and reason of state was discussed by Jean Bodin in his work 
The Six Books of the Republic. The formation of modern state was further facilitated 
by the Reformation, which led to multiple conflicts, religious wars and eventually 
prompted religious leaders to seek protection of princes and kings. In Protestant states 
kings protected a new Christian denomination provided they would head the new 
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churches. In Catholic states, to the contrary, the sovereign gained complete control 
of the country and church (josephinism, gallicanism). These processes accelerated 
changes and centralization of the emerging nation states and, as a result, absolutist 
monarchy became the prevailing system of governance in the seventeenth-century 
European nation states.
Some estate monarchies transformed in an evolutionary way. The Late Middle 
Ages witnessed a revival of classical literature; the lost works of Aristotle includ-
ing Politics were translated from Arabic in the thirteenth-century Florence area; the 
works of the Roman writers, Cicero, Polibius, Tacitus were back in the shelf. These 
trends facilitated the emergence of the city republics in Italy, especially Venice, in 
selected German towns and in the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands as well 
as in Russian Novgorod the Great. However, it was the Polish-Lithuanian Common-
wealth, which was the largest republican project in the world before the emergence of 
the United States of America.
The Jagiellon state, unlike the rest of Europe, did not know the cuius regio, eius religio 
rule; on the contrary, the motto for this part of Europe could be the famous words of 
King Sigismundus Augustus who famously declared in the Sejm: “I am not the king 
of your consciences.” The Jagiellon state did not suffer from religious persecution and 
remained a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state well into the eighteenth century. 
The state was conceived as a continuation of the Roman republican tradition, the 
respublica mixta, a state which was a political community of free citizens whose 
duty was to abide by law. All law making was accompanied by the deepest respect 
for Christian rules and principles. It was the Christian doctrine of love and mutual 
respect that translated into the concept of peaceful coexistence among nations as a 
doctrine in international law and politics. This pioneering notion was expressed by 
Paulus Vladimiri (ca. 1370-1435), rector of the Krakow Academy, when he spoke at the 
Council of Constance (1414-1418). It is thanks to adopting Christian principles in the 
public life and in legislature that natural law prevailed. While acknowledging the 
contribution of various countries to the development of parliamentary and consti-
tutional traditions, it is worthwhile remembering the extraordinary Polish heritage 
pertaining to this area of politics. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth turned out 
to be the precursor of numerous systematic solutions in state governance. It is an 
inspiration and a moving testimony to rich political culture.
Bibliography
Balzer, O. (2009). Geneza trybunału koronnego. Warszawa: Muzeum Historii Polski.
Bałuk-Ulewiczowa, T. (2009). Goslicius’ Ideal Senator and His Cultural Impact over the Centuries: 
Shakespearean Reflections. Polska Akademia Umiejętności: Kraków.
Bardach, J. (Ed.) (1997). Dzieje Sejmu Polskiego. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe.
Butterwick, R. (2005). Political Discourses of the Polish Revolution, 1788-1792. English Historical 
Review, 120.
Butterwick, R. (2007). I Rzeczpospolita dzisiaj. Pressje, 10-11.
122   Bibliography
Davies, N. (2013). God’s Playground. A History of Poland. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Frost, R. (2015). The Oxford History of Poland – Lithuania. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grodecki, R., Zachorowski, S. and Dąbrowski, J. (2011). Dzieje Polski średniowiecznej. Vols. 1-2. 
Krakow: Universitas.
Gutkowski, J. (1996). Sejm polski. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe.
Heck, R. (1997). Polska w okresie monarchii stanowej (1346-1454). Wybór tekstów źródłowych – 
fragmenty. In Wiek V-XV w źródłach. Wybór tekstów źródłowych z propozycjami metodycznymi 
nauczycieli historii i studentów, ed. Melania Sobańska-Bondaruk, Stanisław Bogusław Lenard. 
Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Kaczmarczyk, Z., and Leśnodorski, B. (1957). Historia państwa i prawa Polski od połowy XV w. do r. 
1795. Warszaw: PWN.
Kaczorowski, P. (2006). Nauka o państwie. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo SGH.
Kallas, M. (1996). Historia ustroju Polski X-XX w. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Konopczyński, W. (1948). Chronologia sejmów polskich 1493–1793. Kraków.
Konstytucje Rzeczypospolitej XVI – XX wiek, Trybunał Konstytucyjny, Warszawa, 
www.trybunal.gov.pl;http://wszechnica.trybunal.gov.pl/Konstytucje%20RP_wystawa.pdf; Accessed 
on 30.09.2015.
Lewandowska-Malec, I. (2009). Sejm walny koronny Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów i jego 
dorobek ustawodawczy. Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka.
Michalski, J. (1984). Historia sejmu polskiego. Vol. 1. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.
Tomaszewska, E. (Ed.) (2009). Poland. The Heritage of Pariamentarism until 1791. Brussels.
Uruszczak, W. (2015). Historia prawa i państwa polskiego. Wolters Kluwer: Warszawa. 
Uruszczak, W., Baran, K., Karabowicz, A. (Eds.) (2007). Podział władzy i parlamentaryzm w 
przeszłości i współcześnie: prawo, doktryna, praktyka: 500 rocznica konstytucji Nihil novi 
z 1505 r.: 56 Konferencja Międzynarodowej Komisji Historii Instytucji Reprezentatywnych 
i Parlamentarnych w Krakowie i Radomiu, (5-8 września 2005). Warszawa: Wydawnictwo 
Sejmowe.
Witusik, A. (Ed.) (2004). Unia Lubelska 1569 roku w dziejach Polski i Europy. Lublin.
Igor D. Osipov1 and Leonid V. Smorgunov2
9  Russian Constitutionalism
The conceptualization of the theoretical and ideological foundations of constitution-
alism is related to specific aspects of the methodology of humanities and, in particular, 
philosophy. The discussion of philosophical and legal premises of the constitutional 
process not only touches on legal and political issues, but also raises philosophical 
and ideological issues. The principles of the rule of law, democracy, separation of 
powers, civil society, inalienable rights and freedoms developed in philosophy and 
embodied in modern constitutions are an important criterion for assessing the level 
of development of the state and social progress. The political and legal aspects of 
development that were previously inherent in European societies have now turned 
into an international norm. First of all, this is the case with constitutionalism, which 
is comparable with the paradigm of a social ideal of society. The idea of a rational and 
harmonious society and state can be found as early as the works of Plato and Aristo-
tle. The Hellenes distinguished between political integrity and the basic principles of 
its organization and existence. The Romans, in turn, stressed the visual materiality of 
the natural, artificial and abstract political orders.
In the Modern Age in Western Europe, the idea of constitution was interpreted 
using the expressions, such as “form”, “composition” and “association of republics.” 
In 1733, Lord Bolingbroke gave a classic definition of constitution as follows: “By con-
stitution we mean, whenever we speak with propriety and exactness, that assemblage 
of laws, institutions and customs, derived from certain fixed principles of reason, 
directed to certain fixed objects of public good, that comprise the general system, 
according to which the communality hath agreed to be governed” (Bolingbroke, 1809, 
p.157). Theoretical and practical philosophies converge in the concept of constitution 
as an idea of reasonable structure of society to unlock the creative potential of the 
pragmatic philosophy. The Age of Enlightenment saw the development of theoretical 
foundations of the modern rule-of-law state, democracy and civil society. A rational 
view on society has given rise to the philosophy of law as a theoretical premise for 
the modern constitutionalism. In general, a philosophical analysis of the concept of 
“constitution” can identify global trends in the development of human society as a 
culture and civilization.
In Russia, the constitutional ideas emerged in the first half of the 17th century, 
were developed to some extent in the 18th century, in particular during the enlight-
ened monarchy of Catherine II, and became more or less completely established in 
the 19th and early 20th centuries. Typical in this respect are the constitutional ideas 
1  St. Petersburg State University.
2  St. Petersburg State University.
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held during the reign of Alexander I in the first third of the 19th century. Those devel-
oped into the so-called noble constitutionalism, which manifested itself in activities 
of the Chancellor Alexander Vorontsov and projects of Mikhail Speransky, as well as 
the constitutional projects of the Decembrists Nikita Muravyov and Pavel Pestel. The 
second wave of interest in constitution took place in the second half of the 1850s, 
especially during the reforms of Alexander II. Finally, the first Russian revolution of 
1905 and all related movements for political representation and limitation of the mon-
archy put the issue of constitution back on the agenda. Despite the availability of 
constitutions during the Soviet period, constitutionalism developed as a theoretical 
movement and constitution action as late as the 1960s and thereafter, albeit its philo-
sophical and ideological foundations had been laid by the constitutions of the 1920s 
and 1930s (and related debates). Some scholars refer to the “nominal constitutional-
ism” during the Soviet times (Kravets, 2005, p.95; Medushevsky, 2015, pp.121-122), but 
we see this as roughening the situation and consider Soviet constitutionalism as a 
freestanding rather than a nominal phenomenon. In addition to the official Soviet 
constitutionalism, there were constitutional ideas of the dissident movement and 
legal liberalism during the perestroika period, which, in a sense, create a platform for 
the modern constitutionalism. However, the adoption and application of the Consti-
tution of 1993 added special dynamics to the understanding of the modern constitu-
tionalism in Russia. 
Russian constitutionalism is one of the topics presented in Russian studies. 
A  picture of Russian constitutionalism in the history of imperial Russia is pretty 
good considered. Especially it is noticeable in the works on the history of Russian 
liberalism (Fisher, 1958; Walicki, 1992; Hamburg, 1992; Balmuth, 2000), though some 
research expresses scepticism to the ideas of constitutionalism during the period in 
question (Dorosh, 1944; Sanders, 1992). Of course, the attention of researchers has 
been attracted to the events of 1905-06, when constitutionalism and political ideas 
were embodied in a number of institutional reforms of autocracy (Hosking, 1973; 
Fröhlich, 1981; Weber, 1995; Enticott, 2016). The study of Soviet constitutions is also 
variegated; here the notable works are those related to the display of the limits of 
constitutionalism under socialism (Brecht, 1937; Unger, 1981). The study of modern 
Russian constitutionalism is held in line with the theories of post-Soviet transit. Much 
attention has been paid to the general description of the constitutional foundations 
of the post-Soviet development of Russia (Sharlet, 1993; Ordeshook, 1997; Clark, 1998; 
Henderson, 2011). Special consideration has been paid to the themes of constitution 
and the presidency, the interaction of religion and state, federal structure, and con-
stitutional review (Brzezinski, 1993; Sharlet, 1994; Fogelklou, 2003; Scheppele, 2003; 
Basil, 2009; Flere, Lavrič, Djordjevič, 2016). Additionally, there are works on the com-
parative analysis of concepts, rhetoric and genre of the Soviet and modern Russian 
constitutions (Ruutu, 2010; Schmid, 2010).
This essay outlines the development of constitutional ideas in Russia, representing 
Russian constitutionalism from the perspective of ideas-movements accompanying 
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the organization of Russian society in the state, including the opposition to it, rather 
than in a historical vein. In this respect, modern constitutionalism in Russia can be 
seen as mixing pre-revolutionary traditions of liberalism (mostly liberal conserva-
tism), the Soviet legal consciousness and pragmatic attitudes of political struggle in 
the transitional period. In a sense, the authors of the article employ the methodologi-
cal approach of “path dependence,” choosing to analyze the three main periods of 
Russian constitutionalism, when it became not just a wish, but was put into political 
practice. In this way, philosophy of law and the relation to the constitutional ideas 
of the 19th and early 20th centuries are accompanied by attempts to institutional 
and legal reforms in the history of imperial Russia under Alexander I, Alexander II, 
and Nikolay II. Soviet constitutionalism, rejecting the liberal trend of Russian con-
stitutionalism, forced yet to establish legality and laws, albeit in a specific form. As 
Peter Ordeshook writes, “constitutions matter even for states without a democratic 
tradition” (Ordeshook, 1997, p.50). The current Russian constitutionalism remains 
controversial and incorporates many of the previous constitutional moods. Dissident 
constitutional ideas, which are also referred to in this article, only partly provided an 
ideological basis of modern constitutional history of Russia. In any case, the idea of 
Russian constitutionalism was an important engine for the organization of a state and 
public life. In general, we can agree with Ulrich Schmid that “constitutional narrative 
with its implicit genre and rhetoric must be understood as the core of the identity of 
any given society that chooses to organize itself through legal procedures within the 
framework of a state” (Schmid, 2010, p.450). 
9.1  Philosophy of Law and Constitutional Ideas in the 19th and 
Early 20th Centuries
The concept of constitution reflects not only the universal, but also individual things 
in life that are driven by social traditions and customs. This includes the basic values 
of society that prescribe a certain way of taking top positions and the scope of their 
authority, and also grant the right to use force. What is important is that as the basic 
law, the constitution is linked to the value-based structure of the society. Constitu-
tions of modern states are specific and distinct in terms of history and culture; hence 
they have some national specificity. This is confirmed by a great diversity of consti-
tutional norms and provisions, revealing the creative potential of constitutionalism 
as a process of concretization through the practical implementation of its provisions. 
The development of state institutions depends on the political culture and people’s 
mentality that have been shaped over centuries. One of the prominent Russian con-
stitutionalist lawyers of the early 20th century Vladimir Geriye wrote: “Is there any 
absolute constitutional law binding on all countries and in all times? Are politics (in 
the sense of governance of the state) an abstract theory, rather than a live art which 
126   Russian Constitutionalism
should proceed from and conform to the reality as any other art does?” (Geriye, 1996, 
p.140). The constitutional process should take into account not only the panhuman 
content of the constitution, but also specific conditions in which constitutional pro-
visions are drafted, given the system of values in the mentality of the people in a 
particular society. This comprises the rational aspect of constitutionalism as a real 
problem of state-building that requires that close attention be given to axiological and 
spiritual foundations of the rule of law.
In Russia, the current constitutional process is to some extent similar to what was 
the case before the revolution when Russia had a strong law school that was famous 
in Europe, with outstanding representatives such as Alexander Gradovsky, Maxim 
Kovalevsky and Sergey Muromtsev. In our opinion, however, the tradition of the phi-
losophy of constitutionalism in Russia begins with Mikhail Speransky – close associ-
ate of Alexander I during the period of his liberal reforms. Speransky is the author of 
the first Russian textbook on constitutional law and made a significant contribution 
not only to the development of the theory of constitutionalism, but also to the practi-
cal creation of the legal and constitutional order based on the European and Russian 
standards and principles of political science.
The Russian philosophy of constitutionalism discussed problems such as the 
abolition of serfdom and building a class-free society, and offered two most common 
interpretations of constitution: constitution as the basic law of a country and as a 
law that protects the society from unlawful actions of the state power. Accordingly, 
we can say that the Russian philosophy of law has the “constitutionalism of love” for 
and confidence in the state and the constitutionalism of apprehension of the state as 
a threat to the development of law and freedom in society. Different philosophical and 
legal doctrines were developed by solving these issues.
The first one was liberal, with different individual stages of development. In 
general, liberal constitutionalism recognized the importance of personal rights along 
with voluntary self-limitation of the autocracy. Speransky played an important role 
in the establishment of this line of constitutionalism. In the first decades of the 19th 
century, he called for the vertical and horizontal separation of powers and the superi-
ority of law with specific features determined by the actual conditions of development 
of Russia. Those included the development of ethics of law and power, the preserva-
tion of personal freedoms in the economy and private ownership, as well as legal 
education of people and availability of national code of laws and autocracy.
What was of fundamental importance to Speransky is the step-by-step nature of 
the constitutional process in Russia. He believed that “one of the main rules for gov-
ernors is to know their people, know the time” (Speransky, 2002, p.261). This knowl-
edge will help implement reasonable constitutional reforms, while maintaining the 
autocracy; and the limits of the autocratic power should be set by itself “by treaties of 
the government from the outside and by the imperial word from within” (Speransky, 
2002, p.61). According to Speransky, “the Russian Constitution will be brought into 
being not by the inflamed passions or extreme circumstances, but by the beneficent 
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inspiration of the supreme power, which, having arranged the political being of its 
people, can shape it appropriately and has all the means to do that” (Speransky, 2002, 
p.342). Speransky’s ideas not surprisingly met with resistance from conservatives, 
who viewed them as too radical. As noted by David Sanders, “if these were the objec-
tives towards which Speransky was striving, in the Russian context he was a red-hot 
radical… He called his goal ‘true monarchical government’ – the monarchy of Montes-
quieu rather than the monarchy of the tzars” (Sanders, 1992, p.63).
The liberal form of constitutionalism was relatively underdeveloped in Russia. 
A more fundamental type of constitutionalism was the one that brought together the 
requirement for personal freedom and traditional values of Russian society. It can be 
described as liberal-conservative. This kind of Russian liberalism has been woken up 
to political activity after the death of Nicholas I, and the expectation of the reforms of 
Alexander II. Obvious representatives of conservative liberalism in the mid- to later-
19th century were Konstantin Kavelin and Boris Chicherin, and the beginning of the 
20th century, Pyotr Struve.
A representative of this type of constitutionalism, a prominent Russian lawyer, 
professor at Moscow University, and later the St. Petersburg University, Kavelin 
explored the problem of constitutionalism in the context of development of a people’s 
monarchy or autocratic republic (Kavelin, 2008, p.261). He was questioned and found 
wanting the ideas of noble constitutionalism and people’s representation. According 
to Kavelin, the constitutionality of the people’s monarchy was based on the unity 
of the tsar and the people, expressed through a combination of the rule of law and 
local initiatives. He distinguished between constitution in the broad and narrow 
sense. In his work entitled “The Nobility and Liberation of Peasants,” he wrote: “In 
the broad sense, constitution is understood as any proper structure of the state and 
society, which is based on reasonable, invariable foundations and laws – a structure 
that leaves no room for arbitrary action and where the identity, property and rights of 
each and every one are secured and inviolable” (Kavelin, 1989, p.151). In the narrow 
(“tight”) sense of the word, he understood constitution as a political order based on 
the representation of interests and separation of powers (Kavelin, 1989, p.152). Thus, 
Russia first of all has to realize the need for a constitution in the broad sense of the 
word. He was more interested in the interior improvements than in representative 
governance. He believed that there was a need for “a strong and well-structured court, 
the freedom of speech, and the transfer of the administration of everything that is not 
directly concerned with the unity of the state to local communities. There is a need for 
a constitution in the broad sense. It is necessary to create a structure of the state based 
on reasonable foundations and laws that would leave no room for arbitrary action 
and property, and other rights of individuals are inviolable” (Kavelin, 1989, p.152).
A professor of Moscow University, Chicherin spoke of a constitutional monarchy 
governed by the rule of law. This understanding came to him as a result of his assess-
ment of the development of Western liberalism. Chicherin scholar Gary Hamburg 
shows the evolution of such views and political positions: “Chicherin’s development 
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from pre-emancipation liberal into post-emancipation conservative liberal was rather 
the result of his continuing articulation of the conservative elements latent within 
juste-milieu liberalism… In Chicherin’s understanding, European liberalism entailed 
hostility to revolutionary utopianism, rejection of arbitrariness, and adherence to the 
rule of law. Therefore, Chicherin could be quite sincere in equating ‘true liberalism’, 
‘conservative liberalism’, and ‘rational conservatism’” (Hamburg, 1999, p.271). In this 
case, constitutionality meant representative governance combined with the will of 
the monarch. As Chicherin wrote: “It also follows from the essence of the matter that 
only constitutional monarchy is a perfect representative structure for Russia. There 
should be no doubt for us what should be chosen between the two forms that embody 
political freedom – limited monarchy or republic” (Chicherin, 1998, p.508). For him, 
the basis of the state which “is a product of national identity” is not the ends, but 
the means. The goal is to preserve a strong and effective structure of the state, while 
ensuring that government will not interfere with the economy. Much in this field 
should be given for free activity of man. Chicherin’s philosophy of law was based on 
the unity of freedom and power and considered “a free man in a free society” and “a 
balanced democracy” as an ideal. 
Finally, worth mentioning here is the philosophy of law offered by Pyotr Struve. 
Struve has moved from legal Marxism in the late 19th century to the conservative lib-
eralism of the early 20th century. His philosophy was based on the ideas of the pres-
ervation of the power of Russia as an empire. For him, constitutionalism was closely 
related to patriotism, recognition of the priority of the basis of the state, and protection 
of individual rights and freedoms. According to Struve, “With people who have come 
to movement, whose constitution was born from the spirit of patriotism disturbed by 
severe state losses rather than from radicalism inspired from the outside, you cannot 
achieve anything by a simple order of the power” (Struve, 1997, p.61). Another impor-
tant postulate of Struve’s philosophy was the one about personal suitability – the 
discipline of work for all the social strata. “The ruling circles should know that if great 
Russia is to come out of great upheavals, then you need a creative feat of all of the 
people,” he wrote (Struve, 1997, p.55). Struve and other outstanding representatives of 
this school, such as N. I. Kareev, S. A. Muromtsev, V. I. Geriye, M. M. Kovalevsky, E. N. 
Trubetskoy, and other prominent Russian lawyers, contributed to the creation of the 
Constitutional Democratic Party who had developed the Russian constitution in the 
early 20th century. Let us also note that the thinkers of this philosophy of law were 
positive about the European experience of constitutionalism. 
The third point of view on constitutionalism was presented by conservatism in 
the views of M. N. Katkov, I. S. Aksakov, V.N. Leshkov, L. A. Tikhomirov, K. N. Leontiev, 
K. P. Pobedonostsev, and P. A. Stolypin. The key value of conservatism was that of the 
public order and power, while denying the need for a constitution that limits state 
power. In conservatism, the philosophy of law put emphasis on traditions, customs, 
the moral content of law, the synthesis of the Orthodoxy and the state in the political 
system, the denial of democracy, and the rule of law in the form developed in Western 
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Europe. Conservatism criticized the formalism of constitution as a text, while affirm-
ing the actual structure of the state – autocracy in this case. Political realities were 
understood on the basis of the principle of the unity of land and the tsar. In legal 
sense, this manifested itself in the supremacy of the autocratic power and duties to 
it. As Mikhail Katkov put it, “the duties already comprise rights, the duties are always 
accompanied with rights…A right that is not covered by a duty is easily brought far 
ahead, leaving the baggage of duties behind. The promises to give us a constitution 
are baseless – the constitution is already there in our oath to the state which obliges 
every Russian citizen to take care of the benefits of the Emperor and the state” (Katkov, 
2008, p.323).
At the same time, conservatism assumed the functional separation of powers, 
while maintaining the dominant role of the autocracy in the state. From this perspec-
tive, human rights, democracy and independence of the court were subject to the 
principles of state law. In general, the conservative constitutionalism underlined the 
need for maintaining the unity of the Russian state, traditions, the way of life and 
religious principles in the society. Therefore, the criticism of the Manifesto of October 
17 – the basic laws of 1906 (which, in fact, were the first Russian constitution) by the 
conservatives seems to be logical.
Finally, the fourth school of Russian constitutionalism is radicalism: the narod-
nik movement and Marxism. Without denying the idea of constitutionalism in prin-
ciple, the narodniks Pyotr Lavrov and Pyotr Tkachev supplemented it with a provi-
sion on the need to protect the rights of the peasantry. In Russian Marxism, the same 
approach took the form of the class-based concept of law and state, defending the 
rights of the working class. The right to work and social security was an important 
premise for the concept of state and law in radicalism. It is only notionally that the 
philosophy of law in revolutionary socialism (Alexander Herzen, Mikhail Bakunin, 
Nikolai Chernyshevsky) can be referred to as law-related. It criticized the formalism of 
the constitutional law of the bourgeoisie, was, to a certain extent, socially egalitarian, 
and supported the ethics of social justice. Alexander Herzen wrote: “What respect can 
we have for your Roman-Barbarian rule of law – an awkward building without light 
and air that was renovated in the Middle Ages and whitewashed by the emancipated 
petty bourgeoisie? I agree that the daylight robbery in the Russian courts got even 
worse, but this does not mean that your laws and courts provide justice” (Herzen, 
2012, p.475). If they talked of a new constitutional order, it was the one based on 
morality, ancestry, statelessness and natural justice. In Statism and Anarchy, Mikhail 
Bakunin pointed out that no constitution, even the most liberal and democratic one, 
can eliminate the contradiction between the people and the imperial state in Russia. 
“There is only one constitution that people can benefit from. It is the destruction of 
the empire” (Bakunin, 1989, p.356).
To summarize the discussion on the philosophy of constitutionalism before the 
revolution, we must admit that all the political parties that contributed to the con-
stitutional process in pre-revolutionary Russia were uncompromising and lacked 
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confidence in each other. However, Speransky wrote that the constitution should be 
based on a compromise between various social forces. Unfortunately, the pre-revolu-
tionary Russian political elite did not have enough political wisdom, which had led to 
revolutions. It should also be noted that the pre-revolutionary society demonstrated 
low levels of political and legal consciousness, legal nihilism of the authorities, intel-
ligentsia and bureaucracy. The society clearly lacked a ‘normal’ sense of justice, a 
culture of freedom in combination with responsibility, and a civil society supported 
by an appropriate legal culture. In addition, the constitutionalism in Russia was influ-
enced by paternalism in the perception of power. The tsar was seen as the symbol 
of the highest truth and justice, while public servants, in the opinion of the intel-
ligentsia, were the ones who concealed the truth both from the people and the tsar, 
hampering the communication between the people and the ruler. 
9.2  Ideas of Soviet Constitutionalism
The Constitution of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic of 1918 was 
developed and adopted in the period that the Soviet historiography refers to as “war 
communism.” This was the first constitution to lay down the structure of the state 
of the soviet type, although its significance is not only related to state regulations. 
It was the war communism that left a serious imprint on its content and form. The 
linkage between constitutional issues and policies was not accidental. On the whole, 
one must agree with Katja Ruutu that Soviet and Russian conceptual history of con-
stitutions is more multifaceted and more political in nature than commonly thought 
(Ruutu, 2010, p.77). The constitutions of the USSR subsequently adopted in 1924, 
1936, and 1977 maintained a certain ideological continuity. The Constitution of 1918 
mainly expresses the philosophy of law in the period of “immediate construction of 
communism” using military and political means. However, the general principles of 
constitutional building established at that time were, to one extent or another, repro-
duced in the Soviet constitutions of later periods.
Historically, the “war communism” coincided with the first political period of 
socialist construction. On the one hand, war communism policy was determined by 
specific causes that contributed to the development of a revolution in the context 
of the civil war, foreign military intervention and economic devastation. In terms of 
material production and distribution, this period was characterized by the follow-
ing policies: requisition of agricultural surpluses from peasants by the state either 
partially in exchange for food or for free as a payment for the protection against res-
toration of landowners’ estates; nationalization of the industry by the Soviet state 
and the introduction of strict centralized management (glavkizm); class-based ration-
ing of food on the principle of “he who does not work shall not eat”; private trade 
banned; provision of the population with food and consumer goods almost for free, in 
exchange for work (wage naturalization); rigorous control of the quantity and quality 
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of the output and egalitarian distribution; money replaced by barter (“withering away 
of money”); engaging all the able-bodied population in work on the basis of labor 
conscription (the militarization of labor) (Berkhin, 1970; Gimpelson, 1973). On the 
other hand, this policy was often interpreted not only as a coercive measure, but also 
as a means of socialist construction. 
In 1921, Vladimir Lenin admitted that the ideological origins of the transition to 
communism were associated not only with the spirit of war, but also, to a great extent, 
with the overall theoretical platform of the Bolsheviks before and after October 1917. 
At that time, the theory of socialism was developed as a radical negation of capitalism 
and immediate socialist construction. At the seventh Moscow Gubernia Party Confer-
ence, Lenin said that “If you remember the statements, both official and unofficial, 
that our party made between late 1917 and early 1918, you will see that even then 
we expected that the development of the revolution, the development of the struggle 
might be either relatively short or very long and difficult. But when we assessed the 
possible development, we proceeded for the most part (I do not even remember any 
exception) from the assumptions that were perhaps not always openly expressed, but 
always tacitly assumed – the assumptions regarding the direct transition to socialist 
construction” (Lenin, 1974, p.197). The ideology of immediate construction of social-
ism using radical means has left its imprint on the understanding of many processes, 
including the constitution-building process. A member of the Constitutional Commis-
sion in 1918, and a member of the Bolshevik faction in the All-Russian Central Execu-
tive Committee, Mikhail Pokrovsky eloquently wrote about this period as follows: “It 
seemed what we were able to do so brilliantly on the military front, we would also be 
able to do in public education and in the economy… I will say this frankly, because this 
is something that I experienced myself: we were besotted with this speed. It moved 
at such a pace that it seemed we were very close to communism – the communism 
created by our own means, without waiting for the victory of the proletarian revolu-
tion in the West” (Lunacharsky, Pokrovsky, 1925, p.21). Another member of the Con-
stitutional Commission of the Bolsheviks Nikolai Bukharin confirmed that the “war 
communism” was not conceived as “military,” that is, only suitable at a certain stage 
of the civil war, but it was seen as a universal, general and normal form of economic 
policy of the victorious proletariat (Bukharin, 1924, p.4).
The revolutionary sense of justice was based on the positivist attitudes to law as 
an expression of the public will. At the same time, powers of the state were viewed 
from the perspective of classes. Law was established by the state as a tool for the 
regulation of social relations for the benefit of the ruling class. Justice was seen as the 
will of the ruling class given the force of law. No natural justice was recognized, and 
positive law was a rational tool for resolving political problems. The old bourgeois 
law, as well as the state, was considered as an expression of the will of the bourgeoi-
sie and had to be destroyed in the context of the socialist revolution. In this respect, 
it was believed that the ruling will should not be limited or subjected to assessment 
in terms of the universal legal justice. Laws approved and supported by the power of 
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the state were considered equitable if they were in line with the revolutionary tasks 
of the proletariat, that is, the tasks of overthrowing capital and establishing social-
ism. The principle of the rule of law was seen as a relic of the religious consciousness 
that was formally expressed by bourgeois democracy. This is how the principle was 
assessed by the well-known legal expert of the time Evgeniy Pashukanis: “The rule of 
law is a mirage, but it is a mirage that is very convenient for the bourgeoisie, because 
it replaces the weathered religious ideology” (Pashukanis, 1924, p.111). 
The negation of the natural legal philosophy was accompanied by the criticism 
of the contractual concepts of law and the rule-of-law state. It was believed that a 
contract only established a formal equality of the parties, while actually they were 
unequal and one class exploited the other. Therefore, contractual law was deemed 
false and needed to be abolished. It was argued that legal relations were abstract and 
therefore the creation of a legal superstructure must be based on the real relations. 
This attitude gave rise to a problem of balance between expediency and law. Razu-
movsky wrote, “Formalism in both the understanding and application of the legal 
form becomes harmful when it comes to expediency. You should not confuse the legal 
possibility given by formal equality and its actual use. A legal rule put forward as a 
principle by the proletariat who use it can make sense in its legal abstraction, as a 
legal guarantee protecting the right of the minority, etc. But it must not be identified 
with its practical use” (Razumovsky, 1926, p.48).
Revolutionary legality was based on the subordination of law to politics and 
revolutionary expediency. The instrumental nature of law was supplemented by the 
principle of relativism, where law did not justify the recognition and sustainability as 
such and thus was seen as a volatile structure that was constantly changing under 
the influence of revolutionary goals. In this case, there was no need for constitutional 
supervision and control, because the constitution is not long-term, but is subject to 
the revolutionary process of change. According to one of the developers of the first 
Soviet Constitution Professor Mikhail Reisner, Russia needed a flexible and versatile 
constitution that would not allow for “fixing upon fossilized forms.” To this end, it 
was “built not on the basis of legal law, but rather on the basis of expediency and 
teleology that allow for filling it with any content”. He further emphasized that “when 
we say that our constitution is based on the idea of purpose and expediency, we mean 
that our basic law does not embody immobility and dead justice ... but rather repre-
sents a blueprint, a plan of social construction ... And such a plan does not purport 
to be infallible.” “Accordingly, our attitude to the basic law, or constitution, will be 
completely different from that found in the case of a strictly law-based constitution. 
While in the latter case, the main task is to interpret and apply a law that has been 
established once and forever and then customize any other or absolutely new cases 
to fit it, we, in the first place, have to continuously criticize and work to improve the 
constitutional law,” concludes Reisner (quoted in Mityukov, 1996, p.11).
The Soviet Constitution of 1918 was developed in the context of the development 
and reinforcement of the so-called revolutionary legality that had to serve the tasks 
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of the immediate construction of socialism using military and political means. At the 
same time, it was a historically significant event, as it was the first Russian constitu-
tion that defined the structure of the state in the form of a system of soviets and the 
goal of political development – building socialism. It was constituent in nature, since 
it provided a basis for shaping the political and legal realities of the time. The consti-
tution was a political instrument laying down the tasks of the authorities and mobiliz-
ing to achieve them. It was of legal significance, because regardless of many illusion-
ary and non-legal aspects, it still served as a regulatory basis for building the main 
branches of Soviet law (such as criminal, civil, administrative, budgetary, and elec-
toral). Many modern scholars still underline that the Constitution of 1918 was mainly 
political and ideological, as it rather enshrined a new kind, and the target function, 
of government and imposed the ideology of the Bolshevist party in the form of the 
basic law (Brzezinski, 1993, p.673). The first Soviet Russian Constitution adopted in 
June 1918 had six sections, 17 chapters and 90 articles. It was based on the following 
key principles: (1) the unity of power in the form of soviets; (2) the class-based prin-
ciple of organization of power and administration: the dictatorship of the proletariat 
and the poorest peasantry; (3) the federal, nationality-based structure of the state; 
(4) the unity of rights and duties of citizens of the Soviet Republic; (5) the socialist 
nature of the social structure and the policy of the Soviet power in Russia; and (6) 
free self-determination of nations, proletarian internationalism and the democratic 
world of workers. The constitution adopted in 1924 and the constitutions of the Union 
Republics adopted on its basis in general continued the traditions of constitutional-
ism established by the first Soviet Constitution of 1918. 
Constitutionalism of the victorious socialism expressed in the Soviet Constitu-
tion of 1936 is also built on the class-based principle of law as an expression of the 
will of the ruling class. Ideological constitutionality of that period is based on the 
idea of abolishing the exploiting classes and expanding the social foundation of the 
power as an alliance between the working class and the peasantry, strengthening the 
position of the Communist Party and denying political pluralism. In contrast to the 
previous period of constitutional development, the constitutionalism of the victori-
ous socialism affirms the universal and equal suffrage, emphasizes the unity of the 
social and economic rights secured by the Constitution, and does not recognize any 
bourgeois political rights. In addition, it affirms the conditional nature of the idea of 
withering away of the state under communism and reinforcement of the foundations 
of the socialist state. 
Up until the early 1960s, the Soviet constitutionalism was influenced by Stalin’s 
Constitution of 1936 and its main characteristics given by Stalin in his report “On the 
Draft Constitution of the USSR in 1936” (Stalin, 1939, pp.507-534). The denunciation 
of the cult of Stalin in 1956 along with further steps to eliminate recessions of Stalin-
ism gave rise to the idea of drafting a new constitution that would be based on the 
idea of socialist legality and law. This resulted in the development of the foundations 
of “socialist constitutionalism.” Notably, before the early 1960s, the term “socialist 
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constitutionalism” was actually identified with the concept of “constitutional law” 
and was not developed as an independent phenomenon (Topornin, 1981, p.48). In 
April 1962, it was decided to draft a new Constitution of the USSR and the Constitu-
tional Commission was established. Although worked on rigorously, the new consti-
tution was not adopted in 1967 as planned due to both domestic and international 
constraints. It was only in 1977 that a new constitution was adopted to lay down the 
constitutional principles of developed socialism. The new Soviet constitutionalism 
adopted the general ideological basis of the previous constitutions, but modified a 
few fundamental ideas of the constitutional order. First of all, this involved abandon-
ing the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat and replacing it with the idea of the 
state of the whole people. Although underlining the class-based nature of the state of 
the whole people, it was rather an assertion of the continuity of the development than 
an emphasis on the outlook for activity. The constitution enshrined the leading role 
of the Communist Party that, according to the ideology of Soviet constitutionalism, 
has become an important principle of the political system, as well as the state of the 
whole people and the Soviet people as a new historical community. It asserts the prin-
ciple of “democratic centralism” as the basis for building and operation of the state 
of the whole people. The constitutionalism of the late Soviet regime demonstrated 
some softening of the original principles, however it did not get rid of obvious contra-
dictions in the interpretation of the balance between law and politics. In its socialist 
version, the idea of the rule of law was distorted by the monopoly of a single political 
force that was actually substituted for the state power.
9.3  Constitutional Ideas of the Human Rights Movement in the 
USSR
In the USSR, the human rights movement emerged in the forefront of perestroika and 
glasnost, which were in many respects driven by the so-called “Khrushchev Thaw”. 
The human rights movement is divided into a few different stages: the infancy (1965-
1972); the crisis and broad international recognition (1973-1975); and the Helsinki 
period (1976-1985). The history of the human rights movement is usually counted 
from the demonstration that took place in Pushkin Square in Moscow on December 5, 
1965, and the trial against Russian writers Sinyavsky and Daniel (1966) who published 
the book “Progulki s Pushkinym” [Walks with Pushkin] in the West in 1965 and were 
charged with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. The most famous event in the 
history of the human rights movement is the trial of 21 members of the All-Russian 
Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People (February – December 1967) 
and the publication of the bulletin Khronika Tekushchikh Sobytiy [The Chronicle of 
Current Events] (Moscow, 1968-1983, compiled by N.E. Gorbanevskaya et. al). Impor-
tant events during the infancy of the human rights movement include a demonstration 
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in Red Square against the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact (1968), and 
the establishment of the Committee on Human Rights in the USSR (1970). 
The Helsinki period was marked by activities related to implementing the require-
ments of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (1975) which provided for the respect of civil, political and personal human 
rights. This resulted in the establishment of the Moscow Helsinki Group and similar 
groups in Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia and other republics to supervise the imple-
mentation of these provisions in the USSR. In late 1979, the human rights movement 
launched a campaign against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The human rights 
movement involved a few hundred or perhaps a few thousand people. 
The ideology of the human rights movement was reflected in a number of pub-
lications, such as The Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual 
Freedom, by Andrei Sakharov, Live Not By Lies and The Letter to the Soviet Leaders, 
by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and a collection of articles entitled “From Under the 
Rubble” contributed by Mikhail Agursky, Evgeny Barabanov, Vadim Borisov, Mikhail 
Polivanov, Feliks Svetov, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, and Igor Shafarevich. Their politi-
cal views were in many respects driven by the radical denial of the values of social-
ism. Igor Shafarevich wrote: “Economic and social demands of socialism are means 
for achieving its main goal being the destruction of individuality” (Shafarevich, 1992, 
p.50). The authors put a great deal of focus on the history of Russia, the Russian 
national consciousness and self-consciousness of the Russian intelligentsia. They 
often cited pre-revolutionary Russian thinkers, such as Sergei Bulgakov, Alexander 
Herzen and Fyodor Dostoevsky, as well as famous publications “Vekhi” and “Smena 
Vekh.” The human rights movement was not ideologically homogeneous, bringing 
together various currents, including civil movements advocating for human rights 
with legitimate means within the framework of the Constitution, religious movements 
(Adventists, Pentecostals, Orthodox Pochvenniki (from pochva, meaning soil), and 
national movements. 
In general, the importance of the human rights movement is determined by the 
development of values of civil society and true democracy, human rights, and the 
formation of public opinion. These values have been an important prerequisite for 
the subsequent changes in the USSR. The liberal conception of natural human rights 
was in line with the individualistic outlook of the Soviet intelligentsia, but it was not 
consistent with the Marxist ideology that ontologically denies the idea of inalienable 
human rights. The dissemination of the value of human rights in the Soviet society 
has significantly contributed to the subsequent radical social and spiritual changes. 
These ideas were in many respects associated with the development of consti-
tutional awareness in the USSR. In some cases, the human rights movement pro-
claimed the need to observe some important provisions of the Soviet Constitution of 
1977, in particular on publicity, the rule of the people, and the right of nations to self-
determination. What was meant here is that the constitutional provisions should be 
brought into line with the social realities of the time. This, in itself, caused a conflict 
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between the regime and the intelligentsia. In addition, the human rights movement 
put forward concepts that were beyond its scope (such as private property). 
This largely manifested itself in the human rights activities of Andrei, a 1975 
recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize and the People’s Deputy of the USSR. In 1966-1967, 
he started his human rights activities and issued his first addresses for the protec-
tion of political and civil rights of the Soviet people. In 1968, Sakharov published his 
article entitled “The Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual 
Freedom.” The main idea is that mankind is close to a critical point in its history, 
facing the danger of thermonuclear destruction, environmental poisoning, hunger 
and uncontrolled population explosion. These dangers are enhanced by the division 
of the world and the opposition between the socialist and capitalist camps. 
The ideological starting point of Sakharov’s liberal position is in line with the tra-
dition of Western liberalism: to start with the anthropological premise of freedom and 
autonomy of an individual and the priority of their inalienable rights. All the subse-
quent social characteristics and definitions of society and progress (in the technical, 
economic and socio-political senses) derive from this basic foundation. However, it is 
not economic or social, but civil and political human rights that are most important, 
enabling an individual to take a proactive approach to the outside world. In his Nobel 
acceptance speech Sakharov said, “I am convinced that international trust, mutual 
understanding, disarmament and international security are inconceivable without 
an open society with freedom of information, freedom of conscience, the right to 
publish, the right to travel and choose the country one wishes to live in. I am also 
convinced that freedom of conscience, together with other civic rights, provide both 
the basis for scientific progress and a guarantee against its misuse to harm mankind, 
as well as the basis for economic and social progress. They also constitute a political 
guarantee that makes the effective defence of social rights possible. In addition, I will 
defend the thesis of the primary and decisive significance of civil and political rights 
in shaping the destiny of mankind” (Sakharov, 1990, p.50). 
Already early speeches and articles of Andrei Sakharov showed the main thrust of 
his ideas: to defend social, economic, political and cultural human rights in terms of 
morality. He criticized the lack of spirituality in Soviet society which was suppressed 
by state and party authoritarianism and bureaucracy. Criticizing the bureaucratic 
system of the Soviet state, he wrote: “The bureaucracy is far from self-sacrificing. 
Concealing the realities behind demagogic slogans, our officials make a mockery of 
social justice in housing, in health care (most people, for example, have no possibility 
of getting up-to-date medicines), in the quality of education, etc. The salaries of many 
workers, and especially those of rank-and-file intellectuals, have been artificially 
reduced, in effect imposing a hidden tax that weighs most heavily on the lowest paid. 
The great majority of pensions are shamefully inadequate. At the same time, elite 
groups enjoy enormous, unjust privileges” (Sakharov, 1990, p.77). Sakharov believed 
that the poorest should be compensated for the increased rent, higher prices for food 
and other expenses.
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He called for a true democratization of society, for free and fair elections, for the 
transfer of power to the Soviets, and for the exclusion of the Communist Party from 
the political system. Sakharov’s proposals could make the USSR a civilized demo-
cratic and rule-of-law state of West European type.
In this connection, “the enormous development” of various forms of corruption in 
the country, giving rise to mafia groups allied with the party and state apparatus, was 
seen by him as a crucial problem. When offering means to deal with the Soviet politi-
cal system, Sakharov paid special attention to glasnost. According to him, “Glasnost 
ought to create a new moral climate in the country…People should know the truth and 
be able to express their thoughts freely. Corrupting lies, silence, and hypocrisy should 
be banished from our lives forever” (Sakharov, 1990, p.82). Openness of society means 
monitoring by society of key government decisions, freedom of opinion, freedom to 
receive and impart information, and freedom to choose one’s country of residence 
and one’s domicile within that country in accordance with the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the Covenants of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations. 
According to Sakharov, the future social and political system of the USSR should 
be a mixed (public/private) economy, combining as much as possible flexibility, free-
doms, social achievements and regulation: “It is necessary to create an economic and 
legal environment, which encourages initiative, a flexible response to the economic 
situation, technical innovation, and excellent individual work without any impedi-
ments or restrictions imposed by ideological dogma” (Sakharov, 1990, p.83). Coop-
eratives, family and collective contractors were expected to play an important role 
in the economy. Sakharov put forward the idea of the convergence of capitalism and 
socialism that he believed would reduce the military and political tensions in the 
world. The aim of perestroika was a global and comprehensive disarmament and a 
balanced reduction of conventional and nuclear weapons up to the total destruction. 
“To retreat from the brink of global catastrophe, to preserve civilization and life itself 
on our planet, are necessary priorities… I am convinced that this can come about 
only as a result of profound geopolitical changes leading toward convergence of the 
capitalist and socialist systems, an open society, and greater equality for all races and 
peoples, not only juridical, but also economic, cultural and social equality. Mankind 
needs a new thinking!”, Sakharov wrote (Sakharov, 1990, p.93). The establishment of 
a new system involves enhancing international trust, the protection of human rights, 
law and freedom, social progress and democratization. 
Sakharov proposed to implement the following principles of the rule of law: 
“Freedom of speech and conscience; the possibility for private citizens and public 
organizations to contest before an independent tribunal the acts and decisions of all 
officials and government agencies; due process in trial and investigatory procedure 
(access to defence counsel from the very beginning of a criminal investigation; trial by 
jury; transfer of jurisdiction over criminal investigations from the Procurator’s office, 
which should be solely concerned with faithful execution of the Laws” (Sakharov, 
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1990, p.116). In the context of these proposals, he called for the humanization of the 
penal system in the USSR, and in particular, for the abolition of the death penalty.
Of particular interest are the measures proposed by Sakharov for dealing with 
ethnic problems in the USSR. He found it possible and necessary to create a new, 
national-constitutional system based on horizontal federalism: “This system would 
grant equal political, juridical, and economic rights to all existing national subdi-
visions regardless of their size or current status, maintaining the present borders… 
Persons of different nationalities living together in one Republic should enjoy equal 
political, cultural and social rights in law and in practice…. Any infringement of 
freedom of conscience is impermissible” (Sakharov, 1990, p.115). The principles laid 
down by Sakharov were to form a basis for a society with the synthesized values of 
social justice and human rights. 
The principles proposed by Sakharov were largely implemented in the Constitu-
tion of the Russian Federation of 1993, which served as a basis to draft a number of 
laws building new institutions of the rule-of-law state, such as a multiparty system, 
democracy, separation of powers, local self-government, entrepreneurship and 
others. 
The ideology of constitutional rule of law was reflected in the concept and activ-
ities of Sergei Alekseev. At the turn of the 1980-90s, he served as Chairman of the 
Committee on Legislation, Legality, Law and Order of the USSR Supreme Soviet and 
the Chairman of the Constitutional Supervision Committee of the USSR. Alekseev is 
rightfully considered as one of the main drafters of the current Constitution of the 
Russian Federation of 1993, along with Anatoly Sobchak and the contribution from 
Yuri Kalmykov and Stanislav Khokhlov. They developed an alternative to the official 
draft of the Constitution that included a fundamental section on natural human rights 
and freedoms. As interpreted by Alekseev, the concept of natural law is understood 
as “requirements and ideals driven by the natural and socially natural environment 
that are refracted through the sense of justice and cultural codes to take a legal shape 
and as such serve as legal requirements and prototypes of legal norms — the norms 
of positive law” (Alekseev, 1998, p.26). An advantage of natural law is that it performs 
a methodological function in relation to positive law, which “translates urgent social 
demands into norms.” 
However, Alekseev believes that requirements of natural law also have negative 
aspects that are expressed in morals, customs, religious and other rather vague ideo-
logical positions. Therefore, these requirements are often understood in an arbitrary 
way, “in line with ideas and ideological attitudes of people”, while violence and arbi-
trary action are sometimes “refined” by references to natural law. 
An advantage of positive law is that “as a large entity (a subsystem of society), it 
acts as a regulator of norms and values in the context of civilization” (Alekseev, 1998, 
p.30). Positive law ensures that society functions with continuous dynamics, achiev-
ing the stable reproduction of the social values, conditions and mechanisms that 
are reflected in law, including for the preservation and establishment of the limits 
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of freedom in people’s behavior. Alekseev believed that building a rule-of-law state 
in Russia requires that a “culture of law” be in place to take into account the current 
status of the country’s legal development and to be developed in accordance with 
“the positive legal realities of the past (the values of the Roman-Germanic (mainly 
Germanic) type – this was the path Russia firmly took and began to develop in the 
18th-19th centuries)” (Alekseev, 2001, p.152).
In general, we can see that the ideas of constitutionalism were consistently devel-
oped in the framework of the human rights movement in post-Soviet Russia. 
9.4  Constitutionalism in Today’s Russia 
The current Russian constitution adopted by popular vote in December, 1993 is the 
product of an axiological and social compromise that was the result of a longer con-
stitutional crisis than the events of October, 1993 (Sharlet, 1993). The origin of the 
compromise lies in the problem of search for a combination of individual freedom and 
competence of the state, the people and the power, spontaneous self-organization of 
society and the order, which is typical of Russian constitutionalism. Developed during 
an acute conflict between the two branches of power, representative and executive 
(according to another interpretation: old Soviet and new democratic forces), the con-
stitution proclaims liberal values of natural rights and freedoms of man and citizen 
and establishes the doctrine of the rule of law, separation of powers, democracy and 
civil society. The liberal values enshrined in the constitution also include cultural plu-
ralism of society, the freedom of choice in politics, economics and spiritual life, and 
the protection of privacy and private property. An important achievement of constitu-
tional process is the creation of the Constitutional Court. Institutional presence of the 
Constitutional Court in Russia is a sign of development of constitutionalism, although 
its role in Russia is estimated differently (Brzezinski, 1993; Scheppele, 2003).
In addition, the Russian Constitution lays down the standards of a social state 
and expresses the ideals of social justice. It preserves the rights to work, housing and 
social security, which emphasizes its relationship with the social philosophy of law 
and social law
Finally, the current Constitution has elements of the conservative philosophy 
of preserving the unity and integrity of the strong Russian state, while asserting the 
principle of federalism in its structure. Other conservative provisions include those 
that take into account specific features of the Russian social and spiritual culture 
located in the expression of a strong presidency (Fogelklou, 2003).
According to one of the drafters of the current Russian Constitution, Sergei 
Shakhrai, it is conceptually based on three main ideas. First, the Constitution is 
able to provide an ideological basis for public consent on the basis of ideas and 
principles that are equally important to all individuals regardless of their political 
views. Second, it is procedural in nature and as such applicable in the context of 
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a conflict between different branches of power or between the federal center and a 
region. Third, the Constitution has an organizational aspect, which allowed to use it 
as a general basis for social transformations in the country (Shakhrai, 2013, pp.15-16). 
Thus, the constitutional outlook affirmed the practical nature of the constitution as 
a tool for legal and socio-political transformations. In contrast to the Soviet constitu-
tions, which subordinated law to politics, the new Russian constitutionalism is based 
on the priority of law and its ability to serve as a “core of crystallization of the order” 
(Shakhrai, 2013, p.14). 
All this means that the current Russian Constitution is somewhat eclectic in value 
terms, which makes it flexible in selecting a possible option of the development of 
social relations. In general, the modern philosophy of law provides conditions within 
the framework of state constitutionalism to combine activities of a free and socially 
responsible individual and an endurable public order in Russia. In this philosophy, 
constitutionalism is not only of the liberal-innovative nature, but also has a conser-
vative sense closely related to the strengthening of the constitutional traditionalism. 
The ideology of conservative constitutionalism (or constitutional conservatism) aims 
at strengthening the constitutional nature of the country – the struggle for constitu-
tionalism. This task involves maintaining social peace, providing security of the state 
and taking into account public interests. Constitutionalism is seeking for a form of 
protection of human rights that would not undermine the security of the state. Indi-
vidual rights can only be restricted by law and only if they are abused. Based on this, 
it seems to be important to preserve the bases of the constitution that will enable us 
to take into account innovations that arise in society, while fighting for the constitu-
tion. Tolerant co-existence is the wisest constitutional position. As emphasized by the 
well-known Russian legal theorist and currently the Chairman of the Constitutional 
Court of the Russian Federation Vladimir Zor’kin, “our ideal is to connect the power 
and freedom on the basis of law as the only measure of freedom. It is only possible to 
achieve this by combining liberal measures and strong power. This is what conserva-
tive legal modernization is truly about…The main thing for us today is by all means 
not to allow the opposition between the individual and the state. It should be not 
‘either the state or the individual’, but ‘both the state and the individual’. This is the 
meaning of the Russian Constitution which is guarded by the Constitutional Court” 
(Zor’kin, 2013, p.30).
Important in this context is the discussion of an “economic constitution” (Zor’kin, 
Lazarev, 2010, p.26), which demonstrates the possibility to make the constitution 
more specific as the fundamental law as applied to the development of the most 
important sphere of society. This practice should be extended by considering not only 
the economy, but also politics, culture and morality. Theoretically, it also seems to be 
important to analyze the moral foundations of the constitutional process and develop 
the ethics of constitutionalism, which is associated with the moral positions of the 
actors of the constitutional process – judges of the Constitutional Court and their 
moral responsibility to society for decisions they make. 
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All this requires that a culture of constitutionalism be gradually developed and 
the constitutional consciousness be established in the public consciousness. In this 
context, it is relevant to cite Vladimir Geriye: “In this respect, the Russian public 
opinion has never played such an important role, nor has it ever had such a great 
responsibility. The fate of the Russian constitution, the fruit that it can yield, and 
thus the future of the country depend on what will be the public opinion about the 
current constitution in the first instance” (Geriye, 2008, 147). These words are in many 
respects relevant today. The constitutional process involves the gradual and steady 
improvement of the political system by enriching the enactment practices, building 
new political institutions, and providing the constitutional awareness of the society. 
At the same time, the constitutional process will serve as a restraint to prevent the 
authorities from making hasty, ill-considered political decisions and from using dog-
matic social standards that have lost their relevance and vitality.
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Bogdan Szlachta1
10  Theoretical Problems in the Preamble to the 1997 
Polish Constitution in the Perspective of History of 
Political Thought
Numerous questions of a general nature appear with regard to the text of the preamble 
to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland adopted in 1997. They are the outcome of 
the search, undertaken not only in Poland but also in many other states for a way to 
incorporate the main solutions worked out by the so-called modern political thought. 
My intention is not to discuss the multitudinous political declarations inscribed into 
the Polish Constitution of March 1921 and to prove that in the constitution of the end 
of the 20th century there are even more telling statements than in the basic law from 
the past. My aim is to formulate some observations concerning the roots of the provi-
sions which occur in the constitution in force and are set in the various traditions of 
political thought. For even now one can accept the thesis that the Polish constitution 
of the second millennium draws from various traditions of political thought, not only 
from the liberal and the democratic, but also from the socialist and even the conser-
vative traditions; moreover, it also draws from the republican tradition, the relation-
ship of which, with the liberal and conservative traditions, remains one of the most 
fascinating research problems undertaken today, mainly by the representatives of the 
“School of Cambridge.” Another result of this thesis would be that talking of one axi-
ology, based on a single “normative vision”, possibly rooted in a single “way of politi-
cal thinking”, is problematic. It seems that here we encounter a “complex axiology”, 
drawing from several traditions of political thinking based on various philosophical 
concepts, especially on the various concepts of man. 
Oddly, the introductory text for the Polish Constitution of 1997 contains no refer-
ence to the Polish State, a key reference for the Polish Constitution of 1935, which set 
the basis for the functioning of the Polish authorities in exile during World War II and 
up until 1991. The first sentence of the preamble points out the possibility of sovereign 
and democratic determination2 of the fate of the “Homeland,” regained in 1989, but 
there is no mention of a similar possibility of determining the fate of the Polish State. 
It seems that the authors of the Constitution were acquainted with both these terms; 
however, they were thinking more in terms of a “community” than of an “institution” 
and this is why they decided to use the first term. At least one component appears 
to justify this statement. In the following fragments of the text it is stated that the 
“Polish Nation” is created by all citizens of the Republic and that Poland represents 
1  The Jagiellonian University in Kraków.
2  All the fragments of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland quoted in the article are taken 
from: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm (access: 12.02.2016).
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the “common good.” If these components are to confirm the statement formulated 
above, it is necessary to assume that the “Homeland” and the “Polish State” are a 
common good and that both these categories need to be related to one more category: 
“Poland.” 
However, this thesis seems problematic since the term “Homeland” in the Polish 
tradition is usually associated with land as well as with the cultural traditions char-
acteristic of the “ethnic Poles” and of the citizens coming from beyond this ethnic 
community. Therefore, if the aim was to depict the category of “Polish Nation” under-
stood as a “political community” rather than an “ethnic community,” then the term 
“Homeland” should not have been associated only with ethnic nation but rather 
with the community of citizens, regardless of their ethnic roots. “Civic virtue” should 
be linked to the relationship between an individual and the state understood as an 
instance of a political and legal value; therefore, it could easily be associated with the 
Polish State. However, this leads to a fundamental debate, which is today especially 
intense in several parts of the world, often cast as a central dispute between liberals 
and republicans, those who regardless of the ethnic or ethnic and cultural roots place 
the “individual” first, and those who expect the individual to be “rooted” in a group. 
This is the reason why, as in the case of presenting the concepts of “liberal cul-
turalism,” the liberals challenge the relationship between that which is individual, 
and that which is collective; the issues of the protection of the individual against any 
oppression of the ethnic and cultural group in which that individual is rooted, and at 
the same time also of the protection of the group identities perceived as prominent in 
relation to the individual identities. It also turns out that republicans pay less atten-
tion to the individual and more to their “civil status,” their political relationship with 
the state or, as they sometimes say, the political community. They emphasize not so 
much the individuality of a man but his civil value; and not so much the anteriority of 
an individual in relation to every group, in fact created by individuals, but the rooting 
of an individual in a group, understood not as an ethnic or ethnic and cultural but 
as a political group. It appears that the authors of the Polish Constitution of 1997 are 
involved in this perhaps inconclusive debate. 
It seems that, as liberals, they emphasize the anteriority of the individual in rela-
tion to all communities (especially in the concluding fragment to the preamble which 
highlights the importance of sustaining the inherent dignity of the individual and his 
or her right to freedom), but also, as republicans, they place the individual within 
the “Polish Nation,” note the “perpetual guarantee” not for the “individual rights” or 
“human rights,” but the “civil rights” (however, in this case no relation to a state as 
the “moment” constituting all rights is indicated).
The statement that the authors of the Polish Constitution draw from various tra-
ditions, which at present remain in a state of serious tension because of the ongoing 
dispute about the influence of the “Atlantic republican tradition” in the West, does not 
exhaust the issues appearing in the preamble. On the one hand, as already stated, the 
“Polish Nation,” which includes all the citizens of the Republic of Poland regardless 
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of their ethnic and cultural roots, is spoken of, therefore, in a probable association 
with the Polish State (presumably to champion civic virtue). On the other hand, not 
only is it said that the “Polish Nation” is “culture rooted in the Christian heritage of 
the Nation and the universal values,” but its bond with the Poles remaining outside 
the territory of the Polish State is also emphasized: “…we, the Polish Nation – all 
citizens of the Republic… bound in a community with our compatriots dispersed 
throughout the world.” 
These two fragments of the preamble referring to the above “other hand” have 
neither a liberal nor a republican value. Instead, they are directed neither towards an 
individual as such, regardless of their community roots, nor towards a political com-
munity to which the individual belongs and, therefore, co-creates the “Polish Nation” 
as a “civil nation” of a political rather than ethnic or cultural status. Both fragments 
describe the Poles as an “ethnic nation” which is constituted by their common culture 
rooted both in the Christian heritage and in perceived universal values. 
This is yet another proposition which can be found in the preamble, leading 
towards a group of issues justifying the thesis about the theoretical multiplicity of 
the 1997 Constitution. However, it turns out that the provision about the rootedness 
of culture in the “Christian heritage” and “universal values” not only problematizes 
the two approaches pointed out earlier (i.e., liberal versus republican), but it can also 
suggest a certain kind of separability of the already mentioned sources. This sugges-
tion is intensified by a fragment appearing before it in the preamble, in the provision 
which pronounces that the “Polish Nation” is created by “all citizens of the Republic, 
both those who believe in God as the source of truth, justice, good and beauty as well 
as those not sharing such faith but respecting those universal values as arising from 
other sources.” Here, for the first time, the “universal values” are mentioned (which 
are supposed to be truth, justice, good and beauty); however, they are drawn either 
from God or from “other sources.” A problem of substantial philosophical standing, 
resulting from the thesis about the “establishing,” most probably by God, of that 
which was called the “universal values,” about their appearing as a result of God’s 
will, can be omitted here, along with the inspiring discussion whether opting for the 
voluntaristic solution is a justifiable (and the only possible) approach towards the 
universal values as being constituted by God and not as the result of God’s consti-
tution but as the result of their “everlasting existence,” as perceived by those who 
do not believe in God or who at least do not draw the “universal values” from His 
will. Nevertheless, while omitting these important issues, we should also realize that 
their complexity, and especially their “duality,” can affect understanding of the provi-
sion about the culture rooted in Christian heritage (on the one hand) and in universal 
values (on the other). 
Whether this kind of reading affects the ethnic and cultural rootedness of Poles, 
is found among other citizens of the Republic of Poland, presents another impotant 
issue, perhaps also useful for understanding the complexity of the relationships 
between the Poles, who create an ethnic and cultural group, and those (on the one 
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hand) who, while being Poles, having the same culture, remain outside the country, 
and those (on the other hand), with whom the Poles co-create the political “Polish 
Nation” within the country, as citizens of the same state (named in the preamble “Rzec-
zpospolita Polska” [Republic of Poland]). The Poles living in the country are bound by 
the commonality of the roots with the first group (having common ethnic and cultural 
roots, though resulting from two potentially different sources), emphasized not only 
by the reference to the “best traditions of the First and the Second Republic” made in 
the preamble, but also by the commitment formulated there, to bequeath to “future 
generations” all “that is valuable from our over one thousand years’ heritage” (refer-
ring, most probably, mainly to cultural and political achievements). 
The second group, comprised of the citizens who do not have roots in the Polish 
cultural heritage, are bound only by the civil union: it is with them, with the members 
of this group and not with the members of the previous group, that they, as citizens, 
co-create the “Polish Nation” of a political value. The members of the “Polish Nation” 
who remain in the country, who have Polish citizenship regardless of their ethnic and 
cultural roots, who may or may not believe in God, should, in any case, be grateful 
to their ancestors for their efforts, struggle and culture and at the same time they 
should also receive equal treatment when it comes to rights and obligations towards 
the common good.
The last fragment raises another concern. All the issues already pointed out, 
which prove the multiplicity of approaches present in the 1997 Constitution of the 
Republic of Poland, should be complemented with remarks about the equality of 
rights and obligations of all citizens towards the common good – Poland, and also 
about the role of the basic law, included in this part of the Constitution. According to 
the preamble, the “Polish Nation” (“civil”) establishes the Constitution as the “as the 
basic law for the State, based on respect for freedom and justice, cooperation between 
the public powers [and not on the division of them], social dialogue as well as on the 
principle of subsidiarity in the strengthening the powers of citizens and their com-
munities.” Firstly, it is worth noting that the “Polish Nation” in this fragment becomes 
in a certain way subjectivized, since it is its will (a “collective will”?) that becomes 
the source of the basic law. The basic law exists to determine the “basic laws for the 
state.” Would this “Nation,” therefore, be primary in relation to the “state”? Would 
the will of this Nation be establishing that which becomes a collection of “basic laws” 
for (perhaps) the state constituted in this manner with regard to its “legal dimen-
sion”? Finally, does the state exist before this establishment as a “structure” or an 
“institution” only in the “plan of factuality,” and through this establishment some 
extra, “normative” dimension is bestowed on it?
There is no need to refer to the concept of “constitution of a well-ordered society” 
proposed by Rawls to notice the priority of the “Polish Nation” conceptualized in this 
way (once again: perceived as a “civil nation”) towards the state. It is the subjectiv-
ized “Polish Nation” (as a collection of citizens, and not as a community bound with a 
common culture, even if it were to result from a “two-source origin”) that is to posses 
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the will with the use of which it can establish the Constitution as the “laws basic 
for the state.” In this approach, the “Polish Nation” is prior towards the state. And 
here a problem arises which needs additional attention: if a citizen appears only as 
a member of the state, it is impossible to talk about citizenship as prior to the state; 
the theoretical issue here is of a serious nature and caused serious controversy in the 
past, which related to understanding the state as a structure embodied by a monarch 
associated not with his subjects but in the first place with God, and constituting the 
“basic laws” for the subjects, or as “something” with is “embodied” by the “people” 
who establish the basic laws for themselves (and also for the state associated with 
them). Regardless of the complexity of this issue, it should be stressed that in the pre-
amble to the Constitution a question is introduced that should be emphasized once 
again: if this solution, which seems to be well grounded (even though problematic), 
about the priority of the “Polish Nation” with relation to the state would be accepted, 
or in the case of accepting the thesis about the simultaneous existence of the “Polish 
Nation” and the state, there remains the matter of the absence of the basic laws before 
the legal judgment pronounced by the “Polish Nation.” This subject, therefore, would 
operate in a certain “normative vacuum” and only its judgment would provide access 
to the basic laws. Moreover, even if the state would act on the basis of the “basic laws” 
established for it by the “Polish Nation,” the legal activity of the “Nation” would be 
based not on the law, not even on the “basic laws,” but on the “fact” which would not 
be preceded or regulated even by the “basic laws.” This solution is typical for the con-
temporaries, as well as for several modern concepts; however, it is actually specific 
to these concepts which emphasize the role of “factuality” as the foothold or even 
the source of the “normative sphere” (with an additional problem: does the so-called 
naturalistic fallacy, known to ethicists, occur here?) 
Referring to the fragment quoted above, which states that the “Polish Nation” 
establishes the Constitution as the “basic laws for the state,”, it is worth noting one 
more issue: the fragment mentions the “basic laws” established not for the individ-
ual or the citizen, but for the state, the “laws” which, however, are to be based “on 
respect” (a highly problematic formula) for both freedom (whose freedom? of the state 
or of the individuals-citizens?) and justice (what kind of justice? understood in what 
way? referring to some “normative order” of a higher standard or rather to individual 
entitlements, rights or freedoms, or perhaps to the mutual obligations of groups and 
individuals which together make up the so-called “Polish Nation” “understood as 
civil”?). Furthermore, the “basic laws” established for the state are also to be based 
on the “cooperation of authorities” and on “public dialogue.” They “are to be based,” 
which means that the “cooperation of authorities” and the “public dialogue” are no 
doubt prior to the provisions which refer to them. 
What is more, there is mention about the “the principle of subsidiarity in 
strengthening the powers of citizens and their communities”; therefore, the “rights of 
the citizens and their communities” would surely have to be prior towards the provi-
sions which announce the realization of the principle of subsidiarity, for they are to 
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“sustain” the “rights” (which probably already exist) of both the citizens and their 
communities. Referring to the latter question one’s attention is drawn once again to 
the interesting debate between the followers of the liberal tradition and the follow-
ers of the republican tradition, who have a different understanding of not only the 
freedom of the individual in relation to the potential freedom of the community co-
created by individuals and their “smaller communities,” but also the existence and 
the juridical value of “rights.” 
The problem also involves a much more serious theoretical issue concerning the 
rights of the citizens (and not of individuals, so rather of those who remain in such 
a relation to the state which justifies “civic virtue,” than of those who have not yet 
entered such a relation) as potentially the first provisions of the Constitution which, 
after all, crowns (according to some scholars, at least in a declarative or postulative 
manner) the structure of the state legal system.
This issue is also related to the problem which can be described as follows: it has 
already been said that in the preamble there is no reference to the state (however, 
its name: the Republic of Poland appears; the term “state” can be found in the pre-
amble only once, when mentioning the Constitution of the Republic of Poland as the 
“basic laws for the state”), as well as that in its text there is a reference to the “civil 
rights” which the “Polish Nation” (while establishing the Constitution “as the basic 
laws for the state”) wishes to guarantee “for all time” thanks to itself (or them). There-
fore, the “Polish Nation” is to guarantee the civil rights through the establishment 
of the Constitution, and not the human rights which are mentioned in the preamble 
when the confession occurs that “all citizens of the Republic co-creating the Polish 
Nation are aware of the bitter experiences of the times when fundamental freedoms 
and human rights were violated in our Homeland”. Further, considering that the pre-
amble mentions “universal values” and lists among them truth, justice, good and 
beauty, it should also be added that it subsequently recalls one of these “values”, 
that is justice, in the fragments which refer to the foundations of the Constitution 
as the “basic laws for the state”; however, there is no mention of the “truth of the 
human person” or the good of the single individual or/and group as well as the entire 
“Nation”. Nevertheless, in the concluding fragment of the preamble a statement can 
be found which draws attention to another highly problematic issue. Indeed, a state-
ment occurs with the value of a postulate addressed to those who apply the Constitu-
tion for the good of the Third Republic, while the reference to the good of the “Third 
Republic” (would that be the “name of the state”?) is accompanied by an indicator 
according to which the Constitution should be applied paying respect to the inherent 
dignity of the person, their rights and freedoms, and the obligation of solidarity with 
others. The respect for these “directional principles” is to constitute the unshakeable 
foundation of the Republic of Poland, through which its good (the good of the com-
munity, perhaps some “subjectivized community”?) becomes tightly connected with 
honouring these principles, with such an implementation of the constitutional norms 
which would consider the care for the inherent dignity of the person, their freedoms 
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and the obligation of solidarity with others. The good of the state is in this way inter-
preted from the point of view of the application of constitutional norms according to 
“directional principles”, and not according to the contents of these principles. 
It seems apparent that in this way the provisions of the preamble open a dis-
cussion about the primary character of constitutional norms towards that which is 
named the inherent dignity of the person, their freedom and the obligation of solidar-
ity. However, they do not open a similar discussion about the issue of the primary 
character of these norms towards the civil rights, which are to be “guaranteed for 
all time.” The authors of the Constitution of 1997 most probably assumed that inas-
much as the rights of every citizen are prior towards the constitutional provisions 
and towards the “basic laws for the state” (could this mean that he or she, together 
with other citizens, is supposed to be the “primary guardian” of the legislation?), the 
“human rights do not posses such a value”3.
3  There have been some attempts to solve this problem by stating that the notion of human laws (but 
not citizen laws as the preamble pronounces) needs to be first of all determined on the “philosophical 
and legal level”, defined within the former as the moral imperatives (moral obligations), and it needs 
to be decided that their source rests in the inherent dignity of the person and refers to shaping the place 
for an individual in the society and the state, and especially the protection of values of fundamental 
importance to development and self-realization of an individual. The “human rights” in this approach 
are associated with the inherent dignity of the person and with the obligations of moral value: such 
obligations, moral but not legal, are to be the first goal of democratic state which should translate the 
moral imperatives into the language of legal norms (Prawo konstytucyjne Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 
[Constitutional law of the Republic of Poland], Ed. P. Sarnecki, ed. 3, Warszawa 1999, p. 44). This the-
sis is important in the sense that the democratic legal state is almost a priori obligated (by whom?) to 
accept the moral imperatives and to grant them a legal shape. The structure of the argument, which 
seems to correspond with the contents of the Constitution, suggests that firstly there exists some “re-
ality” which has a moral value and constitutes the source of human laws also having moral value, and 
that the goal of a democratic legal state is to “translate” the “moral imperatives” set in this reality into 
“legal norms”. However, it is worth noting that the existence of such a “moral reality” is not men-
tioned in the preamble to the Polish Constitution of 1997, unless we decide that it is constituted by the 
“two-source” culture which perhaps in some way influences the method of constructing (interpret-
ing?) morality and its appropriate imperatives. The preamble also suggests the existence of the civil 
rights (and not the human rights) which are to be „guaranteed for all time”, that its authors decided 
that these rights (and not the human rights) would potentially exist in a specific “moral reality” (per-
haps also of juridical importance, since the civil rights are to be guaranteed by the Constitution) prior 
towards the legislative will of the “Polish Nation”. We can also stipulate that the research carried out 
today by the so-called philosophers of politics more and more often leads to the conclusion that each 
of the individual rights (a human right or a civil right) is established only through the will of a group 
of subjects including everyone on whom these rights are bestowed. This implies that prior to the “act 
of bestowing” these rights do not exist, that – and this remark is of a more serious nature – prior to-
wards the decisions of a legislator no “moral reality” exists, there is no sphere anterior towards them 
out of which the human rights and/or the civil rights could be drawn. Being aware of these stipula-
tions – so important for the constitutional debates carried out in several countries, especially after the 
end of World War II when the research concerning the “higher normative order” (sometimes associ-
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ated with natural law understood as a set of norms, thus with the set of legal rules and norms) basi-
cally became abundant. I will limit myself to an indication that the “translation” of moral norms 
(understood as imperatives, that is obligations, or principles which are assuredly the basis of these 
obligations) into the language of legal norms may not take place due to the absence of this “reality” 
which is supposed to be translated, due to the absence of that which we call the moral imperatives 
(obligations). This statement is, of course, highly controversial and can be criticized from several 
points of view (it was also criticized by the author of these words in the text Państwo prawa z perspe-
ktywy konserwatywnej filozofii polityki (zarys problematyki) [The legal state in the approach of the 
conservative philosophy of politics (an outline of the problem)]; [in:] Spory wokół teorii i praktyki 
państwa prawa [Disputes over the theory and practice of legal state], Ed. G. Ulicka, S. Wronkowska, 
Warszawa 2011, p. 29-46). It is, however, worth formulating because also the text of the preamble 
leads towards it, especially in those fragments in which – as it has already been pointed out – the 
non-homogeneity of the sources of Polish culture and the non-homogeneity of the sources of “univer-
sal values” are emphasized, which for some people can be changeable (e.g. when they originate from 
God’s will) and for other people cannot, and which by some can be perceived differently than by oth-
ers etc. The attempts to prove that there exists one catalogue of “universal values” which is complete, 
free of contradictions and having the ultimate value are nowadays contested as having a “totalitarian 
potentiality”. As such, this conviction is not generally accepted, which is visible also in the Polish 
experience. It is also worth raising one more issue which appears often even in the manuals: some-
times it is assumed, just as in the previously mentioned study on the Polish constitutional law, that 
the analysis of the human rights on the legal level needs to be carried out in relation to the notion of 
rights (“someone’s rights”) as a specific type of a legal situation of an individual, that is a situation cre-
ated by law; the problematic, as previously demonstrated, moral imperatives associated with the in-
herent dignity of the person on this level become the rights, e.g. they become legal situations created 
by substantive law and thus by the legal norms. That which was recognized as the “first goal of a 
democratic legal state” becomes, therefore, realized thanks to the “translation of the moral impera-
tives into the language of legal norms”, thanks to the legislator’s will to bestow the legal value on the 
moral norms while pursuing the above mentioned goal. The rules are a legal situation of an individual 
based on the assumption that it can demand a specific act from a different subjects (an act or an omis-
sion) to its own benefit, whereas on the specific subject rests the legal obligation to realize this act. 
Therefore, a moral imperative translated into the language of legal norms gives not only an ability to 
act to the one on whom it is bestowed, but also an obligation which corresponds to the ability, resting 
on the addressee of the demand claimed by the subject, who may now use not only the moral, but also 
the legal ability. Indeed, both the moral imperative and the legal rule indicate the existence of two 
sides of the relationship regulated by them: the party to whom the ability is ascribed, and the party on 
whom rests the obligation corresponding to that ability. The “able party” demands realization of the 
obligation (as a “legal duty”) from the other party, that is the public authorities. I would like to stress 
once again that the issue refers to human rights and not the civil rights, and that it is suggested that it 
is the human rights which are to gain a juridical value, and not the civil rights (to which the pro-
nouncement of the preamble about being “guaranteed for all time” refers). This issue is less problem-
atic while it refers to the obligation of applying the human rights (the earlier “moral imperatives”) by 
the executive powers, for these should act on the basis of the established legal norms and within the 
limits set by these norms, and at the same time they are to apply the Constitution – according to the 
postulate included in the preamble – while paying respect to the inherent dignity of the person, his or 
her right to freedom, the obligation of solidarity with others, thus respecting the principles of the un-
shakeable foundation of the Republic of Poland, of the Polish State. This issue is far more problematic 
when one considers the authorities establishing the law, the legislature. For indeed these authorities 
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decide the contents of the set of legal rules and norms and determine the contents of conduct of the 
other authorities of the state, they also shape the set of rights and associate with them the sanction 
directed against the subjects on whom rests the obligation to respect or to realize the abilities-rights 
of the eligible individuals. In the case of the lack of realization of this act by the subject on whom rests 
the “legal obligation” (e.g. public authorities), an individual is granted a legal means which will allow 
for the enforcement of the obligation, for the ability to enforce the law by an individual is the necessary 
feature of the rights, as it is stated further in the argumentation. Therefore, the rights protect the abil-
ity being at first just a “moral imperative”, and by bestowing on it the legal value determines the legal 
means enabling the eligible subject to enforce the obligation resting on the other party, on the public 
authorities. This structure “places” the eligible subject against the obligated subject, granting the 
former with legal means which are to enable the enforcement of the obligations resting on the other 
party from that party. The problem is that it is the state which is recognized as the obligated party, 
from which the eligible individual (after transforming his or her moral ability into an ability of the 
legal value) can claim the realization of an obligation resting on it which corresponds to the ability 
(“moral imperative”), previously moral, recognized as worthy of legal protection by the state authori-
ties which establish the law. Not going into the discussion regarding one of the most serious problems 
in the history of modern philosophy of politics, concerning the subject able to reveal the list and the 
contents of such “moral imperatives”, not entering into the discussion about – as some historians of 
doctrines call it – the “sovereignty” of the individual, the people, the parliament, the head of state or 
indeed the state itself, I would like to indicate that the existence of the mentioned “imperatives” sets 
the limits of legislative freedom of the subject establishing the legal norms, no matter who that subject 
is. At this point, however, occurs a controversial statement which is the result of accepting the ana-
lyzed structure: the rights – which is cognate to legal positivists, write the authors of the manual, and 
similar lines of argument can be found in the majority of books dedicated to contemporary constitu-
tional law – is shaped, and not “passed in the final form”, by the legal norm which is to determine the 
contents of that which first existed as an imperative-moral principle. Therefore, “at the final authori-
ty” it is the will of the legislator which decides not only about granting the legal value to the moral 
imperative-principle, but also about granting it the “legal form”. The legislator shaping the contents 
of the rights is not in fact bound by the contents of the moral imperative-principle, and it is not about 
discerning it but about granting it a form, about confirming it in its own contents which may be unde-
fined in the imperative itself. It also seems that this imperative possesses “to the end” only a moral 
value, and not a legal value, since the legal value occurs only in relation to the act of establishing the 
will of the authority shaping the contents of the law, moreover, shaping it in an imperative manner. 
The problem encountered here is of a fundamental nature. On the one hand it is about the juridical 
value of the rights associated so often with the human rights (in spite of the fact that the Constitution 
announces only the guaranteeing “for all time” of the civil rights), and on the other hand it is about 
the authorities of the legislator setting the norms of a lower standard with regard to those included in 
the Constitution. In the latter case it is expected that the legislator will honour the rights granted to 
each person on the territory of the Polish State (as it is established by Art. 37 Par. 1 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Poland) and that it will take into account the article of the Constitution which states 
not only that The inherent and inalienable dignity of the person shall constitute a source of freedoms 
and rights of persons and citizens but also that this dignity shall be inviolable and that The respect and 
protection thereof shall be the obligation of public authorities, including the authorities of the legisla-
ture (Art. 30 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland). More on the subject, see e.g. B. Szlachta, 
Państwo a obywatel (uwagi o pojmowaniu obywatelstwa i praw z nim związanych) [The state versus the 
citizen (remarks on understanding citizienship and the laws related to it], [in:] Państwo jako wyzwanie 
[The state as a challenge], Ed. A. Rzegocki, Kraków 2000, p. 75-103.
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This way of reading, though characterized by the frequent usage of the structure 
“it seems,” problematizes to an even greater extent the issue of the anteriority of a 
person who is not a citizen before the appearance of the state, or (as in the Constitu-
tion) the anteriority of a citizen who becomes a citizen in relation not so much to the 
already existing state based on some normative structure, but in relation to the state 
as a certain, specific “pre-normative fact” associated perhaps not with the “structure 
of power” but with the “community of human subjects” (again: was this the intention 
of the authors of the Constitution, or where they thinking of some “pre-normative 
community” treated as the “pre-legal state”, and having the ability to establish for 
itself a “normative structure” and to “transform” into the state based on the “norma-
tive structure” established by this community?). With regard to the latter issue, this 
intensifies the problem concerning the existence of a citizen together with his or her 
rights which are to be guaranteed through the “basic laws” established by the “Polish 
Nation” for the state and therefore by the citizens of the Republic of Poland somehow 
existing before the establishment of the “basic laws for the state”. The same can be 
said for the problem of a citizen’s existence as, on the one hand, a co-creator of the 
“basic laws for the state” and, on the other, the subject of laws “guaranteed” by the 
organs of the state, due to the realization of the “basic laws for the state” which are to 
guarantee “for all time” the rights for all citizens, co-established by them. 
It therefore becomes apparent that discovered several controversial issues can 
be found in just the preamble to the Polish Constitution of 1997. These topics may 
be particularly of interest not only to historians of political thought or philosophers 
of politics, but also to philosophers of law, or even ethicists. An incomplete series of 
controversies was described in the text and presented to the Readers more as a set of 
questions than a set of answers. However, perhaps it is worth posing questions even 
while reflecting over the texts of a written constitution, if only to be able to search 
more consciously for the answers to the more detailed questions. 
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